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CHAPTER I 
THE NATURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Argumentation has always held a central place in the study of 
1 rhetoric. Despite the importance of argumentation, however, no theory 
of argumentation has proven to be entirely satisfactory in explaining 
how decisions made in everyday conversations should be reached. 2 
Initial explorations into the nature of argument drew heavily from 
classical logic. This is perhaps due to a tendency to equate logic 
with the syllogism, and to limit the types of arguments that can be 
considered sound with those that can be transposed into syllogistic 
3 form. This position, while still advocated in some form by many, is 
4 
unfortunately limited. Toulmin, for example, notes that there are 
1s ee Karl Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons, 11 
Q.J.S., XLIX (Oct., 1963), 239-249, 
7:see Steven B. Hunt, "The Genre of Rational Argument," (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 197~). 
3 See Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyer's Reasonings (Stanford: 
University Press, 1968). 
4 See David W. Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," Western 
Speech, XXX (Fall, 1966), 141-247; Lynn Anderson and C. David 
Mortensen, "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation, 11 ~-, LIII (April, 
1967), 143-151; Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of Logic 
in Rhetoric," Q.J.S., LIV (Oct., 1968), 260-267, David W. Shepard, "The 
Role of Logic," ~-, LV (Oct., 1969), 310-312, Hugh G. Petrie, 
"Does Logic have any Relevance to Argumentation?" J.A.F.A., VI (Spring, 
1969), 55-60, and C. David Mortensen and Ray Lynn Anderson, "The 
Limits of Logic," J.A.F.A., VII (Spring, 1970), 71-78. 
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several distinctions between analytical syllogistic arguments and 
those that take place in everyday discourse: 
(1) The distinction between necessary arguments and 
probable arguments ••• 
(11) The distinction between arguments which are formally 
valid and those which cannot hope to be formally valid ••• 
(111) The distinction between those arguments, including 
ordinary syllogisms, in which a warrant is relied on 
whose adequacy and applicability have previously been 
established, and those arguments which are themselves 
intended to establish the adequacy of a warrant. 
(iv) The distinction between arguments expressed in 
terms of 'logical connectives' or quantifiers and those 
not so expressed ••• 
(v) The fundamental distinction between analytic arguments 
and substantial ones .•• s 
Anderson and Mortensen suggest that: 
Given the full powers of language, much rhetorical 
argument may be simply beyond logic. In the midst of 
renewed interest in the relacionships between logic and 
rhetorical argumentation, a troublesome question must be 
approached afresh: namely, under what language conditions 
are available logical systems applicable for the assesment 
of the logical worth of rhetorical arguments.6 
While there may be some use to the study of the craditional 
syllogism, it is of limited value. Much argument does not take the 
form of the syllogism, and formal logic is of little help in evaluating 
the premises of a syllogism, it merely helps us decide what inferences 
can be drawn, given the premises, a guideline that often provides no 
information that is new. Toulmin suggests that traditional syllogisms 
tend to be analytic; providing no new information in the conclusion 
7 that was not already known. 
5stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1958), pp. 148-149. 
6Anderson and Mortensen, p. 143. 
7Toulmin, p. 127. 
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There have been several attempts to create new theories of 
argumentation. One such theory was proposed by Toulmin. Hunt8 
suggested that some of the key contributions of Toulmin to argumenta-
tion theory was his developmenL of the concept of field-dependency 
and his discussion of the implications of fields. Essentially, 
Toulmin posits the notion that there are fields (or disciplines) 9 of 
arguments, and that argumentation has both field-varient and field-
invarient characteristics. The study of fields of arguments can aid 
in both understanding how argument functions in that field, and how 
argument functions in other fields: 
• our analysis allows us to compare the patterns 
of historical change in different kinds of collective 
enLerprises. The central feature of our account was a 
model of historical development in 1 compact disciplines', 
but we have seen that an understanding of the conditions 
required for the applicability of this model can throw 
light also on other fields of human activity, which are 
not fully disciplinable. If we contrast the compact 
disciplines ••• with the more diffuse disciplines ••• 
this can help us to understand better, not only those 
collective human enterprises which 5re in fact disciplina-
ble, but also those which are not. 1 
Given the potential insights provided by the study of fields of argu-
ments, furLher exploration would seem to be Justified, 
8 Hunt, pp. 14, 119. 
9 Toulmin uses both the terms field and discipline to cover 
the same concept. The term field appears more in The Uses of Argument, 
while the tern discipline appears in Human Understanding:_ The 
Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton· Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1977). 
lOToulmin, Human Understanding, p. 508, 
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The phrase, 11 field of argument11 , 1.s first introduced by Toulmin 
in his book, The Uses of Argument. He argued that: 
Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field 
when the data and conclusions in each of the two argumenLs 
are, respectively, of the same logical type: they will 
be said to come from two different fields when the 
backing or the conclusions in eac~ of the two arguments 
are not of the same logical type. 1 
Exactly what is meant by "the same logical type" is not made explicit 
in this work, although Toulmin does give several examples of what he 
considers fields, including science, law, ethics, and art-criLicism. 
To confuse matters even more, in Human Understanding, Toulmin refers 
to fields as 11 discipl1nes" and subdivides disciplines into compact, 
' 12 diffuse, and would-be disciplines which would suggest that Toulmin 
felt that fields were more complex than he originally hypothis1zed. 
He argues, however, that the more developed disciplines evolve into 
compact disciplines, which have several characteristics: 
(1) The activities involved are organized around and 
directed towards a specific and realistic set of agreed 
collective ideals. (2) These collective ideals unpose 
corresponding demands on all who commit themselves to 
the professional pursuit of the activities concerned. 
(3) The resulting discussions provide disciplinary loci 
for the production of 'reasons', in the context of 
Justificatory arguments whose function is LO show how 
far procedural 1nnovat1ons measure up to these collective 
demands. (4) For this purpose, professional forums are 
developed, within which recognized 'reason-producing-
procedure51 are employed to Justify the collective 
acceptance of novel procedures. (5) Finally, the same 
11Toulmin, Uses of Argument, p. 14. 
12Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 378. 
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collective ideals determine the criteria of adequacy 
by appeal to which the arguments produced in support of 
those innovations are Judged.13 
Examples of these compacc disciplines include "the better-established 
physical and biological sciences, in the more mature technologies 
14 
and in the better-conducted Judicial systems." These disciplines 
can also have sub-disciplines. 15 
Toulmin also examines why disciplines come about. He suggests, 
for example, that disciplines come about because the divisions of 
knowledge seem to have some practible purpose: 
••• the boundary between disciplinable and non-disciplinable 
activities runs where it does because, in the course of 
their practical experience, men have discovered that it is 
both functionally possible and humanly desirable to isolate 
certain classes of issues and make them the concern of 
specialized bodies of enquiries; while with issues of 
other kinds this turns out to1ge either impossible, or 
undesirable, or both at once. 
The original division of argument into fields is probably based on the 
types of problems that a field is concerned with: 
At the very beginning of our inquiry, we introduced the 
notion of a field of arguments, by referring to the 
different sorts of problem to which arguments can be 
addressed. If fields of argument are different, that is 17 
because they are addressed to different sorts of problems. 
13rbid., p. 379. 
14 380, Ibid., p. 
15 
lb id. , p. 365. 
16 Ibid., p. 405. 
17Toulmin, Uses of Argument, p. 16 7. 
Thus· 
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The crucial element in a collective discipline •.• 
is the recognition of a sufficiently agreed goal or 
ideal, in terms of which common outstanding problems 
can be identified. 18 
A discipline does not remain static, and much of Human Understanding 
is devoted to how disciplines change over time. While the problems 
a discipline faces may remain the same over time, the approaches 
taken by the field will change. New theories will emerge from within 
the discipline. Both the new theory and the old theory will share 
certain common grounds; especially views as to how the arguments are 
to be evaluated· 
For the parties to such a debate - both those who cling 
to the older theory and those who put forward a newer one 
- would still share some common ground, not any common 
body of oretical notions, perhaps, but rather certain 
shared disciplinary conceptions, reflecting their 
collective intellectual ambitions and rational mathods, 
selection-procedures and criteria of adequacy. 19 
Over a period of time, the discipline may change dramacically. While 
the discipline tends to have an independent body of ''concepts, methods, 
and fundamental aims'1 that remains constanc, the content of a 
discipline can change drastically over time. 20 Thus disciplines are 
both continuous and changing: 
Such continuity and change consist in the generation of 
intellectual novelties, only a few of which win acceptance, 
thereby surviving and winning an ongoing place in the 
18Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 364. 
19 Ibid., p. 79. 
201bid., p. 139. 
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conceptual pool associated with a discipline. 
The mechanisms whereby such conceptual variants 
succeed in winning widespread acceptance in the 
discipline or fail to are of two sorts: reasons 
and causes. The reasons constitute rational processes 
for the evaluation of intellectual novelties or 
conceptual variants, and the causes are those various 
social and other factors, such as the I intellectual 
politics'- of disciplines which sometimes override 
reason, and in any case are an important force in 
shaping the accepted intellectual content of a 
discipline. 21 
The importance of change to Toulmin cannot be underestimated. 
For Toulmin, the maJor shortfall of craditional logic is that it 
emphasized a static view of argument and did not give adequate 
attention to the manner in which new ideas and new concepts are 
developed. The key to argumentation is to discover the way ideas 
evolve, and the way new concepts replace old concepts· 
••• in science and philosophy alike, an exclusive 
preoccupation with logical systematicity has been 
destructive of both historical understanding and 
rational criticism. Men demonstrate their rationality, 
not by ordering their concepts and beliefs in tidy 
formal structures, but by their preparedness to 
respond to novel situations with open minds - acknowledging 
the shortcomings of their former procedures and moving 
beyond them.22 
Argumentation is not static; it involves a process of testing old ideas 
against new ideas. The study of argument includes not only the content 
of arguments, but also the structure of the discipline in which the 
argument takes place, including such things as the organization of the 
disciplines, the structure of the publications of the disciplines, and 
21Frederick Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories (Chicago· 
University of Illinois Press, 1977), pp. 674-5. 
22 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 278. 
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the nature of the authorities in a discipline that accept or reJect 
new ideas. 23 Argument is not only rational, its acce~tance in a 
discipline may depend on the internal political structure of a 
?6.. discipline.- Argument in a discipline thus has an element of the 
political, although there are limits to this element. 25 
Toulmin' s theory of fields of argument suggests many possible 
insights into the nature of argument, especially if his conclusions 
in the philosophy of science apply to other fields. Unfortunately, 
much of Toulmin's discussion of fields leaves several critical 
questions unanswered. Hunt notes that Toulmin does not adequately 
define exactly what a field is, although Toulmin does give a few 
examples of fields. 26 The way arguments are evaluated witl:un a field 
is also unclear: 
Toulmin' s model has some potential as an explanatory tool; 
but its adequacy becomes marred by the fact that Toulmin 
has precious little to say about what constitutes 11 good 
reasoning" in the evaluation of intellectual novelties 
other than to say it involves "rational bets" as to which 
of the available competing intellectual novelties is the 
best way to proceed. But in the absence of some sort of 
account as to what constitutes a rational bet, we are left 
in the dark. 27 
In addition, since most of Toulmin' s examples are drawn from science, 
it 1s not clear that his observations apply to other fields of argument. 
23 Ibid., p. 278. 
24 Suppe, pp. 677-678. 
25 Toulmin, Human Understanding, 502. 
26 Hunt, p. 119. 
?7 - Suppe, pp. 679-680. 
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Thus, while the concept of fields offers some promise to scholars of 
argumentation, the potentials of this concept have yet to be explored 
in depth. 
Method of Approach 
Perhaps the best way to examine Toulmin' s theory of fields of 
arguments is to explore one field of argument in depth, and to apply 
insights gained from that study both to Toulmin' s theory of argumenca-
tion and to argumentation in general. Presumably, the contents of any 
single field of argument will contain both field variant characteris-
tics, and field invariant characteristics that can apply to other fields 
of argumentation. The question becomes, which field should be examined? 
As previously noted, Toulmin suggests that the most productive 
type of field to study would be a compact field. These include the 
physical and biological sciences, technologies, and sophisticated 
Judicial systems. Toulmin devotes most of Human Understanding to the 
application of his concept of fields of argument to the sciences, but 
the application to legal argumentation is made only in passing. 28 
This is unfortunate, since legal argumentation is the only discipline 
Toulmin lists as a compact discipline that is not a hard science. 
Unless the concept of fields can be shown to apply to legal reasoning, 
the value of Toulmin~s theory as anything more than a philosophy of 
science is unclear. It would thus seem logical to study the field of 
legal argument in order to study the applicability of Toulmin' s 
concepts of field to other disciplines in the social sciences. 
?8 - See footnote 14. 
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There are other Justifications for such a choice. TNithin the 
Speech Communication discipline there has been an increased interest 
in legal communication, as evidenced by the creation of a comnnttee 
on Communication and Law in the Speech Communication Association. 
Indeed, the origins of law and rhecoric have much in common. Abbott 
notes: 
It is generally accepted that the study of rhetoric was 
born in response to the needs of the law courts of ancient 
Greece. The division of rhetoric and law which came later 
was, ... the perpetuation of an almost accidental 
division.29 
Given the historical connection between law and rhetoric, legal 
argumentation as it exists today would seem to be an appropriate field 
of study. 
Legal reasoning also holds a special position in the hierarchy 
of argumentative fields. Legal reasoning is viewed as being helpful 
in understancing other types of reasoning: 
There are quite a number of other similarities between the 
kinds of reasoning that go on in Philosophy and in Law. 
A thorough training in the forms of legal reasoning ought 
to strengthen the intellectual repertory of any thinking 
man. 30 
Law has always been viewed as employing a ty-pe of argument that is 
more developed than other types of argument. Christie notes that 
"Ever since law became a specialized discipline, it has been assumed 
that legal reasoning exhibits a greater rigor than other types of 
29Don Abbott, "The Jurisprudential Analogy: Argumentacion and 
the New Rhetoric," C.S,S,J., XY:V (Spring, 1974), pp. 50-55. 
30 Fredric L. Bor, "The Nexus Between Philosophy and Law," 
Journal of Legal Education, XXVI (197~), p. 542. 
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non-formal argumentation. 1131 
It is parcly because of this position of legal argumentation in 
the field of argument that boch of the maJor argumentative theorists of 
the twentieth century - Perelman and Toulmin - have drawn heavily from 
law in the development of their theories of argument. H.L.A. Hart, 
in his introduction to the English translation of The Idea of Justice 
and the Problem of Argument explains this characteristic of Perelman's 
writings: 
The connection between law and the study of argument -
rhetoric in the old non-peJorative sense of that word -
is no less clear. Legal reasoning characteristically 
depends on precedent and analogy, and maKes an appeal 
less to unive=sal logical principles than to certain 
basic assumptions peculiar to the lawyer; it therefore 
offers the clearest and perhaps most instructive example 
of modes of persuasion which are rational and yet not in 
the logical sense conclusive. 32 
Perelman draws heavily from law in the creation of his discussion 
of argument. 33 
Toulmin, while emphasizing the philosophy of science, also draws 
heavily from law, especially in The Uses of Argument. For Toulmin, 
the parallel between law and argument is quite close· 
3 lGeorge C • Chris tie, _J_u_r_i_s_.p_r_u_d_e_n_c_e_: __ T_e_x_t_a_n_d_R_e_a_d_i_n_..g.._s_o_n 
the Philosonhy of Law (St. Paul, Minn •. West Publishing Co., 1973), 
p. 833. 
32H.L.A. Hart, 11 Introduction/1 in Ch. Perelman, The Idea of 
Justice and the Problem of Argument (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey· 
The Humanicies Press, 1977), p. v1.1.. 
may 
pp. 
33Abbotc ' Learn from 
1-12. 
p. SL See also Ch. Perelman, "What the Philosopher 
the Study of Law, 11 Natural Law Forum, XI (1966), 
-12-
We can get some hints (of the nature of field dependency] 
if we consider the parallel becween the Judicial process, 
by which the questions raised in a law courc are settled, 
and the rational process, by which arguments are set out 
and produced in support of an inicial assertion. 3~ 
For Toulmin, as with Perelman, legal reasoning is more sophisticated 
than other types of reasoning~ 
Somehow, lawyers and Judges have managed to work their 
way in practice through problems for which philosophers 
have not stated in an3 coherent or sacisfactory 
theorecical solution. 5 
This sophisticacion even extends to the creation of sub-disciplines, 
which are properly placed in their appropriate place in the discipline. 36 
Legal reasoning also enables us to study how concepts evolve, and 
how inferences are drawn. As Toulmin observes. 
As Mr. Justice Holmes demonstrated so clearly, questions 
of Judicial strategy take us - at the limit - beyond 
the reach of all merely formal reasoning, in which 
accepted rules, principles, and patterns of inference 
are applied to novel situations or sets of facts. 
Strategis reappraisals, in law as in science, have -
necessarily - to be arrived at in the light of longer-
term views about how, in a novel socio-historical 
situation, changes in the interpretation of the common 
law can fulfill most completely the basic responsibilities 
of any legal system. 37 
Like Perelman, Taulman draws heavily from law in his theory of 
argumentation. 
34Toulmin, Uses of Argument, pp. 15-16. 
35 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 87. 
36Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 88. 
37 Ibid., p. 489. 
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Given the importance of legal argumentation in any study of 
argument, it is surprising to note the lack of any serious study of 
legal argumentation by students of rhetoric. Perelman emphasizes 
the legal system of the continent, ignoring the developmencs that 
have taken place in England, the United Staces, and other common law 
states (although some legal scholars have attempted to apply Perelman's 
theories of rhetoric to law, most notably Christie38 and Stone39 ). 
To attempt to totally cover the entire field of legal reasoning, 
however, would be impossible for any one scholar. The fact that it is 
a compact discipline means that the concepts in the field have been 
discussed and debated for a long time, and many theories have been 
proposed. The result is that the quantity of material on legal 
reasoning is vast: 
The subJect of legal reasoning is a vast one. It is 
one of the most important questions in any detailed 
study of the law from a philosophical point of view. 
. . . Indeed, anything like a "comr,lete" view would 
take a lifetime and more of study. 4 0 
Choices must be made as to which theorists should be examined. For 
the purposes of this study, the works of three theorists will be 
examined in detail, with the works of other legal scholars drawn in as 
it seems necessary to explore the implications of these theorists. 
The selection of those legal theorists to be included is inevitably 
38christie, 868-871. 
39stone, pp. 332-335. 
aOchristie, p. 837. 
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an arbi~rary one, but there are certain guidelines that aid the 
selection. The theorists chosen should be both highly influential 
and insightful in their analysis. They should be among the leaders 
of the legal discipline. Their theories should be widely discussed 
and debated by legal scholars. Three authors seem to fit these 
criteria well: Edward H. Levi, Lon L. Fuller, and Herbert Wechsler. 
The choice of Levi is logical, given the vast influence of his 
works. Toulmin cites Levi's classical work on An Introduction to 
Legal Reasoning~l twice in Human Understanding,42 both times suggesting 
it is an appropriate work to turn to to understand the nature of 
precedents in legal reasoning. Indeed, Levi has played an important 
role in outlining the nature of legal reasoning; Christie, in one 
of the few legal textbooks on Jurisprudence, argues 
Many, if not most, of the law teachers,of the present 
day have taken Levi's model as the paradigm of legal 
reasoning. If there is an "official" model in the 
United States of what legal reasoning is all about, 
this is it. 43 
Loevinger calls Levi's book "one of the most extensive and elaborate 
inquiries into legal reasoning. 1144 The book provides a basis for 
understanding the type of reasoning that many people feel is the 
mainstay of legal reasoning: Like Toulmin, Levi places importance 
41Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1949). 
42Toulmin, Ruman Understanding, pp. 89, 95. 
43christie, p. 962. 
44Lee Loevinger, 11 An Introduction to Legal Logic, 11 Indiana Law 
Journal, XXVII (Summer, 1952), p. 479. 
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on the process by which decisions are reached.45 He argues that legal 
reasoning is not like that of format logic, but racher is a three 
step process: 
The steps are these: similarities are seen between cases, 
next, the rule of law inherent in the first case is 
announced; then £ge rule of law is made applicable to 
the second case. 
Legal reasoning involves a type of imperfect reasoning~ The Judge 
attempts to develop concepcs and phrases that cover past cases, and 
attempts to apply them to the case at hand. 
From Levi we will move to Lon L. Fuller. Lon Fuller has had a 
great deal of influence on the legal profession. Robert S. Summer, 
in his review of American legal theory in the pasc ten years, 
concluded· 
A special note on Fuller's work is in order. He is by 
far the most fertile and prolific American contributor 
to Jurisprudence on the scene. His efforts also generate 
substantial secondary literature. Among those who have 
reacted critically or appreciatively are philosophe~s, 
political theorists, and social scientiscs as well as 
law school professors. 47 
One of his maJor works is The Morality of Law.48 While strictly,not 
devoted to legal argumentations, it does provide a great deal of 
insight into how law is to be made and applied, and thus it has a 
great deal of potential implications for legal reasoning. This book 
45Levi, p. 5. 
47Robert S. Summers, "Present State of Legal Theory in the 
United States,'' Rechtstheorie, VI (1975), p. 78. 
48Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, Revised Edition (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1969). 
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has als~ invoked a great deaL of controv,ersy.: In the five years becween 
the first and second edition of the book, more than forty-seven 
reviews of the book have been published, including a review by 
Perelman. 49 His second edition includes a response to his critics. 
Briefly, Fuller argues that there is an internal morality of law, a 
morality of duty and a morality of aspiration. The morality of duty 
is the minimum requirement of any legal system, and the morality of 
aspiration is the morality legal systems should strive to attain, 
even though it may be impossible. He next argues that there are 
eight ways a legal system can fail as a legal system. 
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve 
rules at all, so thac every issue must be decided on an ad hoc 
basis. The other routes are (2) a failure to publicize, or 
at least to make available to the affecced party, the rules 
he is expected to observe, (3) the abuse of retroactive 
legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but 
undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, 
since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change, 
(4) a failure to make rules understandable, (5) the enact-
ment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that requLre 
conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) intro-
ducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subJect 
cannot orient his action by them, and finally, (8) a 
failure of congruence between the rules as announced and 
their actual administration.50 
Thus, while Levi emphasizes the past in the use of legal reasoning, 
Fuller emphasizes the present, the proper process that a lawyer should 
use in determining the appropriateness of legal rules. Fuller attempts 
to create the standards by which the legal community can evaluate laws. 
49 ch. Perelman, "Review of Morality of Law1' Natural Law Forum, 
X (1965), pp. 242-245. 
50 Fuller, p. 38. 
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Wechsler, on the other hand, emphasizes the future implications 
of a legal decision in his classic article, "Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law. 1151 Based upon a lecture given at Harvard, this 
paper has provoked a significant controversy. Golding observed: 
This lecture has already occasioned a minor literature, 
in past focusing on matters of interest to constitutional 
lawyers, and in part focusing on matters of a more 
theoretical nature. Although its main thrust may be 
of a more practical scope, no one can deny that Professor 
Wechsler's lecture raises important issues of Juris-
prudence and legal philosophy. 52 
Snortland and Stanga call the paper "a classic in modern legal 
thought. 1153 Clark suggests. 
Even to those of us who must remain not fully persuaded 
by the argument, the leccure has provided a road to more 
careful thinking about these great issues, indeed, no 
higher tribute can be paid a scholar than the veritable 
tempest of discussion it has called forth. 54 
Indeed, Shepard's Citations shows that Wechsler' s article has been 
cited over four hundred t1.mes by court and law review articles si~ce 
it was published in 1959. 55 
51Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law," Harvard Law Review, LXXIII (November, 1959), pp. 1-35. 
52M. P. Golding, "Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme 
Court," Columbia Law Review, LXIII (1963), pp. 35-38. 
53Neil E. Snortland and John E. Stanga, "Neutral Principles and 
Decision-Making Theory: An Alternative to Incrementalism," George 
Washington Law Review, XLI (July, 1973), p. 1006. 
54 Charles E. Clark, "The Limits of Judicial ObJectivity, 11 
American University Law Review, XLI (July, 1963), p. 6. 
55shepard's Law Review Citations (Colorado Springs: Shepard's 
Citations, Inc.), 73 (1975), p. 293, 74 (1976), p. 183. 
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Wechsler' s thesis is S1.lllple· court decisions should be made on 
neutral principles 
I put It to you that the main constituent of che Judicial 
process is precisely chat ic muse be genuinely principled, 
resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching Judgement on analysis and reasons quitg~tran-
scending the immediate result that is achieved. 0 
While there have been many criticisms leveled against this position, 
it is worth study, both for the insights it provides and for the 
reactions the critics of this position have had to ic. 
Resources and Limitations 
As already suggested in the discussion of the various legal 
scholars covered by this study, there is a vast amount of literature 
that has been generated by the three authors covered. Selecting the 
resources will be a difficult task. That does not mean che task is 
impossible. The maJor works cited will act as a starting point for 
analysis. From these works, the study will spiral outward, drawing both 
from the various reviews and criticisms of these works, and related 
works both by the authors and others with similar arguments. Past 
dissertations have tended to strive for in depth knowledge of one 
narrow subJect, this analysis will attempt co sy.nthesize a broader area 
of knowledge in order to form the basis for additional study. 57 
56wechsler, p. 15. 
57see Hunt, pp. 1-30. 
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Lev~'s book is based on an earlier art1cle in the University of 
Chicago Law Review, 58 and he further developed his views on legal 
argument in a paper presented fifteen years after his book. 59 While 
there have not been a large number of critical reviews of his articles, 
there have been several books and papers on the nature of precedent 
60 61 that have been published, ranging from Holmes to Douglas.- These 
works will be drawn in where appropriate. 
Fuller's works have been the subJect of much discussion. A 
portion of the controversy has centered on his conflict with H.L.A. 
Hart's The Concept of Law, and Hart's critical review of Fuller's 
62 book. These works, as well as the considerable number of reviews 
of his book will be reviewed. 
Wechsler expanded his views on Neutral Principles in his book 
Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law. 63 The Federal Judicial 
Center held a conference in 1975 that aff0rded Wechsler to further 
58Edward H. Levi, "An Introduction to Legal Reasoning," 
University of Chicago Law Review, XV (19~8), p. 501. 
59 Edward H. Levi, 11The Nature of Judicial Reasoning," in Law 
and Philosophy: A Symposium, edited by Sidney Hook (New York: New 
York University Press, 1964), pp. 263-281. 
60 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1963). 
61william O. Douglas, 11 Stare Decisis," Columbia Law Review, IL 
(June, 1949), pp. 736-755. 
62H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: 
Press, 1961), and H.L.A .. Hart, "Review of Morality 
Law Review, LXXVIII, (1965), pp. 1281-1296. 
Oxford University 
of Law," Harvard 
63Herbert Wechsler, ~rinciples, Politics and Fundamental Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). 
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6l. 65 
explain his position. Wasserstrom in developing his two tier 
system of decision making advocated a similar posicion to Wechsler, 
and thus will also be considered. The critics of Wechsler are 
numerous. Among the more influential critics are Miller and Howell, 66 
Clark,67 and Mueller and Schwartz,68 although all of the maJor articles 
written in response to the paper will be explored. 
Several limitations of the study have been implied in previous 
sections of this paper. Levi, Fuller, and Wechsler are only high-
lighted as possible illustrations of maJor legal argumentation theories, 
One cannot survey the entire legal field in a study of this scope, 
rather it is hoped that some of the maJor legal theories that have 
been advanced can be explored in the hopes that the nature of che 
field of argumentation in general, and legal argumentation in specific 
can be illuminated, This analysis should aid in discovering more 
about the field of argumentation than past efforts have revealed. 
Organizational Schemata 
I will attempt to examine the field of argument in law by 
descr1b1~gand synthesizing the various theories of legal argument 
64 Federal Judicial Center, "Procedures to Reach Decisions, 11 
Panel discussion, May 15, 1975. 
65 Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory 
of Legal Justification (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1961). 
66 Arthur S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell, ''The Myth of Neutrality 
in Constitutional AdJudication, 11 University of Chicago Law Review, 
X.,'CVII (1960), pp. 661-691. 
67 clark, "The Limits of Judicial ObJeci:ivity, 11 pp. 1-13. 
68Addison Mueller and Murray L. Schwartz, 11 The Principle of 
Neutral Principles," U,C,L.A. Law Review, VII (1960), pp. 571-585. 
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proposed by Levi, Fuller, and Wechsler. This analysis will be done in 
five chapters. 
Chapter I, "The Nature of Legal Argument" states the problem of 
analysis, covers the nature of fields of argument, explains the 
importance of legal argument, discusses the approach of the study, 
briefly reviews the available literature, notes the limitations of this 
study, and previews the organizational structure of this paper. Its 
purpose is to explain the importance of this study, set forth che 
main arguments, and indicate the content of the dissertation. 
Chapter II, "The Influence of the Past· Edward Levi and the 
Nature of Precedents," explores the importance of precedents in legal 
reasoning. Levi's theory of legal argumentation will be emphasized 
as a method of using past decisions to guide current legal decisions. 
The nature of precedents, the reasons for reliance of precedents by 
a legal system, the criticism of the use of precedents, and the method 
of overturning precedents will all be examined. Where necessary, 
Levi's discussion of these issues will be supplemented with the 
positions of other legal theorists. Finally, Levi's ~oving classifi-
cation system will be explored, The system will be defined, and it 
will be contrasted to the traditional view of precedents. The role 
of ambiguity in Levi's system will be discussed, as well as his views 
of the adversary system. Finally, some initial implications of Levi's 
positions for a view of argument will be suggested. 
Chapter III, "The Influence of the Present Lon Fuller and the 
Morality of Law," examines the respons1b1.l1ties of the lawmaker in 
creating the rules by which men are governed and those that govern a 
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legal system. The contrast between the morality of aspiration and 
the morality of duty will be explored. Fuller's inner morality of 
law will also be examined, both to provide possible guidelines for 
argument in other fields and to determine the nature of the arguer in 
the field of law. 
Chapter IV, "The Influence of the Future: Herbert Wechsler and 
Neutral Principles," examines the importance of neutral principles in 
legal decisionmaking. The discussion of Wechsler's posicion will 
include the exploration of six topics. First, the reasons for 
Wechsler's plea for neutral principles will be examined. Second, the 
nature of neutral principles will be explored, including the various 
ways the cerms have been defined. Third, the application of neutral 
principles to specific Supreme Court decisions will be atcempted, 
Fourth, Hart's attack on result-oriented Jurisprudence and his tacit 
support for Wechsler will be noted. Fifth, the attacks on Wechsler's 
position will be described and evaluated. Finally, some tentative 
implications for a theory of argument will be suggested. 
Chapter V, "The Implications of Legal .Argument," will attempt to 
expand some of the issues in the first four chapters. The nature of 
fields will be analyzed, and the nature of the legal field will be 
pr9bed, with possible implications for other fields of argument 
discussed. The nature of the advancement of argument and the altering 
of decisions will be explored, as well as situational constraints on 
legal argumentation. The goal of this chapter is to answer two 
questions: First, what are the nature of fields of argument?, and 
second, what are the implications of legal argument for other fields 
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of argument? To that end, the chapter will suggest that certain 
characteristics distinguish legal argument from ocher fields, including 
che conditions of relevance for problems, the goal of its field, 
the forum in which argument takes place, and the members of the field. 
Specific implications of legal argumenc for argument in general will 
be discussed within each of these four topics. 
CHAPTER II 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE PAST 
EDWARD LEVI AND THE NATURE OF PRECEDENTS 
In law as elsewhere, we can know and yet not understand. 
Shadows often obscure our knowledge which not only vary in 
intensity but are cast by different obstacles to light. 
These cannot all be removed by the same methods and till 
the precise character of our perplexity is determined we 
cannot tell whac tools we shall need. 1 
I told him it was law logic - an artificial system of 
reasoning, exclusively used in courts of Justice, but 
good for nothing anywhere else. 2 
Although all Judges must decide hundreds or thousands of cases 
every year, it is often difficult for them to articulate the exact 
method used in deciding law cases. Over half a century ago, Supreme 
Court Justice BenJamin Cardozo argued· 
The work of deciding cases goes on every day in hundreds 
of courts throughout the land. Any Judge, one might 
suppose, would find it easy to describe the process which 
he had followed a thousand cimes and more. Nothing could 
be farther from the truth. Let some intelligent layman 
ask him to explain· he will not go very far before taking 
refuge in the excuse that the language of the craftsmen 
is unintelligible to those untutored in the craft. Such 
an excuse may cover with a semblance of respectability an 
otherwise ignominous retreat. It will hardly serve to still 
the pricks of curiosity and conscience. 3 
1 H.L.A. Hart, quoted in Edward Allen Kent, Law and Philosoohv: 
Readings in Legal Philosophy (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 
1970), p. 1. 
2Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Law Logic," Ethics, 77 (1967), 193. 
3BenJamin N. Cardozo, The· Nature of the Judicial Process (New 
Haven· Yale University Press, 1921), p. 9. 
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Despite the difficulcy in articulating principles of adJudication, 
there have been several actempts to describe now legal decisions are 
reached. One of the more respected 1news on the nature of legal 
reasoning was developed by Edward H. Levi, a former Attorney General 
of the United Staces and former dean of the University of Chicago 
Law School. Levi argues that legal reasoning is based on a moving 
classification system. This view of legal argument was developed in 
his book, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 4 and was expanded in a 
paper presented at the New York University Institute of Philosophy 
in 1963. 5 These treatises have had a great deal of influence on the 
legal profession. Christie argues that "in America, che most generally 
accepted theory of the nature of legal reasoning is that of Edward 
Levi. 116 Loevinger calls Levi's model of reasoning "one of the most: 
extensive and elaborate inquiries into legal reasoning. 117 
To understand fully Levi's position on legal argument, it is 
necessary to examine briefly three alternative views of legal argument. 
The first two views of argument, law as deductive argument and legal 
4 Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago· 
University of Chicago Press, 1949), An earlier version of this essay 
appeared as "An Introduction to Legal Reason1.ng, 11 Un1vers1.ty of Chicago 
Law Review, 15 (1948), 501-574. 
5 Edward H. Levi, "The Nature of Judicial Reasoning," in Law and 
Philosophy: A Symposium, ed1.ted by Sidney Hook (New York: New York 
University Press, 1964), pp. 263-281. 
6George Christie, 110bJect1.v1.ty in t:he Law," Yale Law Journal, 78 
(1969), 1318. 
7 Lee Loevinger, "An Introduction to Legal Logic, 11 Indiana Law 
Journal, 27 (1952), 479. 
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realism, while influem:ial at various periods of legal history are 
reJected by Levi as being inadequate explanations of legal reasoning. 
The third view of legal reasoning, reasoning from precedent, overlaps 
Levi's position in many ways, but has several points of divergence 
from Levi's model that will help clarify his position. To that end, 
the nature of precedents, the reasons for reliance on precedents, 
the criticisms of reliance on precedents by a legal system, and the 
method of overturning precedents will all be explored. Where necessary, 
Levi's discussion of these issues will be supplemented with the 
positions of other legal theorists. Finally, Levi's moving classifi-
cation system will be explored. The system will be defined, and it 
will be contrasted to the traditional view of precedents. The role 
of ambiguity in Levi's system will be discussed, as well as his views 
of the adversary system. Finally, some 1n1tial implications of Levi's 
positions for a view of argument will be suggested. 
Law as Deduction 
It is often thought that legal reasoning, especially the 
interpretation of statutes, is a form of deductive reason1ng. 8 Yn1s 
9 view has a number of advocates, and it would tend to promote a simple 
view of legal reasoning. 
A superficial view of the law may lead one to believe that 
decisions are arrived at purely on the basis of logical 
8 Levi, Introduction, p. 27. 
9see, for example, Jerzy Wroblewski, "Legal Syllogism and Rational-
ity of Judicial Decision, 11 Rechtstheorie, 5 (1974), 33-46. 
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reasoning. In explaining how the law operates, it 
would be easy to say that all it amounLs to is the 
application of principles, or rules, to factual situa-
tions, leading to an auLomatic conclusion. 10 
The view of legal argument as deduction may be accurate in a large 
number of cases. Cardozo suggested that 11 a maJority [of the cases 
a court hears] could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any 
way but one. The law and its application alike are plain. 1111 This 
view of legal reasoning tends to emphasize the certainty in reasoning, 12 
the courts merely have to follow syllogistical reasoning to decide a 
case, and thus have very little leeway. This view has its benefits, 
1.n that it can insulate courts from outside criticism: 
as long as the Judicial function was believed, 
however erroneously, to be simply one of mechanical appli-
cation of rules, it was only right that Judges should be 
immune from criticism. For, assuming the belief to be 
true, it could only be the law, and not they, which is 
responsible for harsh decisions. But as soon as it is 
realized that some descretion is inherent in the Judicial 
process, then the Judges have to share at least some of 
the responsibility along with the law for the character 
of the decisions they give, which brings them and their 
methods under public scrutiny. 13 
While this view has some attraction, it does not help much in evalua-
ting legal reasoning. Any deductive argument must start with premises 
10william Zelermyer, Legal Reasoning. The Evolutionary Process of 
Law (Englewood Cliffs• Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 4. 
11 d Car ozo, p. 164. 
12Levi, Introduction, pp. v-vi. Levi argues. "The pretense 1.s 
that the law is a system of known rules applied by a Judge; the 
pretense has long been under attack. In an importanc sense legal 
rules are never clear. • 11 (p. 1). 
13R.W .M. Dias, "The Present State of British Legal Theory," 
Rechtstheorie, 2 (1971), 208. 
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chat have been agreed upon}4 In law, much of the dispute is over the 
nature of che law; how to apply the law is a relatively minor problem 
in legal reasoning. The key to legal reasoning (and perhaps any type 
of reasoning) is how the premises for argument are created: 
As a matter of fact, men do not begin thinking with 
premises. They begin with some complicated and confused 
case, apparently admitting of alternative modes of 
treatment and solution. Premises only gradually emerge 
from analysis of the total situation. The problem is 
not to draw a conclusion from given premises, that can 
best be done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering 
a keyboard. The problem is to find statements, of general 
principle and of particular fact, which are worthy to serve 
as premises. As matter of actual fact, we generally begin 
with some vague anticipation of a conclusion (or at least 
of alternative conclusions), and then we look around for 
principles and data which will substantiate it or which 
will enable us to choose intelligently between rival 
conclusions • 15 
It would be impossible to develop a degal code that covered all 
16 possible situations, thus there will always be some room for courts 
to create premises, or redefine premises. Deductive reasoning can 
take over once the premises have been created, but the formation of 
these premises does not follow a "logical" (in the traditional sense) 
pattern: "our principles and rules are neither complete nor always 
14George Christie, Jurisprudence· Text and Readings in the 
Philosophy of Law (St. Paul· West Publishing Cpmpany, 1973), pp. 
835-6; Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings 
(Stanford· Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 292-300. 
15 John Dewey, "Logical Method and Law, 11 Cornell Law Quan:erly, 
10 (1924), 23. Holmes suggested "General propositions do not 
decide concrete cases, 11 (Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U.S. li.5, 76 
[ 1905]). 
16 Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922), pp. li.8-50. 
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logically detennined, Levi's analysis emphasizes this often 
neglected aspect of legal reasoning: how the premises of legal 
argument are formulated, and how individual cases are used to create 
legal rules, 
Legal Realism 
While those that view law as deductive reasoning emphasize the 
constraints thaL law places on legal reasoning, the legal realists 
emphasize the lattitude open to Judges. 18 While for the first group 
there are very few decisions open to a Judge in any case, legal 
realists argue that almost any decision could be reached by a Judge, 
the actual decision reached is based on the biases of a Judge, rather 
than any legal logic: 
The realists emphasized the importance of human choice -
not legal principles - as the causal force with the 
greatest decisional power. In fact, they denied that 
precedents have controlling influence (the most radical 
of the realists claimed that precedents have no impact 
whatever), and argued that Judges' psychologies are the 
key in predicting case outcomes. All law, they held, is 
Judge-made law, because statutes, precedents and customs 
must survivl the bench's molding before taking effect on 
disputam:s. 9 
While legal decisions may be cloaked in logical terins, there are a 
large number of choices open to the Judge. The emphasis of legal 
17 
Zelermyer, p. 5. 
18 Levi, Introduction, pp. v-vi. 
19Dale Hample, "Motives in Law An Adaptation of Legal 
Realism," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 15 (1979), 
156. 
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realists is on exposing the choices made by the Judges and the 
concious or unconcious basis for these decisions. 20 
Jerome Frank, probably the most vocal of the legal realists, 
responded to Levi's book by arguing that Levi tends to overlook the 
21 discretion open to the Judge, especially in the fact finding stage, 
Levi's response to this charge is fairly brief: 
••• I hope the process described in this essay is 
recognizable as dealing Just as much with fact determi-
nation or categorization as with rule-making. One can 
accept the persuasiveness of the legal concept as a 
rule of thumb, and particularly so at the trial or at 
an earlier stage, and yet marvel at the numerous 
possibilities, more open at the trial than at the 
appellate level, to shape the case by an incerpretation 
of the facts in light of a re-examination of che law. 22 
Levi's response does not support his assertion that his theory also 
applies at the fact finding stage of the legal process. It would 
seem, however, that the criticism of the legal realists should not 
make the study of legal reasoning irrelevant. First, despite the 
latitudes open to a Judge, law is predictable. The legal system 
does not produce decisions at random, rather a person familiar with 
legal reasoning can predict the decisions with a great deal of 
20 
Christie, Jurisprudence, p. 642. See also Joseph C. 
Hutcheson, "The Judgement Intuitive· The Function of the 'Hunch' 
in Judicial Decision," Cornell Law Quarterly, 14, (1929), 274-288, 
and Joseph C. Hutcheson, 11Epilogue 11 Yale Law Journal, 71 (1961), 
277-278. 
?l - Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1949, p. 321. 
221ev1, Introduction, p. vi. 
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accuracy. 23 This would suggest that there are some limits to a 
Judge's decision making discretion. 
In addition, the requiremenc thac Judges articulate a reason for 
a decision also acts as a check on legal discretion: 
The obligation to articulate the reasoning entering 
1.nto a dec1.s1.on is itself a safeguard. Not infrequently, 
we are told, a Judge changes his vote because the 
opinion he 1.s preparing 'won't write. 124 
While there may be some discretion, there are also some limits to what 
a Judge can do. Stydy1.ng these limitations, as well as the way 
decisions are Justified can aid in understanding the nature of legal 
reasoning. 
Stare Decis1.s 
If there is a view of legal argumentation as a distinct type of 
argument, it is probably a view that emphasizes the role of precedent 
in legal argumentation. Judges are viewed as following stare dec1.s1.s, 
or, perhaps more accurately, stare decisis, et non gu1.eta movere· 
adhere to decisions and do not unsettle things which are established, 
This view argues that courts are restricted in cases where a prior 
decision has been made by that court or a higher court. 25 While this 
23charles E. Clark and David M. Trubek, ' 1The Creative Role of 
the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Trad1.t1.on, 11 
Yale Law Journal, 71 (1961), 259, 
24paul A. Freund, 11An Analysis of Judicial Reasoning, 11 
in Hook, p. 288. See also Dias, p. 209. 
25 Levi, Introduction, p. vi. For an alternative view of 
Judicial decision-making, see Marc:1n Shapiro, "Stability and 
Change in Judicial Decision-making: Incremencalism or Stare 
Decisis 111 Law in Transition Quarterly, 2 (1965), 131'.i.-147. 
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view is a popular one, it is not followed in all cases in all 
Jurisdictions: "It has long been recognized that st:are decisis was 
primarily useful as a principle where rules of property and rules of 
?6 commercial transactions were involved."- In other areas of law, 
stare dec,sis, while frequently employed, 1s not viewed as being 
binding. Indeed, one of the maJor developments in Jurisprudence in 
the past fifteen years was the 1966 decision of the House of Lords 
that 11 too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to inJustice in a 
particular case and unduly restrict the proper development of the 
law. 1127 This marked the first time the House of Lords ignored stare 
decisis in making a decision (or at least it was the first time it 
admitted ignoring stare decisis), thus destroying the last bast:ion 
of stare decisis. Despite the fact that stare decisis, in its pure 
form, is not used in any legal syst:em, it is import:ant to understand 
its nature in order to understand Levi's position fully. This is true 
both because Levi's theory of argument is similar in many ways to 
stare decisis, and because by contrasting the two positions Levi's 
position can be made clearer. 
Kocourek and Koven suggest that "it is difficult to formulate 
any definition of the American rule of stare decisis which might 
26Roscoe Pound, Law Finding Through Experience and Reason 
(Athens, Georgia· University of Georgia Press, 1960), pp. 39-40. 
27 Quoted in Ruggero J. Aldesert, The Judicial Process -------------Readings, Materials and Cases (St. Paul· West Publishing Co., 
(1976), pp. 861-862. 
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embrace all the exceptions or departures . 1128 Wassers trom, though 
arguing "there is no distinctive meaning chat can be attached to che 
doctrine of stare decis1.s, 1129 suggescs that there are three possible 
types of stare decisis imposed rules· 
(1) The rule of scare decisis requires only that the 
Judge in some fashion relate his decision in the instant 
case to decisions that were made in the past. 
(2) The rule of stare decisis requires that the Judge 
decide cases in the same way 1.n which similar cases were 
decided in the past unless a sufficient reason exists 
for not applying the rule of the earlier case. 
(3) The rule of stare decisis requires that cases which 
ar'e similar to earlier cases be decided in the same way 
in which these earlier cases were adJudicated. 3 0 
In the United States, the second form of stare decisis is probably 
the most widespread. The chird type was used 1.n England until 1966. 
Lev1.Ls system would fall under the first type. 
In order to understand the mechanics of stare decisis, it 1.s 
necessary to understand a little about the mechanics of the case 
system. Strictly speaking, a court's decision affects only the 
immediate case before it, no other individuals are bound by that case. 
Llewellyn argues that there are four ~Jidelines governing any 
decision· 
(1) The court must decide the dispute that 1.s before it. 
(2) The court can decide only the particular dispute 
which 1.s before it. 
28Albert Kocourek and Harold Koven, 11Renovation of the Common 
Law Through Stare Dec1.s1.s,' 1 Illinois Law Review, 29 (1935), 979. 
29 Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision· Toward a 
Theory of Legal Justificac:ion (Stanford: Standard University Press, 
1961), p. 53. 
JOibid., pp. 53-4. 
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(3) The court can decide the particular dispuce only 
according to a general rule which covers a whole class 
of like disputes. 
(4) Everything, everything, everything, big or small, a 
Judge may say in an opinion, is to be read with primary 
reference to the particular dispute, the particular 
question before him.31 
These canons provide some difficulty in developing a concept of what 
constitutes the law, or how the courts will decide future cases. 
While prior cases are held to be binding, at least to a degree, on 
future cases, at the same time they apply only to the immediate 
dispute. The third guideline provides some help to the observer, 
since the case was decided on a general principle, presumably if 
that principle could be discovered it would aid in predicting future 
decisions. 
To aid in the discovery of the general principles underlying a 
decision, legal theorists have argued that all decisions have two 
components, the ratio decidendi and obitur dictum (or dictum). 
The ratio decidendi consists of the reasons for the decision, the 
principles that govern the case. Obitur dictum are comments made 
by the court that are not relevant to the reason for decision. The 
ratio decidendi is binding on future courts, while the dictum can be 
ignored. 
One of the maJor problems facing a legal theorist, then, is 
determining what sections of a case are ratio decidendi, and what 
31Karl N- Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (Donns Ferry, N. Y.· 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1930), pp. a2-43. 
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sections can be ignored as dictum. This requires a lawyer to discover 
what facts in a case have some legal importance: 
The process is one, from a lawyer's statement of a case, 
eliminating as it does all the dramatic elements with 
which his client's story has clothed it, and retaining only 
the facts of legal :un.port, up to the final analyses and 
abstract universals of theoretic Jurisprudence. The 
reason why a lawyer does not mention that his client wore 
a white hat when he made a contract, while Mrs. Quickly 
would be sure to dwell upon it along with the parcel glit 
goblet and the sea-coal fire, is that he forsees that the 
public force will act in the same way whatever his clienc 
had upon his head. 32 
Determining what the ratio dicidendi of a case is can be difficult. 
Some suggest that it should include only the narrowest rule required 
to Justify the decision of the courts, given the facts of the case. 
This is not helpful, since there is no "narrowest" rule, 33 except 
perhaps a rule governing only the individual case. Goodhart suggested 
ten guidelines for determining whether any material should be 
considered as ratio: 
(1) All facts of person, time, place, kind and amount 
are immaterial unless stated to be material. 
(2) If there is no opinion, or the opinion gives no 
facts, then all other facts in the record must be treated 
as material. 
(3) If there is an opinion, then the facts as stated in 
the opinion are conclusive and cannot be contradicted from 
the record. 
(4) If the opinion omits a fact which appears in the 
record this may be due either to (a) oversight, or (b) 
an implied finding that the fact is immaterial. The second 
is assumed to be che case in the absence of other evidence. 
32oliverWendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard 
Law Review, 10 (1897), 458. 
33conrad D. Johnson, "On Deciding and Setting Precedent for 
the Reasonable Man," Archiv fur Rechts - und Social-Philosophie 
62 (1976), 173. 
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(5) All facts which the Judge specifically states are 
immaterial must be consi~ered immaterial. 
(6) All facts which the Judge impliedly treats as 
immaterial must be considered immaterial. 
(7) All facts which the Judge specifically states to 
be material must be considered material. 
(8) If the opinion does not distinguish between 
material and immaterial facts then all the facts set 
forth must be considered material. 
(9) If in a case there are several opinions which agree 
as to the result but differ as to the material facts, 
then the principle of the case is limited so as to fit 
the sum of all the facts held material by the various 
Judges. 
(10) A conclusion based on a hypothetical fact is a dictum. 
By hypothetical fact is meant any fact the existence of 
which has not been determined or accepted by the Judge. 34 
There guidelines provide some assistance, but they cannot be compre-
hensive, and in some cases offer little guidance. 35 Part of this 
confusion may arise from a belief that the initial Judge is presumed 
to have the authority to determine what segments of the initial 
decisions are binding. While this may not be spelled out in detail 
by the initial Judge, it is assumed that be reading the initial 
opinion(s) the second Judge can discover the rule the first Judge 
decided should govern other cases that follow it. The initial Judge, 
in this view, decides what is ratio and what is dicta. 36 Levi argues 
that this approach is undesirable. Rather, he suggests, the second 
Judge should determine the ratio based on her/his view of how the 
earlier decisions should relate to the iannediate case: 
34 A. L. Goodhart, '1Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case," 
Yale Law Journal, 49 (1930), 182-183. 
35 Murphy, pp. 352-354. 
36 Ibid. 
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I think the answer in Anglo-American law .•. is that 
the second Judge, where only case law is involved, is 
free to make his own determination of decisive similarity 
or difference. This, of course, gives che law a great 
deal of flexibility and capacity for growth.37 
The rule of law is thus determined by the last Judge to hear a case 
on an issue, earlier Judges may suggest rules of law, but as long as 
the rule imposed by the last Judge covers the earlier decisions it is 
an adequate decision rule. 
The use of precedents has developed over a long period of time. 
There have been several Justifications for the use of stare decisis 
as a decision rule. 38 First, it is argued that stare decisis aids in 
promoting certainty and stability. Spaeth suggests that "a rnaJor 
by-product of the Judicial system is to provide a measure of fixity, 
a semblance of stability, in the midst of life's changes . 1139 Frank 
notes "Only if rules are certain and stable, it is said, can men 
d h ff h ,,li.O con uct t eir a airs wit sarety. Wasserstrorn, noting that 
certainty is the most popular reason for stare decis1s, suggests that 
"one of the first arguments for a decision procedure that guarantees 
the predictability of Judicial decision is the desirability of a more 
37 1b1.d. 
38Toese Justifications are based on Wasserstrom, who concluded 
that the use of precedents was unJust1.f1ed. Frank also comes to a 
similar conclusion. 
39Harold J. Spaeth, An Introduction to Supreme Court Decision 
Making, Revised edition (New York Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), 
p. 56. 
4°Frank, p. 268. 
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generalized ability to anticipate Lhe future. 11 Since the nacure of 
stare decisis is that future decisions must be based on past decisions, 
individuals can be confident about the future dictates of the law. 
Second, precedent is Justified based on reliance. Once a decision 
is handed down, individuals may act based upon what the court decided. 
If an individual acts in a manner dectated by a court, only to find 
that the court changed its mind later, the nature of Justice would 
be undermined· 
••• the failure to give effect to those activities and 
commitments which were undertaken in Justified reliance 
upon the pronouncements of chat system could serve, 
arguably, only to make the legal system ill-conceived 
irresponsible, and vicious.41 
Third, use of precedent is Justified based on equality. One of the 
premises of our legal system is that all individuals should have 
the equal protection of the laws. "Justice .•• requires equality 
of treatment. 1142 In order for individuals to feel that they are treated 
fairly, this position argues, if a court holds one way in one case, it 
should hold the same way in a similar case involving different parties. 
Fourth, use of precedent aids Judicial efficiency. Many indivi-
duals, especially Judges, argue that courts have a hard cime paying 
adequate attention to all cases. If each case had to be considered 
tabula rasa, the courts could break down: 
• the labor of Judges would be increased almost to 
the breaking point if every past decision could be 
4 1wasserstrom, p. 61. 
42 Frank, p. 267. 
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reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's 
own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the 
li.3 courses laid by others who had gone before him. 
Murphy suggests that stare decisis "provides harried Judges who face 
44 difficult choices with a welcome decision-making crutch." To 
remove past decisions from their place in stare decisis, according to 
this view, would greatly strain the Judge: 
If a judge is not to be bound by precedent, then not 
only must he elucidate, ponder, and evaluate all possible 
rules of law which might be formulated for every case, but 
he must also examine all the reasons that might be advanced 
for instituting any one of these rules rather than any 
other. In short, the task of the Judge would become 
interminable.45 
Fifth, the use of precedent restrains Judges. If a Judge must 
follow precedent, the Judge's power is limited. 46 This help~ insure 
an unbiased decision: 
It is undeniable that if Judges are absolutely bound by 
previous decisions, the personalities of the litigants 
will net influence the Judge in his decisions. It is 
generally said that stare decisis brings about an ideal 
'government of laws and not men. 1 4 7 
Precedent thus guards against errors both of a legal nature, and those 
based on personal bias.48 
43cardozo, p. 149. 
44walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 22-23. 
45wasserstrom, p. 72. 
this argument: 11Hinnissy, 
worruk. 11 (Law Finding , p • 
Pound cites Mr. Dooley as illustrative of 
I've the Judicial timpermint. I hate 
65.) 
46 The lack of discretion may, however, increase the power of the 
courts. See Thomas C. Shelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York· 
Oxford University Press, 1971), esp. Chapcer I. 
47Kocourek and Koven, pp. 980-981. 
48wasserstrom, pp. 75-79. 
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Sixth, precedent helps terminate litigation. Since both 
parties realize that a future decision will be the same as a past 
decision, the losing party has no reason to continue to litigate, in 
hopes of getting a more favorable decision. 49 
Finally, precedent is Justified, ironically, because of precedent. 
Frank suggests that, at least in par~, stare decisis is maintained 
because of habit, 50 courts have always relied on precedents, so 
there is no reason to change this tradition now. Wasserstrom cites 
the example of a House of Lords decision where the House refused to 
decide whether a precedent could be overturned because there was no 
precedent for doing so, 51 
This is not to imply that stare decisis is without its critics. 
Both Frank and Wasserstrom criticise the position, although Frank 
argues merely for its modification52 and Wasserstrom argues for a 
legal system similar to the one discussed in Chapter IV. The main 
criticism of stare decisis 1s that it prevencs change, Kocourek and 
Koven note that 11 scare decisis is a retarding factor in the progress 
of the law and results in the common law becoming stagnant. 115 3 Murphy 
notes that "no branch of government can govern a growing industrial 
society strictly by stare decisis. The Justices must frequently 
49 Ibid., p. 79. 
50 Frank, p. 271. 
5 1wasserstrom, p. 80, This was pre-1966. 
52Frank, p. 286. 
53Kocourek and Keven, pp. 982-983, 
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extend or contract and even occasionally overrule precedents. 1154 It 
is partly in response to this criticism that stare decisis has never 
been strictly followed by our courts, rather the courts feel free to 
modify or even overturn earlier precedents. The question becomes, 
under what circumstances can a court overturn precedents? 
Any system of legal reasoning must respond to the inherent 
conflict between stability and change. Pound suggested· 
Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still. Hence 
all the writing about law has struggled to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of the need of stability and the need 
of change •••• the legal order must be flexible as well 
as stable. It must be overhauled continually and refitted 
continually to the changes in the social life which it 
is to govern. If we seek principles, we must seek 
principles of change no less than principles of stability.55 
As a clear implication of this conflict between stability and 
change, it is often desirable for a court to modify or alter a decision 
as social conditions change. As Frank argues, "The precedent system 
really bites viciously only when a court, regarding a precedent as 
undesirable, nevertheless refuses to deviate from it. 1156 As conditions 
change, the courts may decide to change with the changing conditions 
to create a new decision rule 
Although a rule may bear the s,tamp ot official auchority -
that is, most the 'pedigree test' of legal validity - it 
is held open to reassessm7nt in the light of its consequences 
for the values at stake. 5 
54Murphy, p. 31. 
55Pound, Law Finding, p. 23. 
56Frank, p. 275. 
57Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law end Society in Transi-
tion: Toward Responsive Law (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1978), p. 82. 
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The degree to which chis option is open to the court will vary. In 
cases involving legislative interpretation, for example, the court 
will rarely deviate from prior decisions since, if its decisions 
have been in error, Congress could easily correct the decision of the 
Court. On Constitutional issues, however, overturning a precedent 
by a court is easier, since the process of amendment is very difficult. 
For similar reason stare decis1s is more likely to be followed in 
property and commercial transaction cases, where individuals need 
certainty.58 
The manner in which courts assess and respond to the changing 
conditions is not clear. That courts are required, on occasion, to 
respond to changes in society requires that they h~ve some discretion 
in the outcome of the decision, since the court can always Justify the 
overturn of prior decision by arguing that the conditions that Justified 
the earlier decision are no longer present. There are a number of 
checks on the Judge to prevent too much of this discretion from geing 
exercised, including lower court checks on a higher court, as well as 
congressional and executive checks on the court. 59 
In addition, there may be other checks on the court. Murphy 
suggests that there are a number of constraints on a court. A court, 
for example, cannot create a case, it must wait for an appropriate 
58Levi, Introduction, pp. 56-57. See also, Pound, Law Finding, 
pp. 39-40. 
59For a discussion of the checks on court decisions, see Thomas P. 
Jahnige and Sheldon Goldman, editors, The Federal Judicial Svstem· 
Readings in Process and Behavior (Hinsdale, Illinois· Dryden Press, 
1968), esp. pp. 305-357. 
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case to reach it. Additionally there are checks on a court both from 
60 other governmental entities and from lower and higher courts. 
The court may, however, decide to modify a decision. There are 
several ways this can be done. Frank, for example, argues courts can 
modify decisions by distinguishing a later decision from an earlier 
decision, by altering the meaning of the old rule while giving it 
vocal support, or by shifting the ratio decidendi of a case.61 
Kocourek and Koven suggested five ways a court could create exceptions 
to stare decisis 
(1) Thus, some courts admitting that the doctrine is to be 
applied generally, Justify their departure from Lt when 
ta change of conditions warrant a change of the rule.r 
(2) Many courts formulate a further exception on the basis 
of the expansibility of the common law. 
(3) Other courts, in order to escape the rule of stare 
decisis, announce that the law consists not of rules 
enforced by decisions of the courts, but only the principles 
from which these rules flow. 
(4) The most convenient device used to avoid constraint 
of the 'rule of precedentr is the practice of distinguishing 
cases which are frequently undistinguishable and which 
inevitably results in confusion and uncertainty in the law. 
(5) Still another convenient formula used to Justify 
departing from stare decisis is to argue [when the reason 
for the rule ceases the rule itself ceases]. 62 
There may be some other methods of individualizing decisions throug!:i. 
63 such measures as parole, Jury nullification, and other measures, but 
the modification of rules of law are frequently made through the means 
60 
Hurphy, pp. 123-176. 
,- 1 
0 -Frank, 275-278. 
6? 7Zocourek and Koven, pp. 977-978. 
63 Pound, Philosophv of Law, p. 64. 
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suggested by Frank and Kocourek and Koven. It should be noted that 
all of these mechods, while aiding in increasing the flexibility of 
law, also decrease its certaincy and equalicy functions. Ic is 
against this background that Levi's position can be examined. 
Levi's Moving Classification System 
Essentially, Levi develops his theory of legal argument by 
exploring three issues. First, he attempts to outline the moving 
classification system which he suggests illustrates argument in law. 
Second, he stresses the importance of ambiguity in legal decision 
making. Third, he discusses the importance of the legal forum in 
the legal process. 
Levi suggests that the nature of legal argument is a three step 
process: "similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law 
inherent in the firstcase is announced, then the rule of law 1£ made 
applicable to the second case.1164 This process is a dynamic and 
ongoing process and involves elements of both inductive and deductive 
argument. The determination of similarity is made by the individual 
Judge. Unlike the traditional view of stare decisis, Levi argues that 
the statement of the rule of law in the controlling case is irrelevant· 
The statement is mere dictum, and th~s means that che 
Judge in the present case may find irrelevant the existence 
or absence of facts which prior Judges thought important. 
It is not what the prior Judge intended that is of any 
importance; rather it is what the present Judge, attempting 
to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, thinks should 
be the determining classificacion.65 
64Levi, Introduction, p. 2. 
65 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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He notes that the American legal system is not precise about the 
nature of dictum; if nothing is dictum, then a Judge could insert a 
code of law in a decision and make that binding on all future cases. 66 
Levi argues that this power is unreasonable. There exists a large 
number of potential clusters of cases available to a Judge. The 
Judges are attempting to classify cases by category, and as new 
cases are added, it is likely that the rule will change its meaning. 
To give a Judge the power to determine forever the distinctions that 
67 are binding would be unreasonable. Levi rather suggests that the 
second Judge should have the power to determine what factors should 
be used in classifying legal decisions. This position would allow 
for growth in the law, while at the same time requiring that a Judge 
provide some reason for the new classification. There thus are 
checks on a Judge· "the amount of change is limited by the Judge's 
ability to encompass it within a logical structure that explains all 
prior cases, albeit the Judges of the prior cases would have reJected 
68 the explanation." The Judge does not change decisions, rather the 
69 Judge is detailing the system. Levi does retreat slightly from this 
position by arguing that not all cases must be included in the new 
vision of case law; 70 "Particularly in those areas of the law where 
661evi, "Nature", p. 268. 









reported cases are so numerous, the present Judge is not really 
71 compelled to organize them all, 11 although most of the old cases 
must be included in che new vision. He also argues that the court 
is not obligated to suggest guidelines for future cases, lest the 
flexibility of law be limited, 72 rather the Judge should Just attempt 
to provide guidelines that cover both the immediate case and most of 
the old cases. 
Levi attempts to develop the manner in which concepts are 
developed. Often, for example, there may not be a word that precisely 
expresses the similarities and differences that a Judge wishes to 
emphasize in classifying cases. In other cases, a word may be used 
to cover a concept that may develop a dignity of its own and thus 
restrict the options open to the Judge: "the word starts out to free 
thoughts and ends by enslaving it. 1173 Once the word is accepted, 
however, it becomes "a legal concept. 117 4 This has implications beyond 
the immediate case: 
Its meaning continues to change. But the comparison is 
not only between the instances which have been included 
under it and the actual case at hand, but also if terms 75 
of hypothetical instances which the word itself suggests • 11 
To this extent, once a label becomes popular, reasoning may appear to 
be deductive. This is misleading, however, since the law is always in 
71Ibid. 
72 Ibid., p. 274. 
73 Levi, Introduction, p. 8. 
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search of new paradigms and terms to describe the legal concepts. 
Levi suggests that this is a circular process, with the legal system 
always searching for additional terms to describe the law· 
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept 
which is built up as cases are compared. The period is 
one in which the court fumbles for a phrase. Several 
phrases may be tried out; the misuse or misunderstanding 
of words itself may have an effect. The concept sounds 
like another, and the Jump to the second is made. The 
second stage is the period when the concept is more or 
less fixed, although reasoning by example continues to 
classify items inside and out of the concept. The 
third stage is the breakdown of the concept, as reasoning 
by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear 
that the suggestive influence of the word if no longer 
desired.76 
In many ways, this process is similar to Kuhn's theory of paradigms 
in science. 77 The first step, where the Judges search for new ideas 
and words can be viewed as the pre-paradigm of law· 
•.• in the early stages of the development of any 
science different men confronting the same range of 
phenomena, but not usually all the same particular 
phenomena, describe and interpret them in different 
ways. 78 
The courts are faced with several cases, and they emphasize different 
characteristics of the case in an attempt to develop a theory. This 
process may be more rapid in law than in science since the court must 
come up with some view of law and decide the case before it. 
76 Ibid~, pp. 8-9. 
77 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970). 
78Ibid., p. 17. 
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The second step would approximate normal science, where che 
communicy agrees on a view of law and applies it almost deductively. 
By the end of the second stage, however, the Judge is confronted with 
cases that do not 11 fit 11 in the classificacion scheme currently in 
79 use. In the third stage an alternative view of the world 1s 
presented and substituted for the first. Like the scientific counter-
part, law attempts to 1'hide11 the revolution by reinterpreting history 
80 
so that the old cases are consistent with the new vision. 
Freund extends the analogy to scientific reasoning further in 
his discussion of Levi 1 s position: 
Science, too, may furnish an analogue to the overruling 
of precedents. As every experiment tests in principle, 
according to Duhem 1 s theorem, not only the hypothesis 
under direct scrutiny but the whole antecedent pattern 
of which this is a part, so in law a reexamination of 
antecedent rules and principles is, in principle, open 
when a new set of facts is presented for decision, and 
it becomes a matter of Judgement how radical the 
reexamination shall be. 1 
Legal reasoning thus involves an examination of a set of cases and 
the outcome of those cases. The cases are classified according to 
both their outcome and cheir facts. As new cases arise, new classifi-
cations may be needed as cases are shifted from one cluster to another, 
based on their facts (and occasionally their results). Words are 
then sought to lable these classifications. While the changes may be 
79 Ibid., chapters VI and VIL 
80Ibid., 136-141. 
81 Freund, p. 289~ 
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radical, stability is preserved since the new term in most cases 
would have resulted in the same decision in earlier cases, though 
for different reasons. 
Levi then shifts to discuss two other types of reasoning, 
legislative interpretation and constitutional law, which he suggests 
are related to common law cases, 82 At one level, he suggests, the 
application of statutes should be viewed as deductive, the only 
question is whether a specific instance falls within the law. Often, 
however, the case is more complex than this. It is often difficult 
83 to find the intent of the legislature, especially given that laws 
are often phrased ambiguously. 84 The ambiguous nature of laws is 
due in part to reluctance by legislators to be specific until it is 
necessary, and partly because compromise is easier if a law is vague. 
The court is more limited in legislative interpretation than in case 
law, since the legislature has specified a term to be used. At the 
same time, the use of the word can also provide some flexibility to 
the court· 
There is a difference then from cases law in that the 
legislature has compelled the use of one word. The 
word will not change verbally. It could change in 
meaning, however, and if frequent appeals as to what 
the legislature really intended are permitted, it may 
shift radically from time to time. When chis is done, 
a court in interpreting legislation has really more 
discretion than it has with case law. For it can 
escape from prior cases by sayin~ that they have 
ignored the legislative intent. 8 
8 21evi, Introduction, p. 102, 
83 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
84Ib1.d., pp. 29-30. 
85-b d .:L.2:_. , p. 32 • 
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He suggests that this flexibility 1.s undesirable. The responsibility 
for legislation should rest with the legislature; 1£ the courts are 
always revising opinions on legislation, the responsibility for the 
86 content of the legislation has shifted to the courts. Thus, once 
the court has formulated a rule for interpretation of a scatute, the 
court should continue to follow in the direction earlier decisions 
87 point: 
Where legislative interpretation is concerned, therefore, 
it appears that legal reasoning does attempt to fix the 
meaning of the word. When this is done, subsequent cases 
must be decided upon the basis that the prior meaning 
remains. It must not be re-worked. Its meaning is made 
clear as examples are seen, but the reference is fixed. 88 
If the courts are in error, the legislature can modify the law. The 
failure of the legislature to modify the law following a decision would 
support the thesis that the court's decision was correct. 
This contrasts with cases involving the Constitution. Levi argues 
that the Constitution is much more ambiguous than legislation, and 
it must be ambiguous in order to survive the testing of time. There 
can be no authoritative interpretation of the Constitution; rather 
the meaning of the Constitution is time bound: 
The words are ambiguous, Nor can it be the Court[' s 
responsibility to interpret a definite meaning of the 
Const1tut1on], for the Court cannot bind itself in this 
manner; an appeal can always be made back to the Consti-
tution. Moreover, 1.f it is said that the intent of the 
framers ought to concrol, there is no mechanism for any 
86 1b1-d. 
87 Levi, ' 1Nature,1 1 p. 270. 
88Levi, Introduction, p. 33. 
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final determination of cheir intent. Added to the problem 
of ambiguity and the additional fact that the framers may 
have intended a growing instrument, there is the influence 
of constitution worship. This influence gives great 
freedom to a court. 89 
Some may argue that the Constitution should be permanent and, like 
legislation, any change in the meaning of the Constitution should be 
made by amendment, not by the courts. Levi argues chis position is 
undesirable, not because it is difficult to amend the Constitution, 
but rather because the Constitution is ambiguous: 
a written constitution must be enormously 
ambiguous in its general provisions. If there has been 
an incorrect interpretation of the words, an amendment 
would come close to repeating the same words. What 
is desired 1& a different emphasis, not different 
language. This is tantamount to saying that what is 
required is a different interpretation rather than an 
amendment. 9 O 
This requires that the courts allow the Constitution to "change" 
as conditions change. Thus the courts are much freer to alter the 
meaning of terms in the Constitution than they are with legislation. 91 
The discretion of the court is thus expanded in Constitutional 
It should be clear that Levi stresses the ambiguities involved 
in the law. All legislation, case law, and Constitutional law 
involves the creation and, to a degree, the maintenance of ambiguity. 
Christie suggests that vagueness is often desirable in the law, due 
89 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
90 
Ibid., p. 59. 
91 Ibid., pp. 60-63. 
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to uncercainty on the part of lawmakers as to the components of a law, 9 2 
to avoid mistakes, 93 to allow the law to adJust to changing conditions, 94 
to provide flexibility, 95 and even to aid in precision: 96 
Vagueness is an inescapable aspect of our language. It 
has been submitced .•• that vagueness is not always a 
hindrance to precise and effective communication. 
Indeed ••• vagueness is sometimes an indispensable 
tool for the achievement of accuracy and precision in 
language, particularly in legal language. Vagueness in 
legal language has also given our law a much needed 
flexibility. At the same time there are some Jobs which 
our linguistic tools, partly even because of vagueness, 
cannot completely perf~f'1 without the aid of other 
communication devices. 
For Levi, the legal system is kept ambiguous to allow the infusion of 
new ideas. 98 While the leeway will vary from one type of case to 
another, it will exist to a degree in all cases. This ambiguity is 
99 inevitable, and desirable: 
The Joint exploration through competing examples to 
fill the ambiguities of one or many propositions has 
the advantage of pennitting the use in the system of 
propositions or concepts saved from being sontradictory 
because they are ambiguous, and on this account more 
acceptable as ideals or commonplace truths; it has the 
advantage, also, of postponing difficult problems until 
92 
George Christie, "Vagueness and Legal Language,1t Minnesota 
Law Review, 48 (1964), 889-890. 
93 b.d 1..2:_., p. 889, 
94 
Ibid. , pp. 893-894. 
95 890. Ibid., p. 
96 895-898. Ibid. , pp. 
97-, d l:E2:..._., p. 911. 
98 
Levi, Introduction, p. 4. 
99 
Levi, Introduction, p. 6. 
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they arise and of providing an inner discipline for 
the system by forcing an analysifo8f general propositions 
in terms of concrete situations. 
Nor does the sys~em preclude prediccion of future cases: 
The system permits a foreshadowing of results and therefore 
has built into it the likelihood of a period of preparation 
so that future decisions appear as a belaced finding and 
not a making of law.101 
The final argument of Levi's concerns the nature of the legal 
forum. Levi suggests that a maJor component of legal argument is the 
forum in which legal argument takes place: 
The forum protects the parties and the community by making 
sure that the compelling analogies are before the court. 
The rule which will be created arises out of a process in 
which if different things are to be treated as similar, 
at least the differences have been urged. 102 
The forum in which legal disputes take place 1s critical in 
evaluating argu.~ent. It is necessary that all potential world views 
be presented in order for the Judges to test various possible decision 
rules and decide which decision rule is the base. The availability of 
the court to hear divergent views aids in the impartiality of the 
decision. Echoing John Stuart Mill, Levi argues: 
The ideas have their day in court, and they will have 
their day again. This is what makes the hearing fair, 
rather than any idea that the Judge is completely im-
partial, for of course he cannot be completely so. 103 
lO°tevi, "Nature," pp. 272-273. 
101 Ibid., p. 272. 
102 Levi, Introduction, p. 5. See also Ibid., p. 267. 
103 b d Ii.,p.S. 
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These views may change over time, 104 but all sides have the option of 
presenting their views. The availability of the court as an ear for 
all views also aids in the accepcance of the court's final decision. 
Since the participants were involved in the decision-making process, 
they are more likely to accept the conclusion of the court: 
Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things. 
It indicates in part the hold which the law process has 
over the litigants, They have participated in the law-
making. They are bound by something they helped to 
make. 105 
The drama of the courtroom aids in the legitimacy of the court and 
makes the decision more palatable. 106 Levi does not develop this 
position at length, devoting about a page to it in his initial essay. 
At the New York University symposium, however, he contrasted the 
advantages of the Judicial forum to other places where public policy 
is discussed, and suggested that the Judicial forum is superior· 
The fact is that in our society, although sorae may 
disapprove, the court has advantages as a forum for the 
discussion of political-moral issues. In a broadly 
based vocal and literate society, susceptible to the 
persuasion of many tongues and pens, and with inadequate 
structuring of relevant debate, the court has a useful 
function, not only in staying time for sober second 
thought, but in focusing issues. It is sometimes the 
only forum in which issues can be sharply focused - or 
appear to be so, It has the drama of views thac are 
more opposing and less scattered, because its procedures 
require a certain amount of relevance. It operates more 
within a structure of logical ideas, and yet a structure 
l04 Ibid., p. 6. 
l05 Ibid. , p. 5 • 
106 see Milner S. Ball, ' 1The Play 1 s the Thing: An Unscientific 
Reflection on the Courts Under the Rubric of Theatre," Stanford 
Law Review, 28 (1975), pp. 81-115. 
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into which current views may be infused through new 
words that must find a relationship to the old through 
new meanings. It has the drama of a limited number of 
personalities who are called upon to explain their 
views. It has the advantage of beginning with certain 
agreed-upon premises to which all participants profess 
loyalty, and thus it can force concentration upon the 
partial clarification of ambiguities. 107 
What is critical is that Levi suggests the norms of the legal community 
may aid in the use of the moving classification system, and thus in 
order to utilize the legal reasoning method to its fullest extent, we 
must examine both the logical form of an argument, and the forum in 
which argument takes place. Only a forum that promotes the comparison 
of competing analogies can produce the optimal decision rule. 
Conclusion 
Levi 1 s analysis emphasizes the role that past argumenc plays in 
legal reasoning. The Judge in a legal forum does not enter into a 
dispute (at least in most cases) with no past decisions to guide 
him/her; rather there are a number of prior decisions that provide the 
basis for argument in law. The only question is, how should these 
decisions be utilized? 
Levi's first answer is that the decisions of other Judges should 
play a part in legal decision-making. This has two implications for 
argument. First, Levi, by relying on precedents rather than on 
general rules reJects the view of law-as-deduction that had gained 
some popularity in law. His focus on how to develop premises, rather 
than what to do with premises once they have been established paves 
107 Levi, "Nature," p. 280. 
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the way for similar inquiries in other fields. His alternative system 
of reasoning combines elements of boch inductive and deductive 
reasoning, and attempts to build flexible premises based on past 
decisions in a field. 
Second, Levi notes that there are some restrictions on a Judge. 
Contrary to the views of the legal realists, who would argue that 
Judges decide how they please, and thus precedents are of no use in 
the study of legal reasoning. Levi argues that there are indeed 
constraints placed on the Judge by past decisions. While there may 
be some truth in the legal realist position that a part of law is 
discretionary, Levi views the past decisions as limited factors on 
the Judge's discretion: the Judge must be aware of past decisions 
when making decisions, and that can limit his/her lattitude for 
decision. 
Levi's examination of precedents has other implications for 
argument. The emphasis on stare decisis emphasizes the importance of 
the past in decision-making. While theoretically, any argument is 
based on a single issue, the way that the argument is resolved is 
based on a principle that is generalizable to other arguments. One 
way to insure that the correct decision is arrived at is to examine 
past arguments that were similar to the immediate argument, and to 
examine what rules could apply to both the past and the current 
arguments. This emphasizes the interconnectiveness of all arguments. 
The distinction between the~ and dictum of a case has still 
other possibilities. In any field, relevant material ~ust be 
separated from irrelevant material. In law, individuals have attempced 
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to develop guidelines for determining what material is relevant, but 
even in a compact and developed discipline like law this is not 
possible. Levi suggests, however, that the solution to this problem 
is not to create guidelines for relevance, but rather decide who 
should determine what is relevant, and to provide certain goals to 
help that individual separate the material. Similar procedures could 
be used in other fields. Included in setting up·such a procedure 
should be a discussion of whether the guidelines should be retrospective 
(for flexibility), or prospective (for certainty). 
In addition, the deviations from precedenc suggest possible 
implications for argument. Argument does not take place in a vaccuum, 
and this is certainly the case for legal argument. The rules for 
legal argument are Justified, not because they lead to the discovery 
of truth in some abscract sense, but rather because the doctrine of 
stare decisis promotes certain goals of the legal system; including 
stability, equality, efficLenty, reliance, and Justice. The legal 
rules, then, are not value free, they promote certain values, 
suggesting, at least in law, that argument is not value free. Indeed, 
Levi and others note that law much change with the times, and thus 
sometimes old decisions must be reversed, exceptions must be made, and 
other changes in the way cases are decided may be required. Sub-fields 
may be created within the legal discipline, such as Constitutional Law, 
statuatory interpretation, and so on, each with its own set of rules 
based on the goal of that sub-field. 
The ambiguity of words creates other difficulties with legal 
argument. Ambiguity is needed for law to grow, and sometimes it is 
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purposefully encouraged in legislation. The legal system can help to 
develop methods like the moving classification system to minimize 
this ambiguity, but the court will always have some flexibility. This 
factor, combined with the need for the courts to overturn precedents 
on occasion, mean that legal reasoning will always leave some discre-
tion to the judge, suggesting that even in law, a theoretically well-
developed argumentative discipline, a part of the decision-making 
process is subjective. While there are some checks on this discretion, 
including other courts, the legislative and executive branch, and the 
necessity for a court case to be brought before a court, at least a 
part of legal decisions are discretionary. 
Finally, Levi hints at, although he does not develop, one 
possibly important implication of legal reasoning: the nature of 
the legal forum. This implies that argument has both a logical form 
and a forum in which it takes place. The latter can insure that 
important arguments are not ignored, and that all involved in the 
argument feel that they have been treated fairly. It also insures 
that competing views have a chance to be heard and evaluated. An 
analysis of the legal forum can aid in the analysis of how other 
forums may want to be organized, expecially if, as Levi suggests, the 
legal forum is superior to other forums of argument. 
CHAPTER III 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESENT 
LON FULLER AND THE MORALITY OF LAW 
He who would trade axe for pen, particularly to write 
about legal philosophy, is condemned always to look back 
with whistful eye.l 
I believe that order, coherence, and clarity have an affinity 
with goodness and moral behavior. More than this I have 
never said, less than this I have no intention of saying. 2 
Toulmin' s concept of a 11 field" of argument suggests that one of 
the determinants of a II field" or "discipline" is the agreed goals and 
procedures of a group of individuals: 
A collective human enterprise takes the form of a rationally 
developing 'discipline', in those cases where men's shared 
commitment to a sufficiently agreed set of ideals leads to 
the development of an isolable and self-defining repertory 
of procedures, and where those procedures are open to 
further modification, so as to deal with problems arising 
from the incomplete fulfilment of those disciplinary ideals. 3 
In his book, Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of 
Concepts, Toulmin devotes a chapter to the discussion of the organiza-
tion of the intellectual-professions4 suggesting that one of the 
1Robert S. Summers, "Professor Fuller on Morality and Law," 
Journal of Legal Education, 18 (1965), 15. 
2Lon L. Fuller, "A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworking, 11 
Villanova Law Review, 10 (1965), 666. 
3stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding The Collective Use and 
Evolution of Concepts (Princeton· Princeton University Press, 1977), 
p. 359. 
4 Ibid., pp. 261-318. 
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characteristics of a' field' is che norms of the members of the 
field: 
The intellectual content of any rational activity forms 
neither a single logical system, nor a temporal sequence 
of such systems, Rather, it is an intellectual enterprise 
whose 'rationality' lies in the procedures governing its 
historical development and evolution.5 
A similar argument was made bu another Philosopher of Science, Thomas 
Kuhn, He suggests that, if he were to rewrite his classic essay on 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions he would 11 open with a d1.scuss1.on-
of community structure" 116 Such a community would have several charac-
ter1.stics: 
Bound together by common elements in their education and 
apprenticeship, they see themselves and are seen by others 
as the men responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared 
goals, including the training of their successors. Such 
communities are characterized by the relative fullness of 
communication within the group and by relative unanimity of 
the group's Judgement in professional matters. To a re-
markable extent the members of a given community will have 
absorbed the same literature and drawn similar lessons from 
it .7 
A field, or community would thus share similar goals, values, and 
procedures. It would thus seem appropriate that a study of law as a 
field should also explore the nature of the legal community. 
5 Ibid., p. 85. 
6Thomas S. Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics, 11 1.n Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan 
Musgrave (New York· Cambridge University Press, 1976). See 
also Thomas s. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Second Edition, Enlarged (Chicago· University of Chicago Press, 
1971), p. 176. 
7Thomas S. Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in The 
Structure of Scientific Theories, edited by Frederick Suppe, second 
edition (Chicago· University of Illinois Press, 1977), p. 461. 
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To argue that the legal profession has a certain set of standards 
that are agreed upon by all legal scholars would not be accurate. As 
in all fields, there is some disagreement among legal theorists as 
to the purpose of law, as well as its nature. One of the more 
significant theories of the nature of law was proposed by Lon Fuller, 
Professor of General Jurisprudence at the Harvard Law School in his 
book, The Morality of Law. 8 The book has provoked a great deal of 
thought about the nature of law. Since it was published in 1964, over 
47 reviews of the book have appeared, 9 not to mention a symposium 
devoted entirely to the book,lO and a wide variety of related works. 
Robert S. Summers suggested: 
The Morality of Law will find a place among important books 
in the history of American legal philosophy. It includes 
insights into the relations between morality and law, and 
advances a theory of law of great practical relevance. 11 
Nicholson suggests 11whether one accepts or reJects Fuller's position, 
its importance is clear. 1112 
While at first glance, the contents of the essays contained in 
the book are about morality and law, and not legal logic, the impli-
cations for argument are clear, indeed, Hosking, in his review of the 
8Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised edition (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1969). 
9 Ibid., pp. 243-244. 
l011The Morality of Law - A Sumpos1um," Villanova Law Review, 
10 (1965), 631-678. 
11 Summers, p. 1. 
12 P. P. Nicholson, "The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and 
his er1tics, 11 Ethics, 84 (1974), 326. 
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book argued 11The doctrine of 'inner morality' seems to this writer 
to be a doctrine of the logic of law and not of the ethics of law •1113 
Just as Toulmin suggests a field of argument is a type of enterprise, 14 
Fuller defines law as "the enterprise of subJecting human conduct to 
the governance of rules. 1115 While this definition has been attacked 
16 by some in the legal profession as being too broad, and by others 
as being both too broad and too narrow: "too wide because it catches 
in its net also the rules that apply to private associations and 
17 moral rules [and] too narrow because not all laws are rules," it 
does define the legal field in a similar way to Toulmin's definition 
of a discipline. The emphasis of Fuller is on the activity of making 
laws: 
Law is viewed as an 'activity, 1 and a legal system is the 
result of a sustained purposive effort. As such, there 
are certain conditions that must be fulfilled for the 
successful making of laws, and degrees of success are 
poss::i.ble. 18 
Fuller emphasizes that "the legal order is more than a set of principles 
13Richard Hosking, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
California State Bar Journal, 40 (1965), 93. 
14 Toulmin, p. 359. 
15Fuller, Morality, p. 122. 
16 H. L.A. Hart, Review of Lon L. Fuller, 'The Morality of Law, 
Harvard Law Review, 78 (1965), 1281. See also Marshal Cohen, 
"Law, Morality and Purpose," Villanova Law Review, 10 (1965), 651. 
17 
M. P. Golding, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
Ethics, 76 (1966), 226. 
18 Ibid., p. 225. 
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and nonns. It is a kind of aci:ivity. 1119 It would thus appear that 
Fuller 1 s con~ept of the legal field would be quite similar to that of 
Toulmin. Three concepts developed in his book should prove particu-
larly enlightening: his views of the morality of duty (as opposed 
to the morality of aspiration), the nature of the internal morality 
of law; and the relationship between the internal and the external 
morality of law. 20 
The Two Moralities 
Fuller begins his discussion with the distinction between the 
morality of duty and the morality of aspiration. This distinction, 
as he admits, is not new, though his elaboration and application is 
worthwhile. H. L.A. Hart, Fuller 1 s principle target, concedes: 
The book opens with a contribution to moral philosophy 
which certainly deserves to be assesed as such and not 
merely as a casual by-product of jurisprudential thought; 
for the first chapter is a protest against thinking of 
morality as a simple, unitary concept, and makes a 
detailed plea for discrimination within morality of 
different, though related, dimensions of assesment of 
human conduct. 2 l 
He describes what the morality of law should be, as opposed to how it 
?? 
is viewed by legal theorists.-- Fuller suggests that the morality of 
19 Philip Selznik, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
American Sociological Review, 30 (1965), 947. 
20This review of Fuller will omit sections of the book that are 
not relevant to a theory of argument, especially his section responding 
to H. L.A. Hart 1 s The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), except where Hart touches on the morality of law. 
21Hart, Review of Fuller, p. 1282. 
22James B. Brady, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
Texas Law Review, 43 (1964), 259. 
-64-
aspiration is I the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of the 
fullest realization of human powers. 1123 It is an ideal toward which 
we all seek but which illustrates human conduct at its best. 
The morality of duty, on the other hand, is a minimum requirement 
,for individuals in a society: 
Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of 
human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the 
bottom. It lays down the basic rules without which an 
ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered 
society directed toward certain specific goals must fail 
of its mark.24 
The morality of duty is the morality of the Ten Commandments, phrased 
in terms of "thou shalt not," and occasionally, "thou shall." 
Fuller suggests that this distinction is critical since only the 
morality of duty should be enforced with laws. There is no way that 
we can require a person to "live up to the excellences of which he is 
25 capable." Rather, we should concentrate on the violations of duty. 
While the distinction between the morality of duty and the 
morality of aspiration may seem clear in the abstract, he suggests 
that the distinction is not always clear. He instead pictures a 
continuum of moral issues, ranging from the "most obvious demands of 
social living" and extends to 11 the highest reaches of human aspiration. 1126 
These may be viewed as being divided by an imaginary divider, that 
23Fuller, Morality, p. 5. 
24 Ibid. , pp. 5 -6. 
25 Ibid., p. 9. 
26 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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distinguishes between the morality of aspiration and the morality of 
duty. The bulk of moral argument has been between those who 11 struggle 
to push it [ the divider] upward" and those who 11 work to pull it down. 1127 
This problem exists not only for laws and morals, but for economics, 
h d . 28 aest etics, an science. 
The distinction between the morality of duty and the morality of 
aspiration is never defined clearly, though he does suggest several 
guidelines, He initially draws an analogy between the morality of 
duty and the rules of grammar, and the morality of aspiration and 
the rules of composition. 29 He further suggests, in passing: 
••• the morality of duty finds its closest cousin in 
the law, while the morality of aspiration stands in 
intimate kinship with aesthetics. 30 
The most extensive explanation is developedthrough an analogy to econo-
mics. The morality of aspiration, he argues, is related to the econo-
mics of marginal utility, while the morality of duty is related to the 
31 economics of exchange. The morality of the marginal utility deals 
with our efforts to make the most of scarce resources, while the 
morality of aspiration guides us in 11 the best use of our short lives. 11 32 
27 Ibid., p. 10. 
28 
29. Ibid., p. 
29 Ibid. , p. 6. 
301bid., p. 15. 
31Ibid., p. 17. 
32 Ibid. , p. 20. 
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While the exact standard to be used to separate the two moralities is 
unclear, an effort is made to balance competing goals. 
The morality of duty, on the other hand, is similar to the 
economics of exchange. This is guided by a form of the golden rule. 
"So soon as I have received from you assurance that you will treat me 
as you yourself would wish to be treated, then I shall be ready in 
turn to accord a like treatment to you. 1133 The morality is based on 
reciprocity, which has three characteristics: 
First, the relationship of reciprocity out of which the 
duty arises must result from a voluntary agreement between 
the parties 1.mmediately affected, they themselves 'create' 
the duty. Second, the reciprocal performances of the 
parties must in some sense be equal in value •••• Third, 
the relationships within the society must be sufficiently 
fluid so tgat the same duty you owe me today, I may owe you 
tomorrow. 3 
There are few other distinctions between the morality of duty and 
the morality of aspiration. The failure to fulfil a duty is reason 
for punishment, while the meeting of the morality of aspiration is 
reason for praise. 35 The morality of duty must be attainable. 36 The 
morality of duty cannot be qualified; it is usually an absolute 
obligation of an individuat. 37 Nevertheless, the main distinction 
is the economic analogy. 
33Ibid., p. 20. 
34 Ibid., p. 23. 
35 rbid., p. 30. 
36Richard Wasserstrom, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
Rutger's Law Review, 19 (1965), 582. 
37Fuller, Morality, p. 29. 
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Fuller's distinction between the morality of duty and the morality 
of aspiration has been attacked as being vague, 38 as ignoring conflicts 
between duties and aspirations, 39 and as having little relevance to 
40 law, but it does appear to be a useful distinction for argument. 
Given that argument is a human activity involved with probabilities, 
it is possible that the dual moralities could provide a structure 
of the study of argument. The morality of duty consists of the minimum 
components of an argument, that prevents the argument from being Just 
opinion. The morality of aspiration would be the structure of a 
perfect argumentative situation, impossible in the real world, but 
41 which should be aimed at by an arguer. 
The Internal Morality of Law 
One perenial conflict in legal theory has been between the legal 
positivists and the adherents in natural law. One of the maJor points 
of disagreement has been over the relationship between morality and 
law: 
Positivists assert whatever has the valid form of law is 
law, regardless of the morality or immorality of its content, 
natural law writers deny that form alone is enough, there 
must also be morally good or at least not morally bad 
content. 42 
38 Summers, p. 3. 
39 Ibid., p. 8. 
4 0wasserstrom, p. 582. 
41Ibid. 
4 2Nicholson, p. 311. 
-68-
Thus a natural law proponent would argue that, when a law violates 
a natural (or moral) law, it is not really a law. A positivist, on 
the other hand, suggests that the existence of a law and its morality 
are two distinct concepts,43 This conflict was emphasized with the 
trials of Nazi criminals after World War II who were obeying laws that 
were legally enacted, but which were thought to violate natural law. 44 
While most posivists made some attempt to respond to this problem, 45 
Fuller attempted to develop the natural law perspective. He does this 
by introducing a concept of the "internal morality of law,' 1 also known 
as "the morality that makes law possible," "the special morality of 
law," 11 procedural natural law," "the principles of legality, 11 and 
11kinds of legal excellence. 11 He uses these terms to distinguish 
between the internal morality of law from its external morality: 
The 'internal morality of law' is essentially concerned 
with the procedure of making law. It is the technique 
used by the lawmaker in deciding which rule of subst~ntive 
law should be applied to the particular case which he has 
been called upon to decide. The' external morality of law' 
refers to the content of the substantive rules of law 
which are actually applied by the arbiter in arriving at 
his decision.46 
The inner morality provides procedural guidelines of interest to a 
lawmaker. 
43Golding, p. 225. 
44 chiam Perelman, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
Natural Law Forum, 10 (1965), 242. 
45 Ibid., p. 242. 
46 Edwin W. Tucker, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
Indiana Law Journal, 40 (1965), 271-272. 
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Fuller devotes a chapter to outlining some of the specific rules 
that constitute the internal morality of law. He begins with the 
story of a King named Rex who attempts to reform the legal system. 
Fuller describes his futile efforts at legislation, and concludes 
that there are eight ways to develop a poor system of legal rules: 
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve 
rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an 
ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to 
publicize, or at least to make available to the affected 
party, the rules he is expected to observe, (3) the abuse 
of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself 
guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective 
in effect, since it puts them under the threat of retro-
spective change, (4) a failure to make rules understandable; 
(5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that 
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 
(7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that 
the subJect cannot orient his action by them, and, finally, 
(8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced 
and their actual administration.47 
He thus suggests that a good legal system should have rules that are 
(1) general; (2) publicized; (3) prospective; (4) clear; (5) consistent; 
(6) possible to follow; (7) stable, and (8) congruent with official 
action. 
Fuller postulates that· 
A total failure in any one of these eight directions 
does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results 
in something that is not properly called a legal system 
at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a 
void contract can still be said to be one kind of contract. 48 
He suggests that no citizen can be expected to have any moral obligation 
to obey a legal rule that violates the ten characteristics of the inner 
47Fuller, Morality, p. 39. 
48 Ibid., p. 39. 
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morality of law. Such was the case in Germany under Hitler, when the 
government attempted to institute rules not to aid a citizen in shaping 
his conduct, but '1 to frighten him into impotence. 1149 
Fuller suggests that the internal morality of law is primarily 
the morality of aspiration, though the reasons for this position are 
not clear. He argues: 
The demands of the inner morality of the law, however, though 
they concern a relationship with persons generally, demand 
more than forbearances; they are, as we loosely say, affirma-
tive in nature: make the law known, make it coherent and 
clear, see that your decisions as an official are guided 
by it, etc. To meet these demands human energies must be 
directed toward specific kinds of achievement and not merely 
warned away from harmful acts.SO 
While, if true, this may Justify his claim that che internal morality 
is one of aspiration, his 1n1t1al premise is of questionable validity. 
There is no reason why the morality of law must be expressed in an 
affirmative manner. The rules could be labeled, "do not keep the law 
secret," "do not pass retroactive laws," and so on. His second argument 
is: 
In the morality of law, in any event, good intentions are"-
of little avail, as King Rex amply demonstrated. All of 
this adds up to the conclusion that the inner morality of law 
is condemned to remain largely a morality of aspiration and 
not of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a sense of 
trusteeship and to the pride of the craftsman. 51 
This again is unsatisfactory, since the good intentions of Rex occured 
in the absence of the knowledge of the internal morality of the law. 
49 
Ibid. , p. 40. 
so Ibid. , p. 42. 
511b1d., p. 43. 
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Intentions alone may not be adequate, but intentions plus knowledge 
of the internal morality of law should have prevented Rex's failure. 
Fuller then qualifies the nature of the morality of law as being 
a morality of aspiration when he suggests that the requirement of 
publicity may be an exception to the rule, since it would appear to 
be "a legal requirement for the making of law. 1152 He suggests that: 
A formalized standard of promulgation not only tells the 
lawmaker where to publish his law; it also lets the subJect 
- or a lawyer representing his interests - know where to 
go to learn what the law is.53 
Why other rules are not also exceptions is not clear, though he does 
argue that, since the internal morality is a law of aspiration, there 
can be conflict between laws, and thus the principle of marginal 
utility will come into play. 
Fuller then discusses each of the standards for the internal 
morality of law and explains how they come into conflict with each 
other (at least to a degree), and presents his strongest case for che 
impossibility of any of these standards to be a duty. The idea of 
laws being general, for example, is often thought to be desirable in 
that it insures fairness, since equals would be treated as equals. 
This type of rule does create problems in interpretation and in applying 
the law to an individua1. 54 
52Ibid., p. 43. 
53rbid., p. 43. 
54 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
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The requirement of promulgation is critical to Fuller. While at 
times the law caJnot or is not completely articulated (as in case law, 
or when the internal deliberations are kep~ secret)55 this requirement 
is vital: 
The laws should be given adequate publication so that they 
may be subJect to public criticism, including the criticism 
that they are the kind of laws that ought not to be enacted 
unless their content can be effectively conveyed to those 
subJect to them.56 
This does not mean that every citizen must read all the laws, merely 
that they be available to him/her. 
Retroactive laws present a more difficult situation. In some 
cases, for example, it may be necessary to pass retroactive laws to 
correct past inJustices, as in the case where some external force 
prevents individuals from complying with a law. In addition, much 
tort law is decided on a case by case basis, and the rule that the 
court uses to dete~mine the outcome of a case is based on a rule that 
did not exist before the court gave its decision. 57 An even more 
ambiguous case is the example of a tax law taxing income received 
before the law was passed. The law may not be retroactive, though it 
may be thought to be unfair. 58 Fuller would suggest that since an 
individual's decisions on economic matters are decided on the current 
55 50. Ibid., p. 
56 Ibid., p. 51. 
57 Ibid., pp. 56 -57. 
58 59. Ibid., p. 
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59 tax structure, the law may have a retroactive effect. The point is 
not that either position is correct, but that there are serious diffi-
culties surrounding retroactive law. 60 
Similar problems exist, to some degree or another, for all the 
other principles. Sometimes it is difficult to express rules clearly.61 
Contradictions in law often arise when a new law fails to replace an 
62 old one. The concept of strict liability somet1.rnes requires indivi-
duals to perform acts they cannot do (or punishes them for acts they 
did not do). 63 Changes in law are often required for the same reasons 
64 as retroactive law, and there often is a failure for the law as 
applied to resemble the law on the books: 
This congruance may be destroyed or impaired in a great 
variety of ways· mistaken interpretation, inaccessibility 
of the law, lack of insighc into what is required to main-
tain the integrity of a legal system, bribery, preJudice, 
indifference, stupidity, and the drive toward personal 
power. 65 
In other cases, the lack of congruence can be based upon a degree of 
66 uncertainty about what is meant by the law" While in some cases it 
59 60. Ibid., p. 
60 Ibid., p. 61. 
61Ibid., p. 63. 
62Ibid., p. 68. 
63 77. Ibid. , p. 
64rbid., p. 80. 
65 Ibid. , p. 81. 
66Ibid., p. 85. 
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is not clear that the examples he chooses could not have been avoided 
(or, in the case of strict liabilicy, thac there may be alternate 
purposes of law), he does illustrate some of the problems of the 
moralities. 
He does make a few observations about these standards: 
[First], infringements of legal morality tend to become 
cumulative. [Second], to the extent that the law merely 
brings to explicit expression conceptions of right and 
wrong widely shared in the community, the need that enacted 
law be publicized and clearly stated diminishes in importance. 
[Third], the stringency with which che eight desiderata as 
a whole should be applied, as well as their priority of 
ranking among themselves, will be affected by the branch of 
law in quest:J..on, as well as by the kinds of legal rules 
that are under consideration. [Fourth], it should be 
recalled that in our detailed analysis of each of the 
demands of legal morality we have generally taken the 
viewpoint of a conscientious legislator, eager to under-
stand the nature of his responsibility and willing to face 
its difficulties. The emphasis on nuances and difficult 
problems should not make us forget that not all cases are 
hard. 67 
This would suggest that these internal moralities may vary in importance 
depending upon the specific situation. 
While Fuller's distinction between the morality of duty and the 
morality of aspiration has been favorably received by most of his 
critics, his section on the inner morality of law has been frequently 
attacked. While some of the attacks are based on some of his implica-
tions of these canons on the issue of a citizen's ability to disobey 
68 the law, there are three main criticisms of Fuller's position,that 
are relevant to the study of legal argument. 
67 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
68 Wasserstrom, p. 584. 
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First, some suggest that what Fuller has outlined is not an 
inner morality of law, but merely a description of standards for 
efficiency in a legal system. Fuller's nemisis, H. L.A. Hart aruges· 
Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and reflections 
on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles, 
('Avoid poisons however lethal if they cause the victim to 
vomit,' or 'Avoid poisons however lethal if their shape, 
color, or size is likely to attract notice.' ) But to call 
these principles of the poisoner's art 1 the morality of 
poisoning' would simply blur the distinction between the 
notion of efficiency for a purpose and those final Judge-
ments about activities and 5urposes with which morality in its 
various forms is concerned. 9 
The guidelines Fuller offers, so the argument goes, suggest efficient 
ways to carry out the law, though they may have little to do with 
morality per se.70 ----
Second, while many critics would go along with the eight guide-
lines Fuller suggests, they appear to be arbitrary. Thus Summers argues 
that "[T]here are other ways to fail to make laws that are equally if 
not more fundamental than any of the ways the author identifiesp 1171 He 
goes on to list eight other ways to fail to make laws: 
First, his eight ways do not allow for the failure of a 
society to establish authoratative law making procedures 
at the outset. 
Second, the author cannot •.• satisfactorily accomodate 
failures to comply with authoratative law-making procedures 
after they have been set up • 
• • • a third and no less llilportant way to' fail to make 
law' is to fail to provide institutions for the authoratative 
interpretation of law. 
69wasserstrom, p. 584. 
7°For Fuller's defense of this position, see Fuller, Morality, 
pp. 200-205. 
71s urrnners , p. 19 • 
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••• a fourth significant way to fail to make law - effective 
law - is to fail to provide for its execution by public 
official or private citizen. 72 
To distinguish and identify a few others: (1) The failure 
to provide effective remedies for noncompliance, (2) the 
failure to maintain the ~inimal socio-economic 
cond1t1ons requ~red for compliance, (3) a general failure 
to observe such essentials of 'natural Justice' as 
Jud1c1al impartiality and a right to a hearing so that 
disrespect for law becomes common, (4) the use of law to 
control the uncontrolable, e.g., religious belief, love, 
and so on. 73 
While there may be some responses to these additional rules, such as 
that some of them may be incorporated in Fuller's inner morality, or 
that they emphasize a different aspect of law - its administration as 
opposed to the creation of the rules themselves, they do raise an 
important issue: what criteria should be used to evaluate the 
principles of the internal morality of law? While Fuller does not 
provide such a criterion, his rules do have a common feature: 
••• the common feature of Professor Fuller's eight 
ways of failing to make law is that in each case compli-
ance is impossible, because either there are no prospective 
rules or they are hopelessly contradictory or their 
content cannot be ascertainea. 74 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that his list is compre-
hensive, and the means of determining what new rules should be added 
to the list is uncertain at best. 
The final criticism of Fuller's internal morality of law is that 
several principles are contradictory. He concedes that often the 
72rbid., pp. 19-20. 
731b1d., p. 21. 
7~Graham Hughes, Review of Lon Fuller, Morality of Law,_Stanford 
Law Review, 17 (1965), 552. 
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principles will be contradictory, 75 bu~ his explanation as to the 
resolution of these contradictions is uncertain. He notes, for example, 
that Hitler's legal system did not resolve the issues adequately, but 
again there is no standard for examining at what point a legal system 
fails to achieve enough of the morality to be called a legal system: 
• aside from showing how difficult it may be to 
make this Judgement - although Fuller has no doubts 
that some Nazi attempts at law-making were failures 
at law-making - I do not think that the author's 
remarks on the 'marginal utility principle' are suffi-
ciently detailed to be of much help here, 76 
One possible explanation is that the author's definition of law as 
"the enterprise of subJecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules," and any conflict would be resolved correctly only if it would 
further aid an individual in her/his ability to abide by rules. 
Internal vs. External Morality of Law 
Perhaps the most controversial position Fuller defends is his 
position that if the internal morality of law is followed, the enacted 
laws will tend to be considered ethically moral. He argues, for 
example, that if Hitler or other leaders had followed the internal 
rules he outlines, they would not have passed the repressive legislation 
they did. This position has been frequently criticized. Hart suggests 
there is "no special incompatibility between clear laws and evil. 
Clear laws are therefore ethically neutral though they are not equally 
75A. H. Fuller, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, Modern 
Law Review, 28 (1965), 371. 
76Golding, p. 226. 
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compatible with vague and well-defined aims. 1177 Summers argues: 
there is no correlation whatsoever between clarity 
of formulation and goodness. Many good aims are as 
difficult fo formulate in statutes as are some bad aims, and 
some 7~d aims are as easy to formulate in statutes as good 
ones. 
Even if there is a relationship, che relationship is merely asserted, 
and no support for the relationship is given. 79 
Some people point to examples of individuals following Fuller's 
guidelines and producing bad legislation. Dias gives the example of 
Herod's execution of all male children under the age of one. 80 Dworkin 
gives a hypothetical example: 
Tex, let us suppose, has an evil mind. He is set upon 
wholiy immoral ambitions - he wants, for example, to subJugate 
and enslave one portion of his population. If Tex made the 
stupid mistakes that Rex made, he would fail in this endeavor. 
His black purposes would be thwarted. So Tex, who is not 
stupid, complies with Professor Fuller 1 s canonsi at least to 
the extent necessary to succeed in his design. 8 
There is no reason co believe that the internal morality would prevent 
this behavior. 
Fuller does suggest that evil legislation may be more difficult 
to phrase, but most critics argue that 11 good11 _ e-zil legislation need 
not be harder to frame than "good" moral legislation. 
77Hart, Review of Fuller, p. 1287. 
78summers, pp. 25-26. 
79 Hughes, p. 553. 
SOR. W. M. Dias, Review of Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
Cambridge Law Journal, 1965 (1965), 158. 
81Ronald Dworkin, 11 The Elusive Morality of Law," Villanova Law 
Review, 10 -(1965), 632. 
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In response to this criticism, Fuller has attempted to ellaborate 
on his position. Dworkin, a leading critic of Fuller, summarized the 
potential positions Fuller could defend: 
(1) law is a p~econdition of good law, so one cannot have 
good law without observing internal morality; (2) internal 
morality requires publication, and this restraints a tyrant 
who fears publicity from pursuing ev~l by legislation; (3) 
internal morality demands some precision, and it is hard to 
be precise in legislating inequity; and (4) internal 
morality assumes a view of man as a 'responsible agent,' and 
a legislator holding this view will not seek to affront 'man's 
dignity as a responsible agent' with outrageous law. 82 
Fuller probably holds several of these views. He would suggest that 
individuals would be reluctant to express evil intentions openly. 83 
He also suggests the principles he advocates have a greater afinity 
with good legislation than with evil legislation.84 Finally, he 
suggests that: 
• the internal morality of the law requires a view as 
to the nature of man. To embark on the enterprise of sub-
Jecting human conduct to rules implies commitment to the view 
that man is or can become a responsible agent. 85 
While it may be true that some may comply with the procedures without 
being cocmnitted to them86 presumably the concern for the internal 
morality of law will result in a greater interest in the external 
morality of law. 
82Ronald Dworkin, "Philosophy, Morality and Law - Observations 
Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim, 11 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 113, (1965), 671-672. 
S3Fuller, Morality, p, 159. 
84Ibid. 
85N1.cholson, p. 315. 
86 nwork1.n, "Philosophy, Morality and Law," p. 675. 
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Conclusion 
Fuller's discussion of the morality of law emphasizes the nature 
of the legal discipline and how it affects the way the legal process 
works. Such a viewpoint has several implications for the study of 
legal argument. 
First, the emphasis on legal argument as a discipline emphasizes 
certain aspects of law. Both Toulmin and Kuhn emphasize the nature of 
disciplines in science. The implication is that the conduct of inquiry 
is human activity, This means that the study of the values of those 
individuals may aid in the understanding of the nature of the argumenta-
tive activity. In law, according to Fuller, the emphasis of legal rule-
makers on subJecting human conduct to the governance of rules has 
caused them to set up certain guidelines to govern lawmaking. 
Second, the distinction between the morality of aspiration and 
the morality of duty has implications for the study of argument. 
Fuller argues that there can be no perfect legal system. Instead, 
each legal system sets up two types of rules, one type setting up 
minimum standards, and the other type creating ideal goals. In a 
similar manner, an argumentative system may realize that there can be 
no perfect argument, instead a system may generate two "moralities": 
one of basic rules required of all argument, and another of the ideal 
characteristics of argument in the field which, though perhaps not 
possible to achieve, acts as a model for argument. 
Third, Fuller suggests several concrete guidelines for argument 
in law. These include admonitions that rules of law should be general, 
consistent, public, clear, stable, prospective, and so on. From this, 
there are several possible implications. First, some of the principles 
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of law may be field invarient. For example, it is arguable that the 
rules in any discipline should be general, and that the guidelines 
for argument should be-determined before the argument, rather than 
during the argument (i.e., be prospective). At the same time, some 
of the guidelines may be field varient, in which case it may be 
worthwhile to determine the "inner morality" of other fields. In 
addition, since Fuller notes that the principles may come into conflict 
with each other, he emphasizes that, at least in law, these principles 
' can only be part of a morality of aspiration, hot of duty. Finally, 
since his critics note that a legal system can follow Fuller's morality 
and produce bad laws, Fuller may illustrate that even following logical 
rules of a field does not, by itself, guarantee moral results. 
In addition, like Levi, Fuller notes that the nature of the rules 
of a field are based on the goal of a field. Fuller emphasizes that 
the goal of law is to subject human conduct to the governance of rules, 
and the rules he isolates are designed to further that goal. Finally, 
Fuller emphasizes that, in order to insure Just laws, individuals in 
law must be concerned with the inner morality of law and its workings, 
suggesting that the ultimate measure of how well a field works may 
not be the logical rules it develops, but rather the intellectual and 
(in some cases) moral committment the members of that field have 
toward the goal of the field. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE FUTURE 
HERBERT WECHSLER AND !:-l""EUTRAL PRINCIPLES 
Continuing discussion concerning the concept of neutrality 
and frequent approving references to it nevertheless demon-
strate the existence of a core of meaning offer~ng useful 
insights into the Judicial process. One feels, perhaps 
intuitively, that the standard introduced by Professor 
Wechsler has significance, the problem is to isolate and 
explicate those elements embedded in his analysis responsible 
for this significance. 1 
It is difficult for the Judge to be neutral because he has 
no relatively exact scale of measurement like grams or 
ounces with which to balance. Personal pre3udices are 
likely to creep into inexact measurings. And in another 
sense it is impossible for the Judge to be neutral; unless 
he has some preestablished hierarchy of values or social 
goals, some preestablished standards of relevance, how can 
he determine which characteristics of the interests before 
him to balance?2 
For the imcompetent, it sometimes is true, as has been said, 
that an interest in general ideas means an absence of 
particular knowledge.3 
One of the most influential, and certainly one of the most controversial, 
essays on legal reasoning is Herbert Wechsler's "Toward Neutral Principles 
1 
Robert L. Birmingham, "The Generality of Neutral Principles: A 
Game-Theoretic Perspective, 11 California Law Review, 58 (1970), 
873-874. 
2 Martin Shapiro, "The Supreme Court and Constitutional AdJudication 
Of Politics and Neutral Principles," George Washington Law Review, 31 
(1963), 595. 
3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law 
Review, 10 (1897), 477-478, 
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of Constitutional Law.'i4 This essay was on.ginally a speech delivered 
at the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School on April 
7, 1959 and subsequently published both in the Harvard Law Review and 
in a book of collected articles by Wechsler.5 The response to the 
paper has been overwhelming. Snortland and Stanga call the essay 11 a 
classic in modern legal thought. 116 Clark referred to it as an "already 
7 classic discussion," and Pollak referred to it as 11 a 'state paper' of 
consequence. 118 Rostow suggested that the lecture was 11 the most 
important recent attack on the Court. 119 Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice 
of the United States, in an issue of the Columbia Law Review devoted 
entirely to the contributions of Herbert Wechsler observed: 
In advancing and giving content to the notion of 'neutral 
principles,' ne has set a standard for I Judging the Judges 1 
as we strive to work within the limits of these two systems 
- the Judicial and the constitutiona1. 10 
This does not mean that Wechsler's concept of neutral principles has 
4 Herbert Wechsler, nToward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 11 Harvard Law Review, 73 (1959), 1-35. 
5Herbert Wechsler, ~rinciples, Politics and Fundamental Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). 
6Neil E. Snortland and John E. Stanga, "Neutral Principles and 
Decision-Making Theory: An Alternative to Incrementalism, 11 George 
Washington Law Review, 41 (1973), 1006. 
7 Charles E. Clark, "A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 11 Virginia 
Law Review, 49 (1963), 661. 
81ouis H. Pollak, 11 Const1tut1onal AdJudication: Relative or 
Absolute Neutrality, 11 Journal of Public Law, 11 (1962), 48. 
9Eugene V. Rostow, 11American Legal Realism and the Sense of the 
Profession, 11 Rocky Mountain Law Review, 34 (1962), 136. 
10warren E. Burger, 11Herbert Wechsler,'' Columbia Law Review, 78 
(1978), 951. 
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always been greeted with open arms, indeed, his article has been met 
with voluminous cric1c1sm. Writing less than four years after the 
essay appeared, BenJamin Wright commented: 
Few essays dealing with the theory and practice of consti-
tutional interpretation by the Supreme Court of the United 
States have resulted in so many and such immediate comments 
as Professor Herbert Wechsler' s 'Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law. 1 •••• at least five articles 
have appeared dealing directly with some aspect of its thesis, 
and other writings have touched on it more briefly. An 
essay which results in such diverse replies or explanations 
must be concerned with issues of more than limited applica-
tiop, and merits more than passing attention. 11 
Indeed, Bickel argued "[t]he volume of responsible criticism that Mr. 
Wechsler' s paper on "Neutral Principles" has produced is nothing short 
of the most genuine kind of tribute to him. 1112 Clark concurred: 
Even to those of us who must remain not fully persuaded by 
the argument, the lecture has provided a road to more 
careful thinking about these great issues; indeed no 
higher tribute can be paid a scholar than the veritable 
tempest of discussion it has called forth.13 
Though some may disagree with the solution he poses, the issues he 
raises are important for all scholars of argument in general, and legal 
argument in particular. The issues he raises "reach to the very core 
of the process of Judicial decision and will retain importance as long 
as Judges sit in th is country. 1114 
11BenJamin F. Wright, "The Supreme Court Cannot be Neutral, 11 
Texas Law Review, 40 (1962), 599. 
12 Alexander M. Bickel, "Forward to the Supreme Court, 1960 Term," 
Harvard Law Review, 75 (1961), 47-48. 
13 Charles E. Clark, "The Limits of Judicial ObJectivity, 11 
American University Law Review, 12 (1963), 6. 
14-izent Greenawalt, "Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles , 11 
Columbia Law Review, 78 (1978), 984. 
-85-
While the responses to Wechsler 1 s speech have been numerous; 
Wechsler' s position is articulated in very few places (which, as Tve 
shall see, creates several problems). Besides the initial lecture, 
Wechsler spent little time clarifying his position. He did respond 
to his critics in the introduction to his book Principles, Politics and 
Fundamental Law, 15 but the defense was very brief and not very enlight-
ening. He did appear at the New York University Institute of Philosophy 
symposium on "Judicial Reasoning" with Levi, Freund, Henklin, and 
others, 16 and the paper he presented at that sumposium provides some 
clarification of his views as well as his response to Levi's position. 
More recently he was asked to appear on a panel at the Conference for 
Federal Appellate Judges at the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, 
D. C. in May, 1975 on 11Procedures to Reach Dec1sions, 11 which allowed 
him to respond (again briefly) to his critics. 17 The issues he raises 
are also illuminated by a series of articles by Henry Hart,18 I'hurman 
15wechsler~ Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law, pp. xi-xv. 
16sidney Hook, ed., Law and Philosophy· A Symposium (New York: 
New York University Press, 1964), pp. 263-335. 
1711Procedures to Reach Decisions," Conference for Federal 
Appellate Judges, Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D. c., May 15, 
1975. Wechsler's comments have been reprinted in excerpts as 
"Toward Neutral Principles: Revisited," in The Judicial Process: 
Readings, Materials and Cases, edited by Ruggero J. Aldisert (St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 543-545. 
18Henry M. Hart, "Foward: 
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term," 
125. 
The Time Chart of the Justices, 
Harvard Law Review, 73 (1959), 84-
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Arnold, 19 and Erwin N. Griswold. 20 These articles are often discussed 
in the same articles that address Wechsler' s thesis. 
The discussion of Wechsler1 s position will cover six topics, 
First, the rationale behind Wechsler' s position will be examined, 
including his reasons for Judicial review and the perceived need for 
standards for criticism of court cases. Second, the nature of neutral 
principles will be explored, including the many ways that the terms 
have been defined. Third, the application of neutral principles to 
Supreme Court decisions will be attempted, using the cases Wechsler 
emphasized. Fourth, Hart's attack on result-oriented Jurisprudence and 
his tacit support for Wechsler will be noted. Fifth, the attacks on 
Wechsler's position will be described and evaluated. Finally, some 
tentative conclusions about legal argument wi11 be suggested. 
The Rationale for Neutral Principles 
Wechsler begins his essay by discussing the basis for Judicial 
review. He does this by responding to the position defended by Learned 
21 Hand, who gave the Holmes lecture at Harvard the previous year. Both 
Hand and Wechsler agree that the Supreme Court has the authority to 
review the legitimacy of legislation. Wechsler devotes the first third 
of his lecture explaim.ng why Hand's reasoning is incorrect. This is 
19 Thurman Arnold, "Professor Hart's Theology," Harvard Law Review, 
73 (1959), 1298-1317. 
20Erwin N. Griswold, "Of Times and Attitudes - Professor Hart and 
Judge Arnold, 11 Harvard Law Review, 74 (1960), 81-94. 
21Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1958). 
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not an idle dispute, the reasons why the Supreme Court can review 
the Constitutionality of an act will shape in some way the way the 
Court goes about its task: 
Here as elsewhere a position cannot be divorced from its 
supporting reasons; the reasons are, indeed, a part and 
most important part of the position.22 
Hand argued that Judicial review was not an integral part of the 
Constitution, that is, Judicial review cannot be inferred directly 
from the Constitution. Rather, Judicial review is Justified because 
it is needed co preserve the union: 
••• it was probable, if indeed it was not certain, that 
without some arbiter whose decision should be final the 
whole system would have collapsed, for it was extremely 
unlikely thatthe Executive or the Legislature, having 
once decided, would yield to the contrary holding of 
another 'Department,' even of the courts. 23 
This view would greatly restrict the power of the Court in reviewing 
Congress: 
[SJince this power is not a logical deduction from the 
structure of the Constitution but only a practical 
condition upon its successful operation, it need not 
be exercised whenever a court sees, or thinks that it 
sees, an invasion of the Constitution. It is always a 
preliminary question how importunately the occasion 
demands an answer. It may be better to leave the issue 
to be worked out without authoratative solution; or 
perhaps the only solution available is one that the 
court has no adequate means to enforce. 24 
Wechsler argues that, Judicial review is Justified based upon 
a close reading of the Constitution, not on its pragmatic value. 
22wechsler, 11Toward Neutral Principles,'1 p. 5. 
23Hand, in Ibid., p. 2. 
2~and, Bill of Rights, p. 15. 
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Judicial Review is "grounded in the language of the Constitution and 
is not a mere interpolation. 1125 Drawing from the supremacy clause, 26 
as well as Article III, section I, and section 2, he notes that 
1) a state court can rule on a constitutional issue; 2) the state 
court's Judgement would be reviewable by the Supreme Court, and 
3) lower federal courts are also bound by the Constitution. 27 From 
these positions, he argues that the Supreme Court, which must rule 
on constitutional issues in state cases, can rule on those issues 
in other cases. 28 He further argues that, as argued in Marbury v. 
Madison: "a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that 
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 1129 
This view of Judicial power has several implications, First, 
rather than being optional, Judicial intervention is required. The 
Supreme Court cannot stand back and wait for an action threatening 
the country before it intervenes 1.n the political conflict, rather 
the court must be prepared to decide on cases involving the Constitu-
tion: 
It 1.s the duty to decide the litigated case and to decide 
ic in accordance with the law, with all that that implies 
as to a rigorous insistence on the satisfaction of 
procedural and Jurisdictional requirements,30 
25wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," p. 3. 
26 u.s. Constitution, Article VI, section 3. 
27wechsler, "Toward Neutral Princ1.ples, 11 p. 4. 
295 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
3 ~'7echsler, 11 Toward Neutral Principles," p. 6. 
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This does not mean that the Supreme Court should act as a third chamber 
of Congress; there will be some scandards for limiting court decisions. 
The question becomes, what should those standards be? 
Whatever standards are to be used in evaluating decisions, 11 the 
question is the same one for the Court and for its critics . 1132 Nor 
can history be relied upon to evaluate the decisions of the Supreme 
Court: 
••• history has little tolerance for any of those 
reasonable Judgements that have turned out to be wrong. 
But history, in this sense, is inscrutable, concealing 
all its verdicts in the bosom of the future, it is 
never a contemporary critic.33 
Wechsler argues for a standard that will please neither those who view 
Judicial decision as fiat, nor those who see Judicial decision as 
supporcing the values they believe in; racher he attempts to present 
a decision rule that will introduce reason into the Judicial process. 
He explains the concept in the following manner: 
I put it to you that the main constituent of the Judicial 
process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, 
resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching Judgement on analysis and reasons quite transcending 
the immediate result that is achieved. To be sure, the 
courts decide, or should decide, only on the case they have 
before them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate 
neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant 
application but by others that the principles imply?34 
31 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New York: 
32wechs ler, "Toward Neutral Pn.nciples, 11 p. 11. 
33Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 15. 
-90-
A principled decision, in the sense I have 1.n mind, is one 
that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in 
the case, reasons thac in their generality and their 
neutrality transcend any immediate result that 1.s involved. 35 
Weschler suggests that Judges should employ neutral principles in de-
termining what rules to apply to a specific case. This is not meant 
to be a comprehensive explanation of what a Judge should do, 36 rather 
it is but one guideline that a judge should follow. 
The Meaning of Neutral Principles 
The focus of much of the discussion of Wechsler~s_view of legal 
reasoning has been on his use of the phrase, "neutral principles." 
The fact that the debate has focused on this phrase would imply that 
the terms have a reasonably accepted meaning. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case. Snortland and Stanga suggest that "Wechsler employs 
the term 'neutral' to convey a variety of interrelated meanings," 
including "consistent, general, logical, broad, and unbiased.1137 
Henklin38 argues that much of the controversy over the article may be 
based on a misunderstanding of what neutral means. Friendly agrees, 
arguing: 
The adverse reaction to the lecture in some quarters may 
have come from use of the word 'neutral' 1.n the title. 
This perhaps conveyed a wrong impression that the lecturer 
35 Ibid., p. 19. 
36 Herbert Wechsler, "The Courts and the Conscitution," Columbia 
Law Review, 65 (1965), 1014. 
37snortland and Stanga, p. 1009. 
38Lou1.s Hanklin, "Some ~eflections on the Current Constitutional 
Controversy," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 109 (1961), 652. 
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was urging the Court to ignore the great social issues 
of the day. In the light of hindsight, 'Toward Principled 
Decisionmaking in Consticutional Law' might have been 
a more politic title, but Professor Wechsler can be 
forgiven for supposing thac critics would read not merely 
the title but the cext. 39 
Other critics are noc as kind: 
••• [Wechsler] does not stay with any known or possible 
meaning of the quality he apparently has in mind when 
he uses 'neutral' or neutrality. 140 
These views fail to Justify the attempt to apply, without 
defining or even giveing examples of what is meant a 
conception Mr. Wechsler chooses to call 'neutral principles.' 
He neither defines, gives examples, nor reconciles. 41 
There are some signs, in this Holmes Leccure itself, that 
the Author was by no means sure where chis position took 
him ••• 42 
While Wechsler has attempted to respond to his critics on a few cases, 
these responses did not clarify much. In his 1961 introduction to the 
lectures, he explained his choice of the word, "neutral": 
As to the choice of adJective, my case is simply thac I 
could discover none that better serves my purpose. Neither 
'impartial,' nor 'disinterested,' nor' impersonal,' the 
main alternatives chat I considered, seems to me as 
adequate in its expression; and to rest on 'general,' 
though the idea is certainly included, is to give up 
overtones that I intend. That those overtones are some-
what enigmatic in their content is not, from my point of 
view, a real deficienty, this is an enigmatic subJect.43 
39Henry J. Friendly, "In Praise of Herbert Wechsler," Columbia 
Law Review, 78 (1978), 978. 
40 
Wright, p. 601. 
41 Ibid., p. 617. 
42Julius Stone, 
Perspectives of Law, 
Arthur E. Sutherland 
"Result-Orientation and Appellate Judgement,'' in 
edited by Roscoe Pound, Erwin N. Griswold, and 
(Boston. Little, Brown & Co., 1964), p. 349. 
43wechsler, Principles, p. xiii. 
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The last statement hardly satisfied many of his critics. Nor did his 
response in 1975 
I do recognize that there are problems, as there are bound 
to be in any such delineacion. How general ~ust supporting 
reasons be to a decision to be adequately principled? What 
does 'neutral' add to 'general' or, indeed, 'general' to 
'principlel as a designation of the governing criteria? The 
only answer I can honestly make is that I am not entirely sure. 
I used the words that I hoped would convey an attitude, a 
mood. I did not think that I was drafting an invention.44 
While he goes on to modify his views of neucral, it is important to 
note that most of the responses to Wechsler come from individuals who 
may have differing views of what neutrality means. Thus, any evaluation 
of his thesis must develop a more explicit definition of neutrality, 
both to understand Wechsler's position and to evaluate the responses 
to Wechsler's posicion. 
The term, "neutral" would appear to have at lease six possible 
meanings, based upon both Wechsler' s article and the responses to it. 
First, it could be viewed as an attack on the Supreme Court's certioran 
policy. Second, it could require a court to present reasons for its 
decisions. Third, it could require the Judge ignore the results of a 
decision. Fourth, it could require a Judge to ignore values. Fifth, 
it could require a Judge to give acceptable reasons. Finally, it 
could require chat a Judge develop a principle that goes beyond the 
immediate case. 
Neutral Principles and Certioran Policy. One possible view of 
Wechsler 1 s position on neutral principles would stress his view of the 
Supreme Court's certioran policy. Every year, there are thousands of 
44wechsler, "Neutral Principles Revisited," p. 543. 
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potential Supreme Court cases. The Supreme Court does not have 
45 adequate time to hear and deliberate on all these cases. The question 
becomes how the Court decides which cases it chooses to hear. At one 
level, the appeal to neutral principles presents a possible solution 
to this problem: 
[Wechsler] has tried to work out the legal principle by 
which the Supreme Court should decide whether it should 
adJudicate or should refrain from decision. His view is 
that the Court should act only in those cases where 1.t would 
be applying principles of adequate neutrality and generality; 
cases which do not survive this test should not be heard by 
that Court. 46 
This policy could have vast implications. Certainly the decision about 
what cases to hear can be JUSt as influential as a decision about what 
principles to apply in a case. It is in these areas that, according to 
Wechsler, the Court has adopted some type of neutral scandards· 
••• it is well worth noting that the Court by rule has 
defined standards for the exercise of its discretion, 
standards framed in neutral terms, like the importance of 
the question or a conflict of decisions. Only the maincenance 
and the improvement of such standards and, of course, their 
faithful application can, I say with deference, protect che 
Court against the danger of the imputation of a bias favoring 
claims of one kind or another in the granting or denial of 
review. 47 
At this level, the appeal for neutral standards is to continue to develop 
an obJective standard for determining what cases to hear. 
aS · Hart, pp. 84-125. 
46 charles E. Clark, 11 Federal Procedural Reform and States Rights· 
Toward a More Perfect Union, 11 Texas Law Review, 49 (1961), 226 -227. 
See also Addison Mueller and Murray L, Schwartz, ' 1The Principle of 
Neutral Principles," U.C.L.A. Law Review, 7 (1960), 580-582. 
47wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," pp. 9-10. 
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Neutral Standards and che Reason for Decision. One obJection to 
traditional Court procedure that Wechsler continually refers co is the 
failure of che Court, in many cases, to give any reasons at all. This 
practice may be acceptable in other fields 
No legislature or executive is obligated by the nature of 
its function to support its choice of values by the type 
of reasoned explanation that I have suggested is intrinsic 
to Judicial action - however much we may admire such a 6.8 reasoned exposition when we find it in those other realms.· 
What WecHsler was obJecting to was the tendency of the Court to give 
only brief opinions, or to give no opinions at all· 
There has been particular obJection to handling important 
questions through per curiarn decisions which simply state 
the Court's result with no explanation of how or why it 
arrived at that resulc except the Delphic citation of a 
precedent or two. Nor have the commentators been pleased 
with full opinions which fail to canvass all the relevant 
issues and remut the obJections of opponencs. 49 
Wechsler emphasizes the cases that followed the school segregation 
cases that were dismissed by per curiam decisions, thus providing no 
guidance to future courts. 50 These decisions were obJectef to for 
several reasons. First, they did not live up to what he thought a 
reasoned opinion should include. Edward Wtnte places Wechsler with a 
group of scholars he terms the Reasoned Elaborists, who emphasize the 
arguments presented in opinions. He observes: 
••• the Reasoned Elaborists, reflecting their academic 
orientation, emphasized technical and professional 
expertise in opinionwirting. Their model of an enlightened 
48 rbid., pp. 15 -16. 
4 9shapiro, p. 591. 
SCwechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," p. 22. 
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opinion contained qualities associated with professional 
success among legal scholars choroughness, soundness, 
clarity, and internal consistency. Their interest in 
crafLsmanship reflected cheir own desire to parLicipate 
active1v 1.n shaping che professional progress of the 
Court.)l 
Neutral principles are also desired to help the public predict future 
cases; "a principled decision informs potential litigants of likely 
subsequent decisions."52 
While a case that had no 11 art1.culated theory to support it but 
seems right1153 may have some function in our legal system, it has a 
place only "when there is a theory that becomes apparent on reflection, 
though it may not be articulated by the court. 1154 He suggests 
If the point is that courts may reach correct decisions 
by accident or intuition, I should readily agree, while 
noting that correctness turns on someone else's statemenc 
of the reasons that the court has sensed but has not stated 
in its Judgement. But if it is contended that there is a 
measure of correctness distincc from the existence of such 
reasons, I must say that I am forced to disagree. 55 
Thus, for Wechsler, one of the primary functions of a court is to 
articulate its reasons for decision, and it can be said to reach a 
legitimate decision only if either the court can give a satisfactory 
51G. Edward White, "The Evolution of Reasoned Ellaboration: 
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change," Virginia Law Review, 
59 (1973), 290. 
52Greenawalt, pp. 1000-1001. 
53 Edward H. Levi, "The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 11 in Hook, 
p. 276. 




explanation of the neutral principles behind its decision, or if 
someone else (presumably within a reasonable time period) provides 
such an explanacion,56 
Neutral Principles and Results-Orientation. One approach to the 
explanation of neutral principles has been co suggest that a Judge 
applying neutral principles should decide a case without considering 
what the results of his/her decision will be. Stone argues that 
Wechsler places himself in this position when he argued for neutral 
principles. 
Prima facie, then, on this basis, we might understand 
a rule forbidding 'result-oriencation' co mean (as seems 
indeed to be Professor Wechsler's meaning for the most 
part) that the Judge should first fix upon the rule of 
law he intends to apply before he determines what are 
the precise facts of the case material to his decision. 
Unless he does so, the Judge's procedure is bound to 
be 'result-orientated,' or at least 'result-conscious. 1 57 
The emphasis this view would make is that the effects of a decision 
are irrelevant to the decision. Golding suggested: 11 it is 'results' 
that we expect from the courts, not mere results, however, but 1ust 
results. We cannot understand this except in terms of I principle.' 1158 
This view of neutrality is not whac Wechsler intended. The long 
range results of a decision rule can be considered, as long as the 
results of the immediate case are not emphasized. Wechsler explained 
this in a letter to his critic, Louis H. Pollak: 
56 Ro stow, p. 139. 
57stone, p. 350. 
S8M. P. Golding, "Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme 
Court,'' Columbia Law Review, 63 (1963), 36. 
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By no possible reading did I say that the Supreme Court 
'should have cast out of its reckoning the likelihood that 
a decision one way rather than another would effect an 
enduring contribution to che quality of our society.' 
What I did say ~s that it is not enough chat a decision 
makes such a contribution unless it also rests on neutral 
principles, i.e., was not merely an ad hoc disposition of 
its immediate problem unrationalized by a ge~~ralization 
susceptible of application across the board. 
This would suggest that the results of one principle compared to 
another principle could be examined by a Judge, but deciding a case 
merely on the results to the immediate litigants is not allowed. 
Neutral Principles and Values. Perhaps the greatest misunderstand-
ing of Wechsler's concept of neutral principles has come from those 
who viewed neutral principles as those thac did not reflect a value. 
Miller and Howell devoted an entire article to this posicion.60 
Robert Birmingham explained the reasons for this position: 
The standard of neutrality has been interpreted to deny 
the propriety of Judicial decisions resulting from 
choice among competing values. At most this interpretation 
receives uncertain support from the pronouncements of 
the progenitor of the concept •••• That doubt remains 
appears in large part a consequence of the absence of 
plausible alternative interpretations: the distinction 
between value Judgements and other Judgements, while not 
always clear, permits at least a modicum of classificatory 
precision, on the other hand, differentiation between 
acceptable and unacceptable value Judgements appears 
necessarily to depend on individual preference or arbitrary 
rule. 61 
The result is that a large number of critics have viewed Wechsler as 
59Letter from Herbert Wechsler to Louis Pollak, April 8, 1962, 
quoted in Pollak, pp. 60-61. 
60Arthur Miller and Ronald Howell, "The Myth of Neutrality in 
Constitutional AdJudication, 11 University of Chicago Law Review, 27 
(1960), 661-691. 
61Robert L. Birmingham, "The Neutrality of Adherence to 
Precedent," Duke Law Journal, 1971 (1971), 542. 
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suggesting a value-less Court, phrasing ics opinions in tenns value-
free, a position that we shall soon see has caused much adverse 
reaction. 
As wi~h the last definition of neutrality, this definition is not 
supported by Wechsler, who argues chat neutral principles do not 
11 exclude value Judgements from interpreta~ion, as some others have 
alleged. 1162 Rather, the demand for neutrality provides a guideline 
for evaluating values: 
In calling for neutrality of principle, I certainly do not 
deny that constitutional provisions are directed to 
protecting certain special values or that the principled 
development of a particular provision is concerned with 
the value or the values involved. The da~and of neutralicy 
is that a value and its measure be determined by a general 
analysis that gives no weight to accidents of application, 
finding a scope that is acceptable whatever interest, group, 
or person may assert the claim.63 
Wechsler does not deny that values are involved in the choice of 
principles in a decision. f Rather, he suggests that n~ttral principles 
should be used to resolve conflict of values· 
••• the principle of resolution must be neutral in a 
comparable sense (both in the definition of the individual 
competing values and in the approach that it entails to 
value competition.)64 
Although it is assumed that neutral principles are valueless, this is 
an inaccurate, though popular, reading of Wechsler. Wechsler would 
allow decisions to reflect values, but he would insist that the Judge 
,. ? 
0 -Wechsler, "Courts and the Constitution," p. 1014. 
63wechsler, Principles, pp. xiii-xiv. 
64 Ibid., p. xiv. 
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be prepared to apply those values in all cases where they applied, 
rather than Just apply the values where they fit the bias of the Judge. 
The principles chemselves can reflect values, as long as the values 
are neutrally applied to all cases where they apply. In addition, 
neutral principles can be used to decide conflict between values. For 
example, of one Judge decides that one value is more important than 
another (or develops a system of weighing values), then the Judge 
should apply that heiarchy in all cases. 
Neutral Principles as "Correcc11 Reasons. One problem Wechsler 
encountered was his failure to give examples of a neutral principle; 
rather, he merely attacked prior court decisions. Combined with his 
ambiguous definition of neutral, this could lead some critics to 
suggest that a neutral principle is one that Wechsler agrees with, 
which would hardly be an enlightened view of legal argument. There 
is ar. undertone of the essay that suggests that the idea of neutral 
principles as being those that are acceptable is a possible reading 
of Wechsler' s position. Thus he suggests that "The real test inhereas, 
as I have tried to argue, in the force of the analysis. 1165 Wright 
suggested that one possible view of this meaning of neutral is that a 
decision be "well established, generally accepted, universally appli-
cable.1166 To a degree, this position calls for opinions to be accepted 
by some unspecified audience, though Wechsler does not name the audience. 
One possible view is that che opinion should be acceptable to all the 
65wechs ler, "Toward Neutral Principles, 11 p. 25. 
66 Wright, p. 607. 
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"leading11 scholars in che field. This would not be a desirable position: 
We must accept: che fact chat under the best of circumstances 
honest Judges, working within the boundaries of cheir power, 
and strictly according to che customs of their calling, will 
often write opinions which will fail to convince many, or 67 
all, or the best lawyers of their time, or of lacer times. 
Many of the decisions Wechsler implies may have been desirable were not 
popular at the time they were handed down. Besides, merely to suggest 
that an opinion should be acceptable to the public is too vague, since 
Wechsler does not attempt to develop any standards for decermining 
what makes a decision acceptable: 
If the fundamental test of the neutrality of a principle 
lies in its public acceptability, on the other hand, the 
point of Professor Wechsler' s criticism is lose, because 
Wechsler would require, in addition to acceptability itself, 
criteria of acceptability to which men of good-faith might 
subscribe despite differences in their personal values. 
For Wechsler, to say that a principle is publicly6~ccountable 
cannot be to say only that the public accepts it. 
The question becomes, if audience acceptance per se could not be the 
measure of neutral principles, what guidelines are appropriate to 
determine whether or not a principle is neutral? 
Neutral Principles as General Principles. Probably the most 
accurate description of what Wechsler meant by neutral principles is 
that the principle used should be applicable to other cases. This is 
to be contrasted with an ad hoc decision that is meant to apply only 
69 to the immediate case. --That the principle affects the immediate 
67 4 Rostow, p. 14 • 
68 George G. Christie, "Objectivity in the Law," Yale Law Journal, 
78 (1969), p. 1312. 
69 Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," pp. 12-13. 
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litigants is of minor importance; che emphasis should be on the resulm 
thac transcend che immediate· 
To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only on 
the case they have before them. But must they not decide 
on che grounds of adequate neutralicy and generalicy, 
tested not only by the instant application but by others 
that the principles imply? Is it not the very essance of 
Judicial method to insist upon the very essence of Judicial 
method to insist upon attending to such ocher cases, 
preferably those involving an opEosing interest, in 
evaluating any principle avowed?70 
The principle should be comprehensive; encompassing cases that transcend 
the immediate. The Judge should be aware of the implications of 
extending the principle to other cases: 
The central thought 1s surely that the principle once 
formulated must be tested by the adequacy of its derivation 
from its,sources and its implications with:respect to other 
situations that the principle, if evenly applied, will 
comprehend. Unless those implications are acceptable the 
principle must be reformulated or withdrawn.7 1 
Wechsler concedes that the issue of how general the principle 
should be, or how many other situations should be considered is an 
ambiguous one, though he suggests that the courts consider at least 
the cases that "we can now imagine or forsee, granting, of course, 
that all of us, including even the courts, wear blinkers of some kind, 11 7 2 
The decision should be as comprehensive and reasoned as possible. The 
Judge should draw from both che past and the future in rendering a 
decision: 
70rbid., p. 15, 
71wechsler, "Neutral Principles Revisited, 11 p. 543. 
721, d ....El:_.' p. 544 . 
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History must be weighed, though we must grant that it can 
rarely be decisive, and history must not be re-written or 
fabricated for the purposes of Lhe decision. The course 
of previous adJudication on the same or on related issues 
asserts the normal claims of continuity, which cerLainly 
demand consideration. So too do changes thaL have taken 
place in life and law and che new problems that have thus 
emerged. From sources such as this, Judgement must distill 
a principle that determines the case aL hand and that is 
viable in respect of those other situations, now forseeable~ 
to which the logic of the principle demands that it apply. 7 J 
When Wechsler is read in this light, his charges become very 
serious. If a neutral principle is one chat extends to other cases 
besides the immediate case, and 1£ the courts have not been following 
neutral principles, then: 
••• the Supreme Court is not behaving like a court at all, 
but is deciding similar cases differently, depending on 
whether favored or disfavored parties or interests are 
before the Court - parties or interests favored or disfavored, 
let us be clear, not because their positions should be 
considered different in fact and in law, but simply because 
the Judges happen to be partisans of one, and not the other.74 
The courts should develop neutral principles; principles that they 
"must be prepared to apply across the board, without compromise. 11 
Neutral principles must be of general application that must be "logi-
cally and consistently applied." 76 Thus, in a sense, the court is 
deciding not only the immediate case, but future cases as well. 77 One 
possible corolary of this, though not one advocated by Wechsler, is 
73wechsler, 11 Courts and the Constitution," p. 543. 
74 Rostow, p. 138. 
75 Bickel, "Forward to the Supreme Court, 11 p. 48. 
76 
Henklin, p. 653. 
77 Ibid., p. 66L 
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that the broader the applicability of a principle, the greater its 
neutrality. 78 
Neutral Principles Applied 
One way of clarifying Wechsler' s concept of neutral principles, 
at least in the last sense in which they were defined, is to examine 
his illustrations of cases that do not live up to his standards of 
neutrality. Indeed, part of the notoreity of his essay is that he 
chose to attack the Supreme Court's segregation cases. He did this, 
not because he thought they were undesirable decisions in the sense 
that they were morally wrong, but rather because they were not based 
on neutral principles: 
skeptical about predictions as I am, I still believe 
that the decisions I have mentioned - dealing with the 
primary, the covenant, and schools - have the best chance 
of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our 
society of any that I know in recent years. It is in this 
perspective that I ask how far they rest on neutral principles 
and are entitled to approval in the only terms that I 
acknowledge to be relevant to a decision of the courts. 79 
From this position, he examines the three relevant decisions. He begins 
with the white primary cases, ultimately resulting in Smith v. Allwright.80 
Briefly, this case held that, since primaries are part of the elction 
process, parties can no more prevent racial groups from participating 
in pr1.maries than racial groups can be excluded from voting. While 
this may be a socially desirable decision, Wechsler argues it cannot 
78B1.rmingham, "Generality of Neutral Principles, 11 p. 874. 
79wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," p. 37. 
80321 u.s. 649 (1944). 
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be defended on neutral grounds, He suggests that, by the same 
·principle, a religious party would be prohibited; an implicaLion that 
he assumes would be unfortunate. 81 It should be observed that he does 
not deny that there could be a neutral position behind the decision, 
rather he 1s arguing that such a principle, 1£ articulated, would 
probably not be accepted by the Court. 
Wechsler next examines the restrictive covenant decision of 
Shelley v. Kraemer. 82 Essentially, this case held that, since the 
state cannot discriminate, and since a court is an agent of the state, 
the court cannot enforce a private covenant that discriminates against 
a race. While the reason expressed is clear, Wechsler argues that it 
does not contain a neutral principle: 
Again, one is obliged to ask: What is the principle 
involved? Is the state forbidden to effectuate a will 
that draws a racial line, a will that can accomplish any 
disposition only through the aid of the law, or is it 
a sufficient answer there that the discrimination was 
the testator's and not the state's? May not the state 
employ its law to vindicate the privacy of property 
against a trespasser, regardless of the grounds of his 
exclusion, or does it embrace the owner's reasons for 
excluding 1£ it buttresses his power by the law.?83 
Once again, Wechsler suggests that the decision was not based upon 
neutral principles transcending the immediate case. 
Finally, Wechsler examines the school segregation case in Brown 
v, Topeka Board of Education. His discussion of this case is not clear. 84 
81wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," p. 29, 
8233~ U.S. 649 (1944). 
83wechsler, "Toward Neutral Pr1nciples, 11 pp. 29-30. 
84347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
-105-
Even his critic BenJamin Wright interJects comments like 11 I have 
difficulty in following him1185 and 11 I have difficulty, however, with 
Mr. Wechsler' s reasoning when he says, •• He argues that the 
Court may have overlooked benefits to segregation in its opinion, and 
87 that the separate-but-equal doctrine may be better in some cases. 
From this, he suggests that the decision could not be based on the 
facts, but rather must rest on "the view that racial segregation is, 
in principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it 
is directed. 1188 This is undesirable, first because it "involve[s] an 
inquiry into the motive of the legislature, which is generally fore-
closed to the courts, 1189 and second because it suggests that the issue 
is really one of freedom of association, and that this principle is 
not applied neutrally: "But if the freedom of association is denied 
by segregation, integration forces an association upon those for whom 
it is unpleasant or repugnant. 1190 Expanding this position later, 
perhaps anticipating a Baake-type case, he argued: 
Whether the fourteenth amendment should be read to outlaw 
race or color as determinants of all official action must 
be tested not alone by the effects of such a principle on 
state-required segregation, but also by its impact upon 
85 Wright, p. 606. 
86 rbid. 
87wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," p. 33. 
88 rb1.d. 
89 rbid. 
9oib1.d., p. 34. 
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measures that take race into account to equalize Job 
opportunity or to reduce de facto segregation, as in 
New York City schools. 91 
That these issues were not treated was only part of the problem. The 
Brown case dealt only with public education, yet was extended to 
other areas by per curiam decisions without examining whether the same 
factual conditions are met by parks, golf courses, bath houses, and 
beaches; Just because school segregation may be harmful does not 
mean that the same loss of self-esteem, etc. 1s caused by other types 
of segregation. 92 
The application of neutral principles to these cases has been 
criticized. Bickel suggests that, even if the decisions were not 
neutral, for the Court not to have ruled the way it did would be 
morally undesirable.93 Others have attempted to develop neutral 
principles that could Justify these decisions. 94 These responses 
usually agree with the concept of neutrality, and merely attempt to 
provide alternative, possible opinions that would meet the standard 
of neutrality. Wechsler observed about some of his earlier critics: 
91wechsler, "Courts and the Constitution," p. 1012. 
92wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," pp. 22-23. 
93Bickel, pp. 64-65. 
94see, for example, Louis H. Pollak, "Racial Discrimination and 
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler," University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 108 (1959), 1-34, Charles L. Black, Jr., 
"The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions," Yale Law Journal, 69 
(1960), 421-430, and Richard A. Givens, "The Irnpart1al Constitutional 
Principles Supporting Brown v. Board of Education, Howard Law Journal, 
6 (1960), 179-185. 
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It is significant for me that these defenses of the 
Judgements advance reasons differing substantially 
from the opinions of the Court, They thus contribute to the 
inquiry I hoped to stimulate in areas where bland content-
ment with results has satisfied too many academic minds. 
I wish that I could add that I am able to accept these 
rationales as an answer to the difficulties I have raised. 
The reader 1.s entitled to be told chat I am not, but I 
invite him to pursue the question further and to reach 
an independent Judgement.95 
Unfortunately, he does not explain his obJections to the reformulation 
of the decisions, but his obJections to the actual decisions does 
help explain the meaning of neutrality as being close to the sixth 
meaning discussed earlier: neutrality as being general principles, 
transcending the immediate case. 
Hart's Criticism of the Court 
The same year that Wechsler published his critique of the Supreme 
Court - indeed, in the same issue of the Harvard Law Review as Wechsler' s 
article - another critic was attacking the Court along similar lines. 
This attack, which is sometimes lumped together with Wechsler' s 
position, was made by Henry Melvin Hart, the Charles Stebbins 
Fairchild Professor of Law at Harvard University Law Schoo1. 96 Hart 
initially examined the amount of time available to Judges to hear 
and analyze cases, and he suggested that the Justices have inadequate 
time to spend fully analyzing cases. 97 Partially due to this lack 
of time, and partly due to other factors, the quality of Supreme Court 
95wechsler, Principles, p. xv~ 
96Hart, pp. 84-125. 
97For a brief review of the dispute over the amount of time 
available to Supreme Court Justices, see Griswold, pp. 85-85. 
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decisions has been low: 
••• few of the Court's opinions, far too few, genuinely 
illuminace the area of law with which they deal. Other 
opinions fail even by much more elementary standards. 
Issues are ducked which in good lawyership and good con-
science ought not to be ducked. Technical mistakes are 
made which ought not to be made in decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 98 
He goes on to analyze one Court case (Irvin v. Dowd99) and uses it to 
illustrate how the Court can sidetrack important issues. He then 
isolates a few specific indictments of the Judicial process. First, 
the Court did not adequately explain its position· 
It means 1n turn that they were content to leave the 
sufficiency of the reasons for the decision unexposed 
to any ready examination. Plainly, the failure at least 
to explain what the Court understood its decision to be 
was n~t due to any lack of time.100 
Second, the opinion of the Court ignored other possible positions. 
In Irvin, there was a minority opinion that deviated from the maJority 
opinion. The maJority opinion did not even allude to the positions 
in the minority opinion: 
••• it would seem to be psychologically difficult if not 
impossible for any Judge to emerge from this kind of 
consideration of an able and subtle analysis and then to~ 
explain his own reasoning in arriving at a different decision 
\ 
without having some hint of the possibility of the alternative 
analysis creep into the explanation.lOl 
Hart suggests that more time needs to be spent in deliberation, with 
Justices exchanging ideas before the opinions are finalized, This 
98Hart, p. 100. 
99 359 U.S. 394 (1959). 
lOOHart, p. 122. 
101 Ibid., p. 123. 
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will allow the court to identify the main issues of the case and the 
maJor points of disagreement, with the result that the final decisions 
will improve: 
••• the purpose of expression of individual views is 
not to make a paper record to pres'erve the personal 
position of a particular Justice on controversial questions. 
The purpose of preparing such views in the first place is to 
help the whole Court in coming to a decision, which implies 
that the whole Court should give them the most thoughtful 
consideration possible. The purpose of recording the views 
when they have failed of acceptance is to appeal to the 
riper wisdom of another day, which implies at least that 
the issues to which the views are addressed have been 
delineated as carefully and accuratel1 as the Court as a 
whole is capable of delineating chem. 0 2 
The Court needs to improve its procedures for airing views on the 
issues, current time constraints do not permit this. 
Finally, Hart asks for greater criticism of Court decisions. 
Currently, there is inadequate evaluation of decisions: 
More serious still, neither at the bar nor among the 
faculties of the law school is there an adequate tradition 
of sustained, disinterested, and competent criticism 
of the professional quality of the Court's opinions. 103 
As a result, decisions are evaluated based upon whether the result is 
favorable or unfacorable for an individual. The evaluation of decisions 
should not be based on votes for your side, but on more obJective 
Like Wechsler' s article, Hart's has been criticized on many 
grounds. Thurman Arnold called the article "a whole series of. 
pompous generalizations dropped on the Court from the heights of 
lOZibid. 
lOJibid., p. 125. 
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Olympus. 11104 He further argued that the Court requires compromise, 
that often requires an ambiguous decision of the type that Hart 
attacks. 105 As for the benefics of increased interaction between 
Justices, he suggests that it is impractical and useless, since the 
justices already have firm beliefs that would only be hardened by 
any interaction, 106 a position that is disputed by Dean Griswold. 107 
Responses to Wechsler's Position 
As indicated ealier, the responses to Wechsler's article have 
not been all favorable. Part of the responses have been based on a 
misreading of his thesis, while part of the responses concern more 
fundamental problems of legal reasoning. Essentially, the attacks 
of Wechsler's positions have concentrated on two issues. The first 
attack suggests that neutral principles are impossible; the second 
that neutral principles are undesirable. 
The Possibility of Neutral Principles. The first attack on neutral 
principles simply argues that there is no such thing as a "neutral 
principle." A principle in law inherently involves choices. The 
specific form of this attack varies from author to author. 
One attack on the possibility of neutral principles is based on 
the definition of neutral as not advocating a value. This position 
104 
Arnold, p. 1299. Ray D. Henson argues that "It is fairly clear, 
in the context of the article, that 'reason' 1s something the writer 
agrees with, and that is all it 'means.' 11 ("A Criticism of Criticism: 
In re. Meaning," Fordham Law Review, 29 [ 196 O] , 554). 
l05rbid., p. 1312. 
106rbid., pp. 1312-1313. 
107 Griswold, p. 86. 
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argues that legal reasoning is value laden. Thus an appeal for neutral 
decisions is bankrupt· "Its philosophical underpinnings are doubtful; 
ic springs from a belief that there can be obJective knowledge, a 
108 belief which many would question." One of the most extensive 
defenses of this view came in an article by Miller and Howell. 109 They 
argue: 
••• neutrality, save on a superficial and elementary level, 
is a futile quest; that it should be recognized as such, and 
that it is more useful to search for the values that can be 
furthered by the Judicial process than for allegedly neutral 
or impersonal principles which operate within that process.110 
They then proceed to explain why neutrality is impossible. They begin 
with other disciplines, and note that neutrality is not possible in 
any other discipline: 
In this section we shall set out, in very brief form, the 
opinions of a classical philosopher (Plato), a natural 
scientist (P. W. Bridgman), a physical scientist who is 
also a social philosopher (Michael Polanyi), a sociologist 
(Karl Mannheim), a social scientist (Gunnar Myrdal), a 
political philosopher (Leo Strauss), a historian (Isaiah 
Berlin), and a theologian (Reinhold Neibuhr). The consistent 
teaching of these respected observers is that neutrality or 
obJectivity is not attainable, either in the social sciences 
or in the natural sciences. (Needless to say, it is rarely 
pretended to be in the humanities.) Knowledge, therefore, 
is primarily decisional in nature.111 
They then examine several Judicial decisions, and argue that the Judicial 
lOScharles E. Clark and David M. Trubek, "The Creative Role of the 
Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Comm.on Law Tradition," Yale 
Law Journal, 71 (1961), p. 268. 
109Miller and Howell, 661-6910 
ll01b1d., p. 661. 
lllrbid., p. 665. 
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112 
process cannot be "disinterested. 11 While this position is 
essentially an attack on a position Wechsler does not make, it is 
important to note that the implications of this position is that 
argument is inherently value-laden; it cannot be neutral in the sense 
of being obJective or free from values due both to the premises it 
starts with and, to a degree, the framework it operates under: 
••• it must be recognized that the articulation of value 
premises will not necessarily make them fully amenable to 
the processes of reason. In the final analysis, most1~3 
even all values are based on faith as much as reason. 
Wechsler does not deny the importance of values in legal decisions; 
rather he suggests that "the virtue of a decision depends on the 
extent to which it makes a reasoned cho1.ce of values. 11114 
A second argument concerning the possibilicy of neutral principles 
is the human possibility of neutral principles. Similar to the Legal 
Realists' attack, this position argues that Judges are human, and it 
may be 1.mpossible for them to discover neutral positions: 
112 Ibid., p. 682. 
113 Lawrence R. Vevel, 11Suggested Approaches to Constitutional 
AdJudicat1.on and Apportionment," U,C.L.A. Law Review, 11 (1965), p. 1383. 
114rbid., p. 1380. Mueller and Schwartz attempt to develop some 
guidelines for determining the neutrality of a principle: Another way 
of talking about the principle is to appraoch it from the standpoint 
of what a Judicial opinion must contain to qualify as a 'principled' 
decision. At the very least, of course, it must contain some reason 
for the result •••• Next, the reason given must be related co 
the facts in the case which presents the constitutional problem •••• 
The reason given must not only be related to a fact in the controversy 
presented for decision, it must be related to the constitutional 
problem itself •••• Finally, the reason given must not only be 
related to the constitutional problem involved, it must transcend 
the case at hand. (pp. 578-579) 
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••• it is far from easy for the human mind to avoid 
result-oriented decisions. Consider, for example, the 
extent to which counsel can usuallv oersuade themself 
of the soundness of their cases. 115 · 
Contrary to other positions, this view would argue that there are many 
neutral principles: "Cannot any new principle, or any reversal of an 
old rule, be given a I neutral- form?" 116 This would suggest that 
neutrality alone is not an adequate check; other guidelines are also 
needed. 
Third, it 1.s argued that it is difficult to articulate neutral 
principles. This attack 1s strengthened by Wechsler' s refusal to 
give an example of a neutral principle. Golding outlines this 
problem: 
It is, in fact, impossible to tell by inspection of a 
given legal rule or principle, in isolation from the 
context of its application, whether it is 'neutral' or 
'general' in any significant sense. Trivially, almost 
every legal rule is 'general' and there are also levels 
of generality. 117 
The question becomes, when is a principle general, and when is is not? 
How general must a principle be? Wechsler suggests, for example, 
that a rule should not be based on individual characteristics of a 
litigant, yet in some cases that is required: 
115 Griswold, p. 91. Jan G. Deutsch notes that the principle that 
"all Negro claims are to be upheld" 1.s a neutral principle, yet not 
one many would find to be legitimate as a decision rule. See 
"Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court· Some Intersections 
between Law and Political Science, 11 Stanford Law Review, 20 (1968), 
19 2-3. 
116w . ht 617 rig , p. • 
117 Golding, p. 37. 
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Yet it is impossible to say that it can~ 
be proper that even such facts should be taken into 
account in Judgement. Issues in bankruptsy law, or 
income tax law, or maintenance or alimony law, may 
well turn precisely on how well endowed a party is.118 
There is also the question of exceptions to the principle. Wasserstrom, 
while defending a position similar to Wechsler's, suggests that the 
Court should not Just adopt a useful neutral principle, but rather 
the neutral principle with the greatest utility. This could include 
rules like "One should keep promises except when they would hurt another 
person.11119 If this is a general principle, however, then Wechsler' s 
criticism is moot, since any undesirable implication could be written 
off as an exception to the principle. 
The final obJection to the possibility of neutral principles 
is that a court cannot predict all the relevant exceptions to a rule; 
that is, it cannot predict what principle would be the best in future 
cases. Rostow suggests· 
Any lawyer who has worked through a line of cases about 
easements or trusts or bills and notes or any other legal 
subJect knows that no court has ever achieved perfection 
in its first, or indeed in its twentieth opinion on the 
same subJect. 120 
Conditions may change; better opinions may be formulated. Judges 
are not scientists, on the first hearing they cannot be expected to 
find the optimal decision: 
118 
Stone, p. 350. 
119 Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory 
of Justification (Stanford Stanford University Press, 1961). See 
esp. Chapter 6, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism." 
120Rostow, p. 141. 
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We still want to know what the Judge thought was relevant 
in deciding the case, but the thought that he might do 
some research on his own in matters economic or social 
fills us, no doubt correctly, with dread. 121 
This attack is not extremely accurate, since it assumes (as will be 
discussed later) that the initial decision cannot be reversed. This 
is not the case, as long as the future cases are also based on neutral 
principles: 
Later cases may require qualification, but the principle 
as then qualified is also a principle of general applica-
bility. As modified, the principle still governs the 
earlier case. 122 
Many of these reactions assume chat the requirement that a decision 
be guided by neutral principles is the only requirement Wechsler 
places on a Judge. This is not the case; there are additional, though 
perhaps unstated requirements; Wechsler is merely suggesting one 
possible guideline: 
A court, in my submission, acts by fiat not by law unless 
its Judgements meet this minimal criterion. But it is a 
minimal criterion •••• If a Judgement meets this minimal 
criterion, then one must face the harder question of its 
wisdom and its Justice. A decision ~ay, in short, be wholly 
principled and wrong. t!! I was saying is that it cannot be 
unprincipled and right. 
The second major criticism of Wechsler's position is that, even 
if neutral principles were possible, they would be undersirable. 
Essentially, this position suggests that neutral principles would hamper 
121Levi, p. 278. 
122Louis Henklin, '" Neutral Principles' and Future Cases , 11 in 
Hook, p. 304. 
123 Wechsler, "Neutral Principles Revisited," p. 545. 
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a Judge by preventing the reversal of decisions. Clark predicted: 
There is no way that decision can be avoided; there is a 
kind of pressure - even presumption - to choose what seems 
the side closest to precedent and past action. And that 
means a conservative vote for inaction and the status quo. 
It is a sad, but little noticed, fact that neutral principles 
eventually push to re-enforce the dead hand of the law and 
the rule of the past. 124 
Many desirable cases would have been precluded if the Court had insisted 
on neutral principles. This is largely due to the difficulty in pre-
dicting all the nuances of the law in an early decision. 125 Thus 
Bickel suggests that: 
••• no society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous 
one, can fail in time to exploed if it is deprived of 
the arts of compromise, if it knows no ways to muddle 
through. No good society can be unprincipled, and no 
viable society can be principle-ridden.126 
Our society needs flexibility that neutral principles cannot provide: 
"Mechanical use of rules, if possible, is suited only to a society 
h h 1 1 h d h . 11 127 Th w ic is re ative y omogeneous an unc anging. is criticism 
must be modified, though, since Wechsler clearly would permit a case 
to be overturned (perhaps even more easily than under Levi's system) 
as long as a neutral principle is used to overturn the earlier cases. 128 
124clark, "Plea for the Unprincipled Decision," p. 545. 
125Rostow, p. 142. Ronald Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) takes the position that 
there is only one correct decision in any case, developing his own set 
of principles. For a criticism of this position, see Kent Greenawalt, 
"Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters 
that Bind Judges," Columbia Law Review, 75 (1975), 359-399. 
126 Bickel, "Foward to the Supreme Court, 11 p. 49. 
127nav1.d Dittfuri:h, "Judicial Reasoning and Social Change," 
Indiana Law Journal, 50 (1975), p. 259. 
128vevel, p. 1387. 
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The final criticism of neutral principles is that it requires too 
much from the courts. It is too much to expect t~e courts to decide 
all future cases, Rather, the court should keep open options for 
future courts. 129 Judicial reasoning, according to Levi, should be 
130 retrospective, filling in the gaps of past cases. Wechsler 
argues, however, that the court should at least be aware of possible 
future cases. Perhaps all future cases cannot be anticipated, but 
at least some thought should be directed in that direction. There 
may be some cases where the principle cannot be articulated, but at 
least an attempt at articulation should be made. 131 
Implications for Argumentation 
Wechsler's plea for neutral principles has been the subJect of a 
wide range of controversy. Many implications for argumentation theory 
can be discerned from both Wechsler' s paper and the response to ic. 
The focus of his paper, as well as his critics, has been on warrant 
establishing arguments. In law, as in argument in general, the 
creation of the premises from which argument proceeds is a critical 
step. 
Wechsler notes the importance of the goal of a field in determining 
the legal rules to be applied. His discussion of the origin of Judicial 
review is vital to his argument, since his emphasis on neutral principles 
129christie, p. 13200 
130 Levi, p. 276. 
131wechsler, "Nature of Judicial Reasoning," pp. 297-300. 
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is based on the goal of the court syscem. In addition, his critics, 
by noting how vital values are to a legal system, also emphasize that 
law should reflect societal values. Indeed, contrary to Wechsler 1 s 
wishes, most of his critics note that argument in law (and other 
-fields) cannot be value free, and thus argument must be value laden. 
Second, Wechsler emphasizes the importance of transcending the 
immediate decision in making a decision. Unlike Levi, who emphasized 
the use of past precedents in legal decisions, Wechsler admonishes 
the Judges to look to the future effect of a decision; at least to the 
forseeable cases that could be covered by the rule used to decide the 
immediate case. The decision must transcend the immediate result of 
the case, and the Judge must consider the other cases a decision would 
cover. While Wechsler may have difficulty articulacing the exact 
nature of his neutral principles, they may act as, to use Fuller's 
terms, a "morality of aspiration," a goal for individual Judges to 
strive for, even if they be fully achieved. For other disciplines, 
the strive for "neutral" principles may also be desirable. Individuals 
may predict what other phenomena may be covered by a rule that applies 
to an immediate investigation, and to discover if the prediction is, 
in fact, accurate. 
Wechsler and Hart also noce that argument takes time. The Judge 
in a Supreme Court, or in any other field, can only hear a finite 
number of arguments if (s)he plans to have enough time to deliberate 
and make a rational decision. This has two implications. First, it 
increases the need for neutral principles since, once the principle 
has been decided, che Judge can determine futuTe cases by deductive 
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reasoning (presumably saving time), rather than going through all the 
effort required to weigh all the advantages and disadvantages of 
individual cases. Second, the limits on the amount of arguments a 
judge can hear places increased emphasis on the certiorari policy of 
a court: determining what case to hear can become almost as important 
to the legal system as determining the decision in a case that is 
heard. 
Fourth, Hart again raises the issue of the forum of legal argument. 
Supreme Court decisions arenot made by vote, but rather require a great 
deal of deliberation. More time and increased interest in exchange of 
opinions between Justices, according to Hart, will produce better 
decisions, even though the fonn of argument remains the same. Thus 
a study of the forum of legal argument may aid in better argument in 
law, and perhaps in other fields. 
Finally, Wechsler emphasizes the importance of articulating reasons 
for decisions. Tne Judge may be in a different position from other 
members of the legal profession, in that (s)he is expected to settle 
arguments, rather than make arguments. To that end, the writing of an 
opinion can assist in the working~ of the legal system. The Judge has 
the obligation to respond to the arguments of the party (s)he decides 
against, both to insure there is a reason for reJecting that position, 
and to insure that the losing party feels that (s)he has been treated 
fairly. The articulation of reasons also acts as a check on the Justice, 
and provides guidelines for future litigants. 
CHAPTER V 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Many years ago, at the conclusion of a particularly 
difficult case both in point ~flaw and of fact, 
tried to a court without a Jury, the judge, a man 
of great learning and ability, anneunced from the 
Bench that since the narrow and preJudiced modern 
view of the obligations of a Judge in the decision 
ef causes prevented his resort to the Judgment 
aleatory by the use of his 'little, small dice' he 
would take the case under advisement,'and, brooding 
over it, wait for his lunch. 1 
In the end, the Justification for the adversary 
system lies in the fact that it is a means by which 
the capac1ties of the ,ndividual may be lifted to 
the point where he gains the power to view reality 
through eyes other than his own, where he is able 
to become as impartial, and as free from prejudice, 
as 'the lot of humanity will admit. 12 
There is the old story of the layman who was appointed 
to a position in India where he wauld have to pass in 
his official capacity on various matters in 
controversy between natives. Upon consulting a 
legal friend, he was told te use his cammon-sense 
and announce his decisions firmly; in the maJority 
of cases his natural decision as to what was fair and 
reas~nable would suffice. But, his friend added: 
'Never try to give reasons, for they will usually be 
wrong. 13 
1Joseph c. Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgement Intuitive: The 
Function of the 1 Hunuch 1 in Judicial Decisien, 11 Cornell Law 
Quarterly, 14 (1929), 274, 
2Lon L. Fuller, 11The Adversary System," in Talks on American 
Law, Second edition, edited by Harold J. Berman (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1971), p. 47. 
3 John Dewey, 11Logical Method and Law, n Cornell Law QuarcerlY, 
10 (1924), 17. 
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4 When in doubt, do the right thing. 
When we began this discussion of legal argumentation, we 
outlined two issues concerning argument in general: 1. What 
is the nature of a field of argument; and 2. What are the 
implications of legal argumentation for argumentation theory 
in other fields? Having explored the theories of three legal 
scholars, it is now possible to propose a tentative answer to 
these questions, Such a response is best made by indicating 
what guidelines are suggested by this study for use in distin-
guishing fields of study from each other, and by explaining 
how the characteristics that distinguish legal argument from other 
fields ~f argument can aid in the understanding of argument in 
general. Thus, this chapter will suggest that fields of argument 
differ from each other in four basic areas: the goals of the 
field; the conditions of relevance for problems; the forum in 
which argument takes place; and the members of the field. 5 
Specific implications of legal argumentation will be discussed 
within each of these four topics. 
Goals of a Field 
Every field is unified by a goal that both provides guidance 
for argument within a field, and also distinguishes that field 
from other fields. Toulmin notes: 
The crucial element in a collective discipline (we 
I 
4 Paul Porter Doctrine, cited in Walter F. Murphy, Elements of 
Judicial Stracegy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 36, 
5For an alternative view of fields, see Stephen Toulmin, 
Richard Ricke and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc,, 1979), pp. 195-202, 
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have argued) is the recognition of a sufficiently 
agreed goal or ideal, in terms of which common 
outstanding problems can be identified. 6 
Members of a field are unified by some purpose, Their argument 
has iome overall direction or goal: 
••• in other enterprises and fields of argumentation, 
the modes of practical reasoning we expect to find in 
any particular field - in natural science or art 
criticism, in ethical discussion or elsewhere - will 
once again reflect the general purposes and pr,ctical 
demands of the enterprise under consideration. 
The field has some purpose for existing, and the rules of 
argument in that field will reflect the goal of the field. The 
goal of the field will also shape the way the members of the field 
approach the study of the phenomena they are interested in: "The 
activities involved are organized around and directed towards a 
8 specific and realistic set of agreed collective ideals." 
The importance of the goal of a field is illustrated by the 
legal field. Dworkin notes: 
The emphasis on tactics had a more lasting effect 
within the law schools. Scholars like Myres McDougal 
and Harold Lasswell at Yale, and Lon Fuller, Henry 
Hart, and Albert Sachs at Harvard, though different 
from one another, all insisted on the importance of 
regarding the law as an instrument for moving society 
toward certain large goals, and they tried to settle 
questions about the legal process instrumentally, by 
asking which solutions best advanced these goals. 9 
6stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding: The Collective Use 
and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1972), p. 364. 
7Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, p. 200. 
8Toulmin, p, 379, 
9Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 4. 
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Those legal scholars discussed in the first four chapters support 
this conclusion. Levi thus views the goal of law to be providing 
the best balance between stability and change, and his description 
of legal reasoning is designed ta promote chis balance. The 
proponents of stare decisis Justify that decision rule by an 
appeal to the goals that they feel a legal system should have: 
stability, Justice, efficiency, reliance, and certainty. 
Wechsler begins his discussion of neutral principles by examining 
the reasons for (or geal of) Judicial review. Fuller 0ffers his 
guidelines fer an internal morality of law by arguing that the 
goal of a legal system is to'~ubJect human conduct to the gevernance 
of rules. 1110 In all these cases, the guidelines for legal reasoning 
are Justified based on the goal of the field. 
The emphasis on the goal of the field has some interesting 
implications. Since each field has its own set of goals, and the 
warrants for argument are selected in order to further that goal, 
it is possible that some fields may develop rules for argument 
that may not be "rational" in the traditional sense. For example, 
Lord Herschell suggested "Important as it was that people should 
get justice, it was even more important that they should be made 
to feel and see that they were getting it, 1111 This would suggest 
lOLon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969), p. 122. 
11Lord Herschell, quoted in Roscoe Pound, "Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 11 Columbia Law Review, 8 (1908), 606. 
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that he wou1d argue for decision rules that may not be logically 
sound, but that those affected feel are Just. In some cases this 
may require the Judge to be inconsistent or illogical, if by so 
doing those affected think Justice is done. The implication is 
that, in some cases, the goal of a field may not be truth, but may 
be efficiency, the satisfaction of those involved, er other ends. 
One example of a "non-rational" field, fo:i: example, might be 
argument that takes place between friends. The goal (or one goal) 
of this field may not be to discover the truth, but to argue in 
such a way as to enable the relatienship to continue. In this case, 
normally fallacious arguments like hasty generalizations and pest 
hoc arguments may be legitimate (or at least not incorrect) if 
their use does not hinder the goal of the field. Similarly, a 
"sound" argument, if it causes one member to get angry, would run 
against the goal of the field, and thus would be reJected as 
inappropriate by members of that field. 12 The appropriateness of 
any argument, thus, is a function of the goal that members of a 
field share. The goal will vary from field to field, and thus is 
one way to differentiate between fields. 
Once the goal of a field has been determined, this goal is 
utilized by members of a field to help screen out potential information 
and to determine what types of arguments should be heard. This 
screening process suggests a second way that fields differ from 
each other: the condition of relevance. 
12For an example of the cype of rules that may govern such 
a field, see George R. Bach and Peter Wyden, The Intimate Enemy 
(New York· Avon Books, 1968). 
-125-
Conditions of Relevance 
Fields of argument often differ from one another based on 
the conditions each field places on data before that data can 
be said to be relevant to the field. This is not to say the 
actual data will vary from field to field; rather, due to the 
perspective a field has, certain features of the data will be 
highlighted. 
The data in one field will often be the same as the data 
in another field. This is certainly the case in law. Legal 
decisions on segregation have used data on the effects of segre-
gation on education; decisions on abortion draw from data associated 
with biology; and decisions reviewing environmental impact 
statements draw from other scientific fields. Dworkin argues: 
The philosophy of law studies philosophical problems 
raised by the existence and practice of law. It 
therefore has no central core of philosophical problems 
distinct to itself, as other branches of philosephy do, 
but overlaps most of these other branches. Since the 
ideas of guilt, fault, intention, and responsibility 
are central to law, legal philosophy is parasttic upon 
the philosophy of ethics, mind, and action. Since lawyers 
worry about what law should be, and how it should be 
made and administered, legal philosophy is also parasitic 
on political philosophy. Even the debate about the nature 
of the law, which has dominated legal philosophy for some 
decades, is, at bottom, a debate within the philosophy of 
language and metaphysics.13 
The data thus may be the same for law and other fields. It is not 
the data per~ that divides fields of argument from each other, 
rather, the criteria used to determine what data is relevant, 
13R. M. Dworkin, The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 1. 
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what portions of the data should be abstracted out, and what 
data is irrelevant helps distinguish one field from another. 
Toulmin, Reike and Jam.k phrase the question: 11What makes one 
particular set of grounds or facts acceptable and relevant for 
the purposes of this or that specific claim?l4 Even though two 
fields may find that the same data is relevant for both fields, 
the process used to reach that conclusion will vary from one 
field to another, and the criteria of relevance will vary: 
Accordingly, relevance is a subJective matter, to 
be discussed in science by scientists, in law by 
lawyers, and so on. There are very few 'conditions 
of rel~vance' of an entirely general kind that hold 
good in all fields and forums and apply to all types 
of arguments,15 
The criteria of relevance involves two concepts. At the first 
level, it involves abstracting out of the universe of potential 
inputs the relevant information needed to make a decision; in legal 
terms this involves the separation of the ratio from the dicta. 
This means that two observers from different fields will look at 
the same event and view different data: 
The reason why a lawyer does not mention that his client 
wore a white hat when he made a contract, while Mrs. 
Quickly would be sure to dwell upon it along with the 
parcel gilt goblet and the seal-coal fire, is that he 
forsees that the public force will act 6n the same way 
whatever his client had upon his head, 1 
14 Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, p. 34. 
151bid. 
16011.ver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law, 11 Harvard 
Law Review, 10 (1897), 458. 
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Each field must set up some criteria for evaluating what part 
of the data is worth mentioning in an argument. 
The second, and largely neglected, concept implied by the 
criteria of relevance is what issues should the field address? 
Any field is faced withavast array of potential data and claims 
to examine and must make decisions concerning what areas of 
study should be pursued. The legal counterpart to this process 
is the certiorari process, discussed by both Hart and Wechsler. 
The court system cannot decide all cases that arise, so it must 
choose which cases it will hear. Woodward and Armstrong observe: 
The decision to take the case requires that the 
Court note its Jurisdiction or formally grant~-
Under the Court's proceedures, the Justices have 
discretion in selecting which cases they will 
consider. Each year, they decide to hear fewer 
than two hundred of the five thousand cases th~t 
are filed.17 
This means that the standards for evaluating whether or n~t a 
case will be heard are built into the system of legal argument. 
The certiorari policy involves two assumptions. First, 
it assumes that argument takes time. Second> as a result of 
the first assumption, the certiorari process assumes the legal 
system must make choices about which arguments to hear. The 
judicial system must be selective, hearing and deliberating on 
some arguments, while ignoring other arguments. Although "the 
romantic notion that the Supreme Court sits 'to do Justice' in 
17 Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Bretheren (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 2, 
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every case potentially within its Jurisdiction dies hard 11 , 18 
the Supreme Court must make choices on what cases it will hear, 
Prettyman argues: 
Obviously, the Court must deny hearings in all but 
the most exceptional cases, or it will not be able 
properly to exercise its judgement on the Tgrits 
in those cases in which review is granted. 
The Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme 
Court concurred: 
The indispensable condition for the discharge of 
the Court 1 s responsibility is adequate time and ease 
of mind for research, reflection, and consultation 
in reaching a Judgement, for critical review by 
colleagues when a draft opinion is prepared, and for 
clarification and revision in light of all that has 
gone before. 20 
While there is clear agreement on the importance of the certiorari 
decision, the guidelines for certiorari are, as Wechsler suggested, 
unclear. The only codification of the certiorari policy is in the 
U.S. Supreme Court Rule 19. Emphasizing that a writ of certiorari 
is a matter of Judicial discretion, the rule lists a few of the 
conditions that will be considered in granting certiorari: 
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question 
of substance not theretofore determined by this court, 
or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with 
applicable decisions of this court. 
18Felix Frankfurter and Henry M. Hart Jr., "The Business of 
the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933," Harvard Law Review, 48 
(1934), 264. 
19 E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., "Opposing Certiorari 1n the 
United States Supreme Court, 11 Virginia Law Review, 61 (1975), 200. 
20Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme 
Court," Federal Rule., Decisions, 57 (1973), 578. 
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(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision 
in conflict with the decision of another court of 
appeals on the same matter; or has decided an 
important state or territorial question in a way in 
which has not been, but should be, settled by this 
court. 21 
The list of conditions in rule 19 is not comprehensive, nor is 
it meant to be. Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin and Rosen suggest 
that the Supreme Court is influenced by the parties involved, 
the existence of dissention among lower court Judges, and the 
nature of the issues raised. 22 Earp summarized some of the reasons 









the unimportance of the issue; 
the absence of a conflict between the lower court 
opinion and other circuits or prevailing Supreme 
Court precedents; 
the uniqueness of the fact situation or specific 
issue, with the attendant l1kel1hoed that the 
problem will not recur; 
the danger of too narrow or too broad an 
interpretation of the decision; 
the presence of unresolved issues of fact or 
the complexity of the fact situation; 
the inappropriateness of review due to current 
economic, political, or social conditions which 
favor the status quo; 
the unreasonableness of the timing of the petition, 
in light of recent legal developments in the area; 
and, 
the fairness and correctness of the lower court 
decisicms. 23 
21u.s. Supreme Court Rule 19, 28 United States Code Annotated. 
22Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin, and 
Daniel Rosen, "The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue 
Theory," in The Federal Judicial System, edited by Thomas Jahnige 
and Sheldon Goldman (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1968), 
pp. 109-121, esp. p. 115. 
23stephen W. Earp, 11Sovereign Immunity in the Supreme Court: 
Using the Certiorari Process to Avoid Decisionmaking," Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 16 (1976), 911-912. 
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Prettyman24 provides a longer list of 30 reasons for the denial 
of certiorari, although in many cases they overlap. 
At times, the Supreme Court has attempted to articulate 
guidelines governing when they will rule on an issue. The most 
widely cited example of these guidelines is Brandeis' concurring 
decision in Ashwander .Y.• Valley Authority: 
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality 
of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding . . . . 
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it. 1 
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional 
law broader than is required by the precise facts to 
which it is to be applied. 1 
4. The Court will not pass upon a const1tit1onal 
question although properly presented by the record, 1£ there 
is also present some other ground upon which the case may 
be disposed of. 
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute 
upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is inJured 
by its operation. 
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality 
of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself 
of its benefits. 
7. 'When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn 
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality 
is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will 
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.25 
What all these guidelines attempt to do is to establish some obJective 
way to determine which arguments the Court should hear. 
While the certiorari policy may appear to be unique to legal 
argument, the same function must be served in all fields. It is 
impossible to study all knowledge. The field as a field tends to 
24Prettyman, pp. 200-207. 
25 Ashwander .Y.• Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348. 
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emphasize certain types of study over others. Kuhn poses the 
question that faces each scientist: 
On what aspects of nature do scientists ordinarily 
report? What determines their choice? And, since 
most scientific observation consumes much time, 
equipment, and money, what motivates the scientist to 
pursue that choice to a conclusion? 26 
The field must provide guidelines for members of the field to 
follow in determining what avenues of inquiry should be followed: 
A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the 
community from those socially important problems that 
are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they 
cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and 
instrumental tools the paradigm supplies, •.• One 
of the reasons why normal science seems to progress 
so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on 
problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should 
keep them from solving. 27 
The field must develop standards, sometimes unspoken, to determine 
what argument in the field should be encouraged, and what should 
be tabled for future discussion. What experiments are worthwhile? 
What hypotheses should be tested? While this step is critical, it 
is often not articulated, Decisions about what research should be 
funded and what research should be discouraged all will affect 
the growth of the field. At the same time, research that may 
seem insignificant to the field may turn out to be most productive: 
A study of the 'Anti-bacterial Substance in Filtrates 
of Broth' resulted in the first workable penicellin. 
Out of a proJect called' Sex life of the Screwworm' 
26 Thomas S, Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 25. 
271bid., p, 37. 
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came the eradication of a parasite that was destroying 
millions of dollars' worth of cattle every year.28 
Thus, the creation of standards for determining what subJects 
are worth debate can h~nder the flow of scientific knowledge: 
With standards set higher, no one satisfying the 
criterion of rationality would be inclined to try 
out the new theory, to articulate it in ways which 
showed its fruitfulness or displayed its accuracy 
and scope. I doubt that science would survive the 
change. What from one viewpoint may seem the 
looseness and imperfection of choice conceived as 
rules may, when the same criteria are seen as values, 
appear an indispensable means of spreading the risk 
which th19 introduction or support of novelty always 
entails. 
Thus the field is placed in a dilemma: It must develop some 
criteria for determining what arguments are worth arguing, while 
the creation of such a rule will distort the view of realtity 
and perhaps prevent the discovery of useful arguments. 
Perhaps nowhere is this choice more obvious than 1.n academic 
debate, where a portion of the literature is devoted to the discussion 
of the selection of debate topics. The procedure is similar to that 
of Cengress, which must first decide what bills should be discussed 
in a given term, and then it discusses the merits of the legislation. 
I 
Freeley suggests some of the guidelines used by the academic forensics 
community: 
1. Is there evidence of reasonably widespread interest 
1.n the area •••• 
28 Robert A. Barr, "U.S. Research Grants: Butt of Fun and Fury," 
U.S. News & World Report, December 17, 1979, p. 82. 
29Thomas s. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: 
1.n Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago; 
Press, 1977), p. 332. 
Selected Studies 
University of Chicago 
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3. Is the weight of conflicting evidence and reasoning 
approximately equal? 
4. Is most of the evidence available in the cypical 
college library? 
7. Is there a high degree of probability that the 
status quo will not change during the debate season?30 
While these guidelines are directed toward an audience that will 
vote on specific topic, the principle behind them is the same as 
that of the Supreme Court's certiorari policy: the determination 
of what arguments are worth arguing can be as critical as the 
actual argument that takes place. One could not criticize Congress' 
arguments on women's rights in the late 1950 1 s: the problem was 
not that the arguments used by Congress were bad, but rather that 
there were no arguments, Thus, at least one critical variable 
in examining argument in a field is not just analyzing what is 
argued, but to examine how the members of the field determine what 
should be argued. 
Forums 
Fields of argument can also be distinguished from each other 
by examining the forum in which argument takes place within each 
field. O'Keefe distinguishes between two types of argument, which 
he calls argument1 and argument2•31 Argument1 refers to the 
utterance, or the form of an argument. Argumentz refers to an 




J. Freeley, "What are the Criteria of a Good Debate 
Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Speech 
Association, November 11, 1979, pp. 1-6. 
31naniel J. 0 1Keefe, 11Two Concepts of Argument, 11 Journal of 
the American Forensic Associa~ion, 13 (1977), 121-128. 
32see Walter Ulrich, 11A Process View of Argument, 11 Journal 
of Human Interaction, 1 (1978), 38~43. 
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field of argument has a distinct type of argumentative forum. 
Just as Bitzer suggested that each rhetorical action takes place 
in a "rhetorical situation1133 each argument takes place in an 
argumentative forum. Each field develops professional forums 
nwithin which recognized 'reason-producing- procedures are employed 
to Justify the collective acceptance of novel procedures. 1134 
Toulmin, Rieke and Janik suggest: 
The trains of reasoning that it is appropriate to use 
vary from situation to situation. As we move from 
the lunch counter to the executive conference table, 
from the science laboratory to the law courts, the 'forum' 
of discussion changes profoundly. The kind of involvement 
that the participants have with the outcome of the reasoning 
is entirely different in the different situations and so 
also will be the ways in which ~ossible outcomes of the 
argument are tested and Judged, 5 
The importance of the forum of debate to legal argumentation has 
already been alluded to. Levi argues: 
The forum protects tha parties and the community by 
making sure that the competing analogies are before 
the court. The rule which will be created arises out 
of a process in which if different things are to be 
treated as similar, at least the differences have been 
urged. 36 
The forum thus acts to insure that all ideas have their chance in 
a court. Given the importance of the forum of argument, it 1.s 
33Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy 
and Rhetoric, 1 (1968), 1-14. 
34Toulmin, p. 379. 
35Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, p. 7, 
36Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 5. 
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appropriate to examine the nature of the legal forum. 
There are three possible views of the importance of a forum 
in law. First, the forum can be seen as being irrelevant. Second, 
the forum can be viewed as being naturally desirable; and third, 
che forum can be viewed as having a neutral impact on argument. 
The first view suggests that a forum is unnecessary for argument 
to take place, This position is very superficial, since it 
ignores the human nature of argument. In a court, the rules of 
law and facts in a case do not spring into being, rather thay are 
sought after by humans, Discovering the nature of a crime, or the 
prior case law requires effort by individuals, as well as a forum 
for the materiaal to be presented before, This requires that some 
emphasis be placed on the nature of the forum, 
The second view of the forum emphasizes that the nature of 
the forum is also unimportant because it will not effect the outcome 
of an argument. Drawing from the philosophy of advocates of free 
speech, this position suggests that, left alone, the truth will 
emerge within a field. This Mill argues: 
The steady habit of correcting and completing his own 
opinion by collacing it with those of others, so far 
from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into 
practice, is the only stable foundation for a Just 
reliance on it: for, being cognisant of all that can, 
at least obviously, be said against him, and having 
taken up his position against all gainsayers: knowing 
that he has sought for obJections and difficulties, 
instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light 
which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter -
he has a right to think his judgement better than that of 
any_person, or a~7 multitude, who have not gone through a 
similar process. 
37John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in Essential Works of John 
Stuart Mill, edited by Max Lerner (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 272, 
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This view tends to emphasize the marketplace of ideas concept: 
that, left alone, a field will naturally move toward the truth. 38 
This view has a great deal of instrinsic appeal, being tied to 
First Amendment values. 
While the assumption that an unregulated forum does produce 
the truth does have a great deal of support, it is not without 
its critics. 39 Thus Chafee suggests that a number of factors 
may prevent unlimited discussion from producing the truth including 
selective attention, information overload, and unequal distribution 
of access to the media. 40 Windes and Hastings, while advocating 
free speech, note that freedom of speech requires the exchange of 
ideas: 
For in the absence of debate unrestricted utterance leads 
to the degradation of opinion. By a kind of Gresham's 
law the more rational is overcome by the less rational, 
and the options that will prevail will be those which 
are he!d most ardently by those with the most passionate 
will. 4 
38see, for example, Alexander MeikleJohn, Political Freedom 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), Thomas I. Emerson, 
The System of Freedom of Expression (New York. Vintage Books, 
1970), esp. pp. 3-20, and Franklyn S. Haiman, Freedom of Speech 
(Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1976), esp. chapter 
5: ''Why Freedom of Speech: Challenge and Response." 
39see Peter Radcliff, ed., Limits of Liberty: Studies of 
Mill's On Liberty (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1966). 
40 Zechariah·Chafee, Jr., ''Does Freedom of Speech Really Tend 
to Produce Truth," in The Pn.nciples and Practice of Freedom of 
Speech, edited by Haig Bosmajian (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1971), pp. 326-328. 
41Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and 
Advocacy (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 31. 
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What is interesting is that often those with the most vocal support 
of the freedom of speech are t~ose that see a need to regulate 
the forum of communication. Thus in speech, while maintaining 
that restrictions on the content of speech are unJustified, many 
feel that an organized body should follow rules of parliamentary 
procedure, which regulates the forum of debate. Choase notes 
the paradox as it applies to law: 
In a court, it is of utmost importance that the truth 
be discovered. Whatever lawyers s.ay when talking at 
large about freedom of speech, when it comes to their 
own affairs, they display great anxiety when truth 
and falsehood are grappling in a free and open encounter. 
The result is the most highly regulated marketplace for 
ideas imaginable. Who can speak, when they can speak, 
what they can speak about, the order in which people can 
speak, who is allowed to question them, what questions 
can be asked, and much more are all determ~ned by the 
regulations of the court. It is apparent that lawyers 
believe, in their own business, that_it is only through 
a highly controlled marketplace for ideas - that is, 
the absence of free speech as it is generally understood 
- that tru~h can be established. 42 
The importance of the regulation of the forum of legal argument 
leads to the third view of the forum: the importance of the 
regulation of the forum. 
One way to view the importance of the regulation of a forum 
to a field is to view the field as an organization. In ord~r for 
the field to operate, certain regulations are needed to insure the 
43 efficient operation of the organization. In law, the overriding 
42R. H. Choase, "Advertising and Free Speech,n in Advertising 
and Free Speech, edited by Allen Hyman and M. Bruce Johnson 
(Lexington, Hass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1977), p, 7. 
43see, for example, Bobby R. Patton and Kim Griffin, 
Decision-making Group Interaction, second edition (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978). 
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governing principle for the field is the use of the adversary 
process. While there is not a lot of material on che nature 
of the adversary process, 44 there appear to be two Justifications 
for the use of the adversary process. First, the adversary 
process is Justified because it promotes the truth. The American 
Bar Association ProJect on Standards for Criminal Justice notes: 
The adversary system which is central to our administration 
of criminal Justice is not the result of abstract thinking 
about the best means to determine disputed questions of 
law and fact. It is the result, rather, of the slow 
evolution from trial by combat or by champions to a less 
violent form of testing by argument and evidence.45 
While some may argue that many of the characteristics of the 
advocacy system may rese~ble trial by combat,46 the assumption 
behind the adversary system is that it can promote the attainment 
of the truth better than alternative means: 
Two adversaries, approaching the facts from entirely 
different perspectives and objectives and functioning 
within the framework of an orderly and established 
set of rules, will uncover more of the truth than would 
investigators, however industrious and obJective, seeking 
to compose a unified picture of what had occurred.47 
By assigning advocates to represent both sides in a conflict, 
presumably the truth will emerge. 
44Anne Strick, InJustice for All: How our Adversary System 
of Law Victumizes Us and Subverts Justice (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1978), pp. 20-21. 
45American Bar Association ProJect on Standards for Criminal 
Justice, The Prosecution Function and the Defense Function (New 
York: Institute of Judicial Administration, 1971), p. 2, 
46strick, p, 39. 
47George C. Christie, 110bJectivity in the Law," Yale Law 
Journal, 78 (1969), 1329-1330, 
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In addition to the truth-seeking function of the adversary 
process, the adversary process also aids in giving all parties 
involved the impression that they have been treated fairly. 
Christie argues: 
It will be assumed that the primary social purpose 
of the judicial process is deciding disputes in 
a manner that will, upon reflection, permit the 
loser as well as the winner to feel that he has 
been fairly treated. As Professor Fuller has 
contended, this goal requires that courts grant 
the parties the right to present proofs and reasoned 
arguments to them and that the courts squarely 
meet the proofs and rea~oned arguments addressed 
to them by the parties. 48 
Fuller suggests that the Justification for the adversary process 
is 11 to preserve the integrity of society itself. It aims at 
keeping sound and wholesome the procedures by which society 
visits its condemnation on an erring rnember, 1149 The adversary 
process increases the likelihood that a person will feel that 
they have been treated fairly· 
For the accused, a neutral tribunal serves to increase 
his assurance that he will be treated fairly, and tends 
to establish confidence that leads him to stand trial 
rather than flee or otherwise seek to subvert the legal 
process and, if he is found guilty, to accept the 
penalties in a spirit conducive to his rehabilitation. 50 
To insure these goals, several guidelines must be drawn up by the 
members of the field, Ehninger and Brockriede outlined six such 
48Ibid., p. 1329-1330, 
49Fuller, "The Adversary System," p, 39. 
SOAmerican Bar Association ProJect on Standards for Criminal 
Justice, p. 4. 
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guidelines for an advocacy system in general when they argued 
that all parties in an advocacy system must: 
1. Enter the competing views into full and fair 
competition to assess their relative worth. 
2. Let this competition consist of two phases. 
First, set forch each view in its own right, 
together with the most convincing supporting 
proofs. Second, test each view by seeing how 
well it withstands the strongest attacks an 
informed opponent levels against it. 
3. Delay a decision until both sides have been 
presented and subJected to testing. 
4. Let the decision be rendered not by the contending 
parties themselves but by an external adJudicating 
agency, 
5. Let this agency weigh the competing arguments and 
produce a decision critically, 
6, Let the participa~fs agree in advance to abide by 
such a decision. 
One implication of this view of the forum is that there is a clear 
separation between the advocates and the Judge, Each party has a 
distinct function in the advocacy system, which requires different 
rules: 
The philosophy of adJudication that is expressed in 
'the adversary system' is, speaking generally, a 
philosophy that insists on keeping distinct the 
function of the advocate, on the one hand, from 
that of the Judge, or of the Judge from that of Jury, 
on the other. The decision of the case is for the 
judge, or for the Judge and Jury. Thac decision 
must be as obJective and as free from bias as it 
possibly can.52 
This would prescribe certain rules for both the advocate and the 
judge. Simon suggests that there are four principles of conduct 
for the advocate: 
51American Bar Association ProJect on Standards for Criminal 
Justice, p. 4. 
52Fuller, "The Adversary System," p. 34, 
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The first principle of conduce is the principle of 
neutrality, This principle prescribes that the lawyer 
remain detached from his client's ends, •.. 
The second principle of conduct is partianship, 
This principle prescribes that the lawyer work 
aggressively to advance his client's ends ••• , 
(Third) is the principle of procedural Justice. In 
its most general usage, procedural Justice holds 
that the legitimacy of a situation may reside in the 
way it was produced rather than its intrinsic properties. 
(Fourth) is professionalism. In its most general 
usage, the term professionalism refers to the notion 
that social responsibility for the development and 
application of certain political and specialized 
disciplines should be delegated to the practitioners 
of these disciplines,53 
For the Judge, there is a separate, though less articulated 
function. The Judge is to remain neutral and to attempt to avoid 
inJecting his/her biases into the decision. 
While the adversary system is most commonly associated with 
the legal system, its benefits at promoting truth and increasing 
satisfaction has led to calls that it be used in other fields. 
Janis and Mann note: 
A number of experts on the psychology of large 
organizations have called attention to some of 
the procedural implications of management studies 
showing that conflicts and disagreements among the 
members of a decision~making group, including those 
stemming from clashing interests among rival subunits 
within a bureaucracy, can have a constructive effect 
on the quality of the group's search for and analysis 
of alternatives.54 
5 3william H. Simon, "The Ideology of Advocacy• Procedural 
Justice and Professional Ethics," Wisconsin Law Review, 1978 
(1978), 36-38. 
54Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psycholo-
logical Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment (New York: 
The Free Press, 1977), p. 397. 
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They therefore recommend that in all meetings "devoted to 
evaluating policy alternatives, one or more members 'should 
be assigned the role of devil's advocate. 11155 In science, 
Kantrowitz has suggested an adversary proceeding to resolve 
disputes: 
••• when two sides disagreed on a scientific policy 
question, the opponents would be asked to appear 
before a specially constituted panel composed of 
distinguished scientists from fields other than the 
one under dispute, Advocates, who would also be 
publicly supported when necessary, would present 
their arguments to the panel and would actually 
cross-examine each other. The panelists would then 
examine the arguments and publish their Judgement 
on the facts. 5 
While Kantrowitz 1 s suggestion has not received much support, it 
does illustrate that by examining the nature of argumentative 
forums in various fields, suggestions for the modification of 
other fields can be made. 
The legal argumentative field does have a distinct forum 
for argumentation. The emphasis is on the adversary process, 
through which competing views of the nature of the law are presented 
and evaluated, The ultimate decision between views of the law is 
made by a third party, This procedure is Justif~ed both because 
it increases the probability that truth will be found and that 
all concerned will feel that they have been treated fairly. The 
adversary process does, however, rely on human actors, and thus 
raises questions about the nature of the members of the field. 
55 Ibid,, p. 399. 
56 ''Weighing che Evidence," TIME, February 23, 1976, p. 45. 
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Members of a Field 
The final area of distinction between fields consists of 
the members of the fields, Each field consists of a community 
of individuals with similar characteristics, Argument is a human 
activity, involving the interaction of human beings, and thus a 
study of argument should also consider the nature of those involved 
in argument: 
A collective human enterprise takes the form of a 
rationally developed 'discipline', in those cases 
where men's shared commitment to a sufficiently 
agreed set of ideals leads to che development of 
an isolable and self-defining repertory of procedures; 
and where those procedures are open to further 
modification, so as to deal with problems arising 
from the incomplete fulfilment of those disciplinary 
ideals. 57 
Like the legal system, the members of the field fall 1.nto two 
categories, although depending on the field these can overlap, 
The first set of members are the advocates; those that do the 
detailed work and present the arguments to be evaluated: 
A scientific community consists, in this view, of 
the practitioners of a scientific speciality, Bound 
together by common elements 1.n their education and 
apprenticeship, they see themselves and are seen by 
others as the men responsible for the pursuit of a 
set of shared goals, including the training of their 
successors. Such communities are characterized by the 
relative fullness of communication within the group and 
by the relative unanimity of the group's Judgement 1.n 
professional rnatters.58 
57Toulmin, p. 359. 
58 Thomas S. Kuhn, "Second Though_ts on Paradigms," 1.n The 
Structure of Scientific Theories,. edit_ed by Frederick Suppe 
(Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 461. 
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While sharing common views of the field, members advance their 
positions on the specific matter of controversy. In law, there 
are certain guidelines governing the advocates, especially in the 
post-Watergate era. Restrictions are placed on the manner in 
which an advocate can present material, and so on. The legal 
field also has unarticulated standards for the nature of the 
advocate. Jeans suggests that an advocate should have intellectual 
breadth, desire, an active mind, conbativeness, stomach, and 
sensitivity. 59 While the existence of these characteristics is 
not needed for an individual to be a member of the community, 
they do illustrate or provide a prototype for an 11 ideal 11 member of 
the community. Johannesen argues that in other forums similar 
guidelines for the advocates exist. 60 
These guidelines for the arguer are not, in the strictest 
sence, logical in nature. Rather, they are descriptive of desired 
behavior; in Fuller's terminology, they set up a morality of 
aspiration. It is desirab~e that individual advocates attempt to 
understand all the issues; that the advocacy take place in a 
cooperative environment; that the advocates seek the truth, but 
there is no obJective way to measure the subJective motivations 
of the individual arguer. The field can thus create certain 
characteristics for individual advocates to aspire to, but these 
59 James W. Jeans, Trial Advocacy (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company, 1975), pp. 3-7. 
60Richard L. Johannesen, Ethics in Human Communication 
(Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1978), 
pp. 27, 55-56. 
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act merely as goals for advocates. 
A second type of individual (or group of individuals) 1n a 
field's community is the Judge. This individual evaluates the 
arguments that others in the field present. Toulmin notes: 
To the extent that some group of men can be identified 
whose Judgement carries dominant weight with professional 
colleagues in the science concerned, the approval of 
these men does more than anything else to ensure the 
success or failure, not only of new societies, 
Journals, and meetings, but also of new ideas. 61 
The Judges are members of the community, not outside figures. All 
argument within a community is directed ~o members within the 
community, not an outside audience: 
One of the strongest, if still unwritten rules of 
Scientific life is the prohibition of appeals to heads 
of state or to the populace at large in matters 
scientific, Recognition of the existence of a 
uniquely competent professional group and acceptance 
of its role as the exclusive arbiter of professional 
achievements has further implications. 62 
The Judge role may not be centralized in one member. In law, 
for example, in some trials there are bifurcated Juries; one 
jury will "determine guilt or innocence, the other will determine 
the sentence. 
In law, at least a portion of the responsibility of the 
Judge has been to insure that the legal field maintain an image 
61Toulmin, p, 283. 
62Kuhn, Structure, p. 167. 
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Part of the Courtts power, for example, comes from 
the great public respect or even reverence for the 
law. Included here is what might be called the myth 
of a government of laws, not men. This concept, 
although largely true as a sta~ement of the American 
heritage, has never been very satisfactory as a 
realistic and literal description of the political 
process; indeed it would seem better to say that laws 
~re 'made, enforced, and interpreted by men. r63 
A large portion of the power of the Judiciary rests on the mystique 
that surrounds it and the assumption that it operates in a rational 
manner, This may oversimplify the workings of the Court. As 
Wechsler 1 s critics have pointed out, it is often hard, if not 
impossible, to develop neutral principles for evaluating cases. 
One of the most devastatin~ blows to the view of the legal system 
as operating rationally came with the December, 1979 publishing 
64 of The Brethren, by Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong. Dispelling 
the myth that Supreme Court Justices are more rational than mortal 
men, Woodward and Armstrong examined the inside workings of the 
Supreme Court. The picture described is one where decisions are 
are made based on internal court politics and personal dislikes. 
Warren Burger is said to have c0mmented that ''We are the Supreme 
Court and we can do what we want, 1165 and Douglas, when asked how 
he could decide a case when he was too blind to read replied, 
111 1 11 listen and see now the Chief votes and vote the other way. 1166 
63 David L. Grey, "The Supreme Court as a Communicator," 
Houston Law Review, 5 (1968), p. 407. 
64woodward and Armstrong, op. cit. 
65 Ibid., p. 61. 
66 Ibid., p. 391. 
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While at one level this merely illustrates that the Justices may 
not be following the precepts of legal reasoning, as Wechsler 1 s 
critics have observed, it may be hard co develop neutral principles 
to govern the evaluation of argument. Rather than strive for 
ways to develop strict guidelines to govern the ways that argument 
can be evaluated, it may be wise to develop certain values that 
he (or she) should promote: 
The professional Judgements of a 'Supreme Court 
Justice' in any science are never (as we saw) 
totally free, capricious or subJective: no standard, 
well-established procedure can guide the authoritive 
scientist in devising a new intellectual strategy, 
yet he is obliged to stake his own reputatiog on 
the outcome of his intellectual reappraisal. 7 
Thus Miller and Howell, in their response to Wechsler, argued: 
••• neutrality, save on a superficial and elementary 
level, is a futile quest; that it~should be recognized 
as such; and that it is more useful to search for the 
values that can be furthered by the Judicial process 
than for allegedly neutral or impersonal principles 
which operate within that process.68 
The judge should emphasize a commitment to the goals of the field. 
Indeed, many legal scholars argue that an understanding of the 
nature of the human condition is more important for a good Judge 
than the following of the standards of "correct" legal reasoning. 69 
67Toulmin, p. 502. 
68 Arthus S, Miller and Ronald F. Rowell, "The Myth of Neutrality 
in Constitutional AdJudication," University of Chicago Law Review, 
27 (1960), 661. 
69see Holmes, op. cit., pp. 457-478, Pound, op. cit., 
pp. 605-623., Karl N. Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons about how Statutes are co be 
Construed," Vanderbilt Law Review, 3 (1950), 395-406, Louis D. 
Brandeis, "The Living Law, 11 Illinois Law Review, 10 (1916), 
461-471, and Hutchenson, op. cit., pp. 274-288. 
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Fuller would emphasize that a Judge emphasize the possibility 
that an individual be able to follow the law, and thus the Judge 
should emphasize those values that enable individuals to be able 
70 to be governed by rules. Similar guidelines may exist in other 
fields. Janis and Mann, for example, would suggest that a policy-
maker follow seven principles: 
The decision maker, to the best of his ability and 
within his information-processing capabilities: 
1. thoroughly canvasses a wide range of alternative 
courses of action; 
2. surveys the full range of obJectives to be fulfilled 
and the values implicated by the choice; 
3. carefully weighs whatever he knows about the costs 
and risks of negative consequences, as well as the 
positive consequences, that could flow from each 
alternative; 
4. intensively searches for new information relevant to 
further evaluation of the alternatives; 
5. correctively assimilates and takes account of any new 
information or expert Judgement to which he is 
exposed, even when the information or Judgement does 
not support the course of action he initially prefers; 
6. reexamines the positive and negative consequences of 
all known alternatives, including those originally 
regarded as unacceptable, before making a final 
choice; 
7. makes detailed provisions for implementing or 
executing the chosen course of action, with special 
attention to contingency plans that might b71required 
if various known risks were to materialize. 
While these are not rules of logic, they serve as standards for 
behavior, or procedures to be followed by a decisionmaker. The 
implication is that many fields, including law, set up certain 
standards of behavior for members of the field which act as 
constraints on the decision-making behavior. 
70see Fuller, The Morality of Law. 
71Janis and Mann, p. 11. 
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The four characteristics of a field help us to compare one 
field to another. In some cases two fields will differ in all 
four areas, while in other cases two fields may differ in only a 
few areas. This suggests that these four characteristics may 
not have equal weight in d1st1nghishing between fields, 
If two types of argument differ across all four characteristics 
- that is - they are aimed at different goals, use different 
criteria for determining relevance, use different forums, and 
have a distinct membership - then the two types of argument can 
be considered to be in different fields. When two types of 
argument share only one or two of chese characteristics, the 
problem of determining if they are in the same field is a little 
more complex. The same individuals may belong to two or more 
fields. 
Similarly, the same forum can be shared by two or more 
fields (for example, some newspapers are part of the forum for 
the fields of economics, sociology, and political science). It 
would appear that the first two characteristics of a field - its 
goal and its criteria for relevance - distinguishes one field from 
another, The criteria for relevance can also help us discover 
subfields within a field unified by one goal. The last two 
characteristics help us to compare two fields, and perhaps to 
discover subfields. 
Other Implications of Legal Argument 
While several implications of legal argument for a general 
theory of argumentation have been mentioned throughout this study, 
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two should be highlighted. First, legal a~gument may serve as 
a paradigm for argument for other fields. By combining both 
inductive and deductive reasoning, Levi has outlined a type of 
reasoning that has implications for other fields. The analogy 
to Kuhn's view of the philosophy of science has already been 
mentioned.7 2 Lichtman, Rohrer and Misner develop a similar model 
for policy analysis. 73 The pattern is simple: past events are 
observed, and similarities and differences are observed. From 
this, a general classificatory scheme is developed that would 
include the ilIUilediate event that the arguer is attempting to 
classify. Wechsler would carry this one step further and require 
chat the arguer at least consider the implications of the classi-
fication of future decisions. 74 
The nature of the individual events (or precedents) will vary 
from field to field. In some cases, each precedent will consist 
of both a decision and a result. For example, in public policy, 
a policymaker may look at past actions and their results and 
note that certain policies have had certain desirable results 
while others have had certain undesirable results. In deciding a 
future policy, the decisionmaker would attempt to find common themes 
72 See Chapter II. 
73Allan J. Lichtman, Daniel M. Rohrer, and Joseph Misner, 
"The Role of Emperical Evidence in Debate· A Systems Approach," 
in Advanced Debate· Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching, 
second edition, edited by David A. Thomas (Skokie, Illinois: 
National Textbook Company, 1979), pp. 272-286. 
74 See Chapter IV. 
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for past failures and atcempt to show that the proposed policy 
does not have the same characteriscics, while sharing the 
characteristics of successful policies. The process will be 
ongoing; as new data comes in the classification system will 
change. 
Legal argument also aids 1n the guidance of futu~e study. 
By emphasizing possible ways that the data can be interpreted, 
it emphasizes ways to test one classification scheme against 
another. For example, if one discovers that an individual behaves 
in a certain way whenever you see him, there are several conclusions 
one could draw: 1) the person behaves that way at all times; 
2) that person behaves that way whenever he sees you; 3) the 
person behaves that way the time of day you see him; and so on. 
Each scheme explains the behavior of the individual, Just as 
several principles may govern a set of legal case. To determine 
the most accurate description, the observer would isolate a 
prediction that one theory would predict, but not another, and 
see if the prediction is accurate. 
The final implication of legal argumentation is the importance 
of the articulation of reasons for Judgement. One of the 
restrictions placed on a Judge is that the Judge be required to 
articulate the reasons for the decision. As Wechsler has observed, 
this would place some constraints on the Judge. Leflar notes: 
One function that is recognized both by detached 
students of the Judicial process and by opinion 
writers themselves is that the necessiry for 
preparing a formal opinion assures some measure 
of thoughtful review of the faxts in a case and 
of the law's bearing upon them. Snap Judge~encs 
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and lazy preferences for armchair cheorizing 
as against library research and time-consuming cerebral 
efforts are somewhat minimized.75 
The act of Justifying a decision explains to the advocates the 
reason for decision and also allows chem to modify their 
positions in subsequent arguments. To a degree, it also high-
lights the separation of the Judge from the advocate. The 
Judge must address the arguments made by the advocates, but the 
decision is more of an evaluation of the arguments and che weighing 
of the positions, as opposed to the initiation of new arguments, 
although sometimes the line between the two positions is not clear. 
By the attempt to explain to both parties why the decision went 
the way it did the judge attempts to leave both parties satisfied. 
Conclusion 
The study of legal argumentation can lead to a vast number 
of implications for the student of argument, only some of which 
have been discussed in this study. Consistent with Toulmin's 
theory of reasoning, the legal community would appear to be a 
distinct field of argument, although it has some similarities 
to other fields. The maJor characteristics of legal argument 
that distinguish it from the other fields are ~ts goals, its 
standard for relevance of argument, the forum in which its 
argument takes place in, and the nature of its community. All 
of these characteristics have some importance for the study of 
argumentation. 
75Robert A. Leflar, "Some·observations Concerning JudicLal 
Opinions," Columbia Law Review, 61 (1961), 810. 
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The goal of a field will also affect the type of argument 
that takes place. While many f1elds may seek the understanding 
of a specific branch of knowledge, other considerations may also 
enter into the argument. A field may view ocher goals as being 
more important, such as Justice, efficiency, or sensitivity to an 
individual, and thus may develop rules that may not be "rational" 
in the traditional sense. The standard of relevance answers 
the question what items should be argued. In a world with a large 
number of potential arguments, choices must be made, and a field 
must develop criteria for making those choices. While the Supreme 
Court's certiorari policy is one way of addressing the problem, 
other fields may want to develop more precise guidel1nes. 
The forum in which an argument takes place is also critical. 
Argument does not take place in a vacuum; rather it involves 
human beings in a specific argumentative situation. The specific 
characteristics of that situation can influence the willingness of 
individuals to argue, the amount of information open to the arguers, the 
amount of time available for each individual to argue, and many other 
elements important to argument. Law, through the adversary system, 
provides one such forum for argument, but many others exist, 
It may will be productive for future scholars to examine bath 
the common features of argumentative forums, as well as those 
characteristics that encourage productive arguments. 
The members of che field are also an importanc part of the 
argumentative situation. All members of the communicy tend to 
share certain values and goals, A field may also create certain 
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standards of excellence; a morality of aspiration, for the 
members of the field. Since the members often have discretion 
about how to argue and how to evaluate argument, certain goals 
are provided and scandards of conduct are provided for members 
of the field. Again, it may be desirable for other fields to 
articulate the prototype advocate and Judge of that field, 
The four characteristics of a field help us to compare one 
field to another. The first two characteristics - the goal of a 
field and the crLteria for relevance - help us to distinguish 
one field of argument from another. The last two characteristics 
- the forum of the field and the field's membership - help us 
to compare two fields, 
Finally, the format of legal argument can be applied to 
some other fields, both the form (the moving classification system) 
and the forum (the advocacy system). The requirement that the 
Judge articulate reasons for a decision can also aid other fields 
in placing check on'decisions. 
Since the time of Aristotle, law and speech have been 
interconnected, Unfortunately, law has developed an image of its 
own, as a super-rational system that overlooks many of the 
' 
discretionary aspects of Justice. While some aspects of the 
legal system place restrictions on the decision, such as the 
adversary system, the use of the decision, and~ decisis, it 
still has elements of the irrational. Perhaps argumentation 
theory should learn from law that total absence of discretion and 
values in argument is neither possible or desirable, and rather we 
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should emphasize the forum in which argument takes place, the 
people who argue, and the restraints (though not total) on 
discretion in an argumentative situation. 
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